PART 2 - Corporate entities
There can be no conspiracy, for purposes of civil rights conspiracy
statute, between or among corporation and its agents or employees.
Nieto v. United Auto Workers Local 598, E.D.Mich.1987, 672 F.Supp. 987
Conspiracy requirement of this section could not be met by conspiracy
within single corporate entity.
Wintz v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, D.C.N.Y.1982,
551 F.Supp 1323
In regard to this section's requirement of a conspiracy between "two
or more persons," such requirement is not met where a conspiracy is
alleged to have occurred among a corporation and its directors, all of
whom acted solely within their official capacities, or where a
conspiracy is alleged to have been perpetrated by a union and its
officials.
Legal Aid Soc. v. Association of Legal Aid Attorneys of City of New York,
D.C.N.Y.1982, 554 F.Supp 758
Intracorporate conspiracy doctrine barred claims under federal civil
rights conspiracy statute against school administrators for allegedly
agreeing with each other and with school counselors to disregard state
law by not reporting to Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) a teacher who allegedly sexually abused female
students; administrators could only have conspired to cover up or
conceal teacher's conduct within their official capacities as school
administrators.
Doe v. Board of Educ. of Hononegah Community High School Dist. No. 207,
N.D.Ill.1993, 833 F.Supp 1366
If defendant corporations were, for all intents and purposes,
interchangeable, there could be no conspiracy between them, actionable
under this section.
Thomas v. Rohner-Gehrig & Co., D.C.Ill.1984, 582 F.Supp 669
Defense that single corporation and its employees cannot conduct
conspiracy did not shield transit authority's supervisory employees
from potential liability in civil rights action based on alleged
conspiracy to arrest minority subway passengers, where passengers
alleged series of separate discriminatory acts by transit authority
and its agents and alleged that each supervisor possessed independent,
personal conspiratorial purposes.
Yeadon v. New York City Transit Authority, S.D.N.Y.1989, 719 F.Supp. 204
Mortgage lender was not liable in suit alleging that policies and
practices of lender and its employees constituted racially
discriminatory conspiracy under % 1985; there were no allegations that
any acts were outside scope of employment so as to bring case within
exception to rule that corporations cannot conspire with its agents.
Steptoe v. Savings of America, N.D.Ohio.1992, 800 F.Supp. 1542
[cont]
--- FMail/386 1.0g
(1:2629/124)
---------------