From: "Mark" 

Eh, I'm not really in the mood to read a liberal laundry list of all the
weak points that they perceive Bush not to be covering. I doubt things are
perfect, but am sure they're not as dire as described either. It seems to
me they come from the point of view of "Iraq was wrong and we'll die
because our chemical plants would be safe if we hadn't gone into the 'wrong
war, wrong time, wrong place'"

It's the same old 9/10 "defense" mind-set, one I strongly disagree with
. We can't make every factory, every bus
station, every train station, everything everywhere secure -- rather we
have to take them out before they get here, and we're doing a damn good job
of it too.

"Rich Gauszka"  wrote in message
news:43c704b5$1{at}w3.nls.net...
>
> "Mark"  wrote in message
news:43c701cf$1{at}w3.nls.net...
>> No problem Rich. Get em all! I do agree that different instances will
>> have different repurcussions based on the underlying fact set, but it is
>> not up to those that have the information to take it upon themselves to
>> decide what is damaging and what isn't.
>>
>>
>
> The start of the link below also has a good history of secrecy policies
> from the attack on New York   ( the one in 1916 )
>
> http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=36889
>
> Consider, for example, the administration's approach to dealing with the
> serious homeland security threat posed by the storage of dangerous toxic
> chemicals. Industrial manufacturing facilities storing acutely toxic
> chemical - such as chlorine gas, ammonia, and cyanide - present a
> potentially enormous and devastating opportunity for terrorists. The EPA
> has estimated that at least 123 plants store toxic chemicals that, if
> released through explosion, mishap or terrorist attack, could result in
> deadly toxic vapor plumes that would put more than 1 million people at
> risk. The U.S. Army Medical Department's worst-case estimate for a
> terrorist attack on a chemical plant is that it would lead to about 2.5
> million deaths.
>
> The location of these sites is not a genuine secret. Some are not far away
> from where we are now. Let me show them to you. [Show slides]
>
> There are practical steps that, if taken, could minimize or eliminate
> these threats. The facilities could substitute less toxic alternatives for
> their most acutely hazardous ingredients. They could convert to
> "just-in-time" manufacturing, whereby the most highly toxic
molecules are
> synthesized immediately before use rather than synthesized separately and
> stored in bulk reserve. Or they can reduce storage volumes of the most
> acutely toxic chemicals.
>
> And originally, risk reduction was the administration's strategy. They
> planned to inspect the worst facilities to ensure that practical and
> necessary steps to reduce unnecessary risk and to ensure public safety had
> been undertaken.
>
> But after receiving intense pressure from the chemical industry, the
> administration backed down, settling for voluntary efforts by the industry
> to strengthen site security. Under this plan, plants may build stronger
> fences or add guard dogs - measures that do nothing to eliminate the
> target or reduce the risk of catastrophic accident.
>
> Because the EPA is not even requiring that companies report to the
> government the steps they have voluntarily taken at their facilities, the
> government lacks needed information about the extent to which the dangers
> at these sites have been reduced.
>
> And thanks to new secrecy provisions enacted at the administration's
> request, people living immediately adjacent to these potential targets
> know less than ever about what is going on behind the chain-link fences.
> Therefore, local citizens who might be affected are less able or likely to
> demand corrective action.
> Are we more secure trying to conceal the fact that any one of the 123
> chemical plants around the country could endanger a million or more people
> if attacked? Or are we better off informing the public so that they can
> demand that the risk of terrorist incidents or catastrophic accidents be
> reduced at those plants?
>
> Are we more secure trying to conceal that U.S. customs inspectors are only
> able to examine 1 to 2 percent of the shipping containers entering the
> United States?
>
> Or are we better off informing the public so that they can demand that the
> inspection process be improved by identifying vulnerable loading docks and
> tracking the movement and condition of each container from the point of
> origin to its arriving destination?
>
> Are we more secure trying to conceal the Department of Energy's plan to
> ship high-level nuclear waste within a mile of congressional office
> buildings? Or are we better off letting the public know so that they can
> demand new routes or storage solutions that don't put the Capitol at risk?
>
> We should think about these questions in an historical context. Over the
> last century our nation has become a superpower. We have achieved our
> success by creating a system of government premised not on secrecy but on
> accountability, openness ingenuity and debate.
>
> We live in a society awash in information. Google, the most popular search
> engine, catalogues more than 3 billion web pages. But even Google misses
> most of it - Wired magazine recently reported that there are likely in
> excess of 1 trillion pages freely available on the Internet. In this kind
> of environment it becomes clear that it is analysis, not access, which
> often creates a strategic advantage.
>
> In the face of these changes, we can choose to turn inward - but we do so
> at our own peril. There are solutions to the complex problems of the new
> century, solutions that will make all of us safer and more secure. But
> they won't be solved by a small group of insiders. They will be solved by
> all of us, working together, challenging each other and holding each other
> accountable.
>
> That way, when we win the fight, we will still have an America that is
> worth fighting for.
>
>

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