From: "Rich Gauszka" 

The full article  by Army Lt. Col. Paul Yinling ( deputy commander, 3rd
Armored Calvary Regiment )   is an interesting read.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198

Failures of Generalship in Iraq

America's generals have repeated the mistakes of Vietnam in Iraq. First,
throughout the 1990s our generals failed to envision the conditions of
future combat and prepare their forces accordingly. Second, America's
generals failed to estimate correctly both the means and the ways necessary
to achieve the aims of policy prior to beginning the war in Iraq. Finally,
America's generals did not provide Congress and the public with an accurate
assessment of the conflict in Iraq.

Despite paying lip service to "transformation" throughout the
1990s, America's armed forces failed to change in significant ways after
the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In "The Sling and the
Stone," T.X. Hammes argues that the Defense Department's
transformation strategy focuses almost exclusively on high-technology
conventional wars. The doctrine, organizations, equipment and training of
the U.S. military confirm this observation. The armed forces fought the
global war on terrorism for the first five years with a counterinsurgency
doctrine last revised in the Reagan administration. Despite engaging in
numerous stability operations throughout the 1990s, the armed forces did
little to bolster their capabilities for civic reconstruction and security
force development. Procurement priorities during the 1990s followed the
Cold War model, with significant funding devoted to new fighter aircraft
and artillery systems. The most commonly used tactical scenarios in both
schools and training centers replicated high-intensity interstate conflict.
At the dawn of the 21st century, the U.S. is fighting brutal, adaptive
insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, while our armed forces have spent the
preceding decade having done little to prepare for such conflicts.

Having spent a decade preparing to fight the wrong war, America's generals
then miscalculated both the means and ways necessary to succeed in Iraq.
The most fundamental military miscalculation in Iraq has been the failure
to commit sufficient forces to provide security to Iraq's population. U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) estimated in its 1998 war plan that 380,000
troops would be necessary for an invasion of Iraq. Using operations in
Bosnia and Kosovo as a model for predicting troop requirements, one Army
study estimated a need for 470,000 troops. Alone among America's generals,
Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki publicly stated that
"several hundred thousand soldiers" would be necessary to
stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. Prior to the war, President Bush promised to
give field commanders everything necessary for victory. Privately, many
senior general officers both active and retired expressed serious
misgivings about the insufficiency of forces for Iraq. These leaders would
later express their concerns in tell-all books such as "Fiasco"
and "Cobra II." However, when the U.S. went to war in Iraq with
less than half the strength required to win, these leaders did not make
their objections public.

Given the lack of troop strength, not even the most brilliant general could
have devised the ways necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. However,
inept planning for postwar Iraq took the crisis caused by a lack of troops
and quickly transformed it into a debacle. In 1997, the U.S. Central
Command exercise "Desert Crossing" demonstrated that many postwar
stabilization tasks would fall to the military. The other branches of the
U.S. government lacked sufficient capability to do such work on the scale
required in Iraq. Despite these results, CENTCOM accepted the assumption
that the State Department would administer postwar Iraq. The military never
explained to the president the magnitude of the challenges inherent in
stabilizing postwar Iraq.

...
This article began with Frederick the Great's admonition to his officers to
focus their energies on the larger aspects of war. The Prussian monarch's
innovations had made his army the terror of Europe, but he knew that his
adversaries were learning and adapting. Frederick feared that his generals
would master his system of war without thinking deeply about the
ever-changing nature of war, and in doing so would place Prussia's security
at risk. These fears would prove prophetic. At the Battle of Valmy in 1792,
Frederick's successors were checked by France's ragtag citizen army. In the
fourteen years that followed, Prussia's generals assumed without much
reflection that the wars of the future would look much like those of the
past. In 1806, the Prussian Army marched lockstep into defeat and disaster
at the hands of Napoleon at Jena. Frederick's prophecy had come to pass;
Prussia became a French vassal.

Iraq is America's Valmy. America's generals have been checked by a form of
war that they did not prepare for and do not understand. They spent the
years following the 1991 Gulf War mastering a system of war without
thinking deeply about the ever changing nature of war. They marched into
Iraq having assumed without much reflection that the wars of the future
would look much like the wars of the past. Those few who saw clearly our
vulnerability to insurgent tactics said and did little to prepare for these
dangers. As at Valmy, this one debacle, however humiliating, will not in
itself signal national disaster. The hour is late, but not too late to
prepare for the challenges of the Long War. We still have time to select as
our generals those who possess the intelligence to visualize future
conflicts and the moral courage to advise civilian policymakers on the
preparations needed for our security. The power and the responsibility to
identify such generals lie with the U.S. Congress. If Congress does not
act, our Jena awaits us.

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