From: "Rich Gauszka" 

I agree that Jefferson's statement had nothing to do with judicial review.
I mentioned it only in the content that he saw the necessity of change.


"Gary Britt"  wrote in message
news:4415844a{at}w3....
> I'd say you are wrong.  1.  Jefferson's statement contemplates the
> GOVERNED
> and NOT judges would make these new constitutions every 20 years, and 2.
> The
> whole concept of wanting a sunset law on the constitution and its
> amendment
> and re-adoption by the GOVERNED (NOT judges) every 20 years ASSUMES the
> constitution was not subject to change by evolving thought or judges,
> otherwise there would be absolutely no need to formally change it, if he
> was
> arguing for JUDGES changing it by fiat due to evolving thought.
>
> Gary
>
> "Rich Gauszka"  wrote in message
> news:4414f9dd$1{at}w3....
>> While I make no claims of reading Jefferson's mind I would suspect his
>> motive was that a Constitution shouldn't just be mindlessly memorized and
>> followed with fundamentalist zeal. I agree his approach could cause a bit
> of
>> chaos though 
>>
>>
>> "Mark"  wrote in message
news:4414f75f$1{at}w3....
>> > "James Madison, Jefferson's contemporary, found comfort
in knowing that
>> > the
>> > populace would not be thrust into political turmoil every 20 years, and
>> > noted that the way the Constitution is now structured, it implies an
>> > acceptance of the status quo unless explicitly changed."
>> >
>> > Madison was right. Sheesh, Jefferson wanted to allow changes the
>> > constitution for each and every generation? I shudder at the thought.
> The
>> > amendment process is more than sufficient. > > wanting to rely on some clowns in some other country to determine
> his/her
>> > ruling continues to be ridiculous>
>> >
>> >
>> > "Rich Gauszka"  wrote in message
> news:4414eb3b{at}w3....
>> >>
>> >> "Gary Britt"  wrote in
message news:4414e2e9$1{at}w3....
>> >>> One could, but that wouldn't be constitutional. 
Evolving thought is
>> >>> supposed to build a groundswell of support so that amending the
>> >>> constitution is possible.  Only by amending the
constitution can the
>> >>> citizens express by their votes a new or revised
social compact that
> is
>> >>> embodied in the constitution.  Only in this manner
does this social
>> >>> compact known as the constitution have the
affirmative commitment of
> the
>> >>> governed to bind themselves and their posterity to the change.
>> >>>
>> >>> Change implemented in any other matter is not constitutionally
>> >>> derived
>> >>> from the consent of the governed as is required by our founding
>> >>> documents, and is therefore government deriving its
powers by fiat
>> >>> and
>> >>> dictatorship versus the consent of the governed.
>> >>>
>> >>> Gary
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>
>> >> Even the founders had a problem with stagnation
>> >>
>> >> http://www.usconstitution.net/consttop_newc.html
>> >> There have been many proposals for substantial change to the
>> >> Constitution. Thomas Jefferson himself was wary of the power of the
> dead
>> >> over the living in the form of an unchanging
Constitution. To ensure
> that
>> >> each generation have a say in the framework of the government, he
>> >> proposed that the Constitution, and each one following it, expire
>> >> after
>> >> 19 or 20 years. James Madison, Jefferson's contemporary,
found comfort
> in
>> >> knowing that the populace would not be thrust into
political turmoil
>> >> every 20 years, and noted that the way the Constitution is now
>> >> structured, it implies an acceptance of the status quo unless
> explicitly
>> >> changed.
>> >>
>> >> -------------------------------------------------------------
>> >>
>> >> I'm not saying to change it on a whim. Judicial review is not new
> process
>> >> that just popped up as some would make it out to be. I suspect that
>> >> one
>> >> of your ancestors argued against it 200 years ago. 
>> >>
>> >>
> http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/rcah/html/ah_048800_judicialrevi.
htm
>> >> Exercised by both the state and federal judiciary,
judicial review is
>> >> most identified with the U.S. Supreme Court. Although the
Constitution
>> >> does not expressly provide for judicial review, the
Founding Fathers
>> >> anticipated that the Court would exercise some control
over the other
>> >> branches of government. Chief Justice John Marshall's
famous assertion
> of
>> >> judicial review in Marbury v. Madison (1803) was not a
brash departure
>> >> but a crystallization of a nascent tradition.
>> >>
>> >> The disparity between the Court's claims and its actions attracted
> little
>> >> comment until the 1890s, when James Thayer published an
article that
>> >> moved the issue of judicial restraint to the center of
constitutional
>> >> debate. He argued that the Constitution has a range of possible
> meanings
>> >> and that the Court should void only those acts of the national
> government
>> >> that are beyond the pale of permissible meaning. Whenever
it voids an
> act
>> >> that is not "clearly mistaken," it is
overturning an interpretation
> that
>> >> a coequal branch of government prefers and substituting an
> interpretation
>> >> it prefers. Nondeferential review, he concluded, is discretionary
>> >> lawmaking that usurps the executive and legislative functions.
>> >>
>> >> After Thayer, judicial review began to be conceived as a device by
> which
>> >> nine unaccountable officials impose their opinions upon the nation.
> With
>> >> the rise of pragmatic jurisprudence and legal realism in the early
>> >> twentieth century, the view that judges make law when
they interpret
> the
>> >> Constitution became a truism. And the central issue of
judicial review
>> >> has become what, if anything, justifies their doing so. The Court
>> >> responded by engaging in restrained or active review according to
>> >> principles first sketched by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in United
> States
>> >> v. Carolene Products Co. (1938). Those principles spurned active
>> >> review
>> >> except when necessary to guard freedoms specifically
protected by the
>> >> Bill of Rights, rights considered fundamental to the functioning of
>> >> the
>> >> political process, or the rights of "discrete and
insular" minority
>> >> groups. Under these principles, the Court began in Brown
v. Board of
>> >> Education of Topeka (1954) a course of review that
changed the face of
>> >> American society by enforcing the civil rights of
minority groups and
> the
>> >> poor and enlarging the civil liberties of all citizens. This course
>> >> frequently required the judiciary to impose remedial measures that
>> >> redirected the activities of the states. Indeed, in the
"one person,
> one
>> >> vote" decisions that followed Baker v. Carr (1962), the Court
>> >> remodeled
>> >> state government itself.
>> >>
>> >> These developments provoked controversy, which coalesced around the
>> >> Court's defense of the unenumerated right of privacy in Griswold v.
>> >> Connecticut (1965) and its development into the right to
an abortion
>> >> in
>> >> Roe v. Wade (1973). Because of the controversy, and eight years of
>> >> conservative Republican appointments, the Court in the mid-1980s
> reversed
>> >> its course and began to abandon the Carolene Products model of
>> >> judicial
>> >> review. In its place, the Court has claimed to be
developing a model
>> >> of
>> >> judicial review premised upon judicial restraint. The new Court has
> said
>> >> it will defer to the decisions of democratically
accountable officials
>> >> and overturn only those acts that clearly violate specific
> constitutional
>> >> text or traditions. Yet the Court's protection of
property rights in
>> >> Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) and its
condemnation of
> a
>> >> municipal affirmative action plan in City of Richmond v.
J. A. Cronson
>> >> Co. (1989) intimated more active review of some
constitutional claims.
>> >> Thus it is unclear whether the Court's recent rulings portend a
>> >> triumph
>> >> of judicial restraint or merely another shift in the
focus of judicial
>> >> activism.
>> >>
>> >> Judicial review, then, remains firmly established but subject to
>> >> limitations. The controversies over judicial review may be
>> >> interminable
>> >> because, as Robert McCloskey pointed out, they attempt to resolve
>> >> America's contradictory commitment to popular sovereignty and
> judicially
>> >> enforceable fundamental law.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >
>> >
>>
>>
>
>

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