James wrote:
> On Mon, 21 Mar 2005 21:57:09 GMT, Dustbin
>  wrote:
>
>
>>James wrote:
>>
>>>On Mon, 21 Mar 2005 11:26:21 GMT, Dustbin
>>> wrote:
>
>
> [...]
>
>>>>"Fourthly, the implication that the family
>>>>history study is indicative of a genetic
>>>>predisposition is entirely invalid. We have been
>>>>debating nature vs nurture for well over a
>>>>century. The very reason that the subject has
>>>>been so fraught with difficulty is because it is
>>>>- and remains - virtually impossible to tease
>>>>apart the genetic and social components. Thus,
>>>>any genetic component cannot be assumed from the
>>>>Trupti Patel family history study either in the
>>>>Trupti Patel case, or in other cases.
>>>
>>>
>>>Huh?   You're dismissing the case for genetic predisposition in a
>>>simple sentence?
>>>
>>
>>I must confess that I was crediting you with
>>knowing a little about the subject. The argument
>>for/against genetic predisposition has raged for
>>decades. I didn't think I would have to provide
>>evidence for one of the most vigorous debates of
>>the twentieth century.
>
>
> I suppose it's only fair to reply to the rest of your post.   It was
> prohibitively lengthy, however.  Let's try to keep the points brief.
> Rather than expressing my ignorance about the subject, I was
> questioning how you wanted to waive genetic predisposition for some
> assumed social imperative to kill one's infants.
>
Firstly, sorry for getting back to this over a
day later. I thought you had dropped me for
having a go at you.

Secondly, I find it necesary to press the points
by substantial argument because you do not seem
to understand.

I don't understand what you mean about me
wanting to waive genetic predisposition to kill.

I don't want to waive it. My point is only that
it *could* be. You see, my objection to this
whole thing is that *if* you can have a genetic
predisposition for the one thing (the tendency
in the child to die) you can have the genetic
predisposition for the other (the tendency in
the mother to kill).

Yes, the tendency is assumed as you suggest. But
that does not prohibit it. Also, even in the
face of a family history study there us still a
degree of assumption in the results used.
>
>
> [...]
>
>>>>"Fifthly, even if a genetic predisposition is
>>>>assumed there is no evidence whatsoever from the
>>>>Trupti Patel study that distinguishes that there
>>>>is a genetic predisposition in the children to
>>>>die. E.g. As much as a genetic predisposition of
>>>>the children to spontaneously die it might
>>>>equally be a genetic predisposition of the
>>>>mother to kill. Psychiatrists are very fond of
>>>>using genetic predisposition to explain people's
>>>>behaviour. Why is it that when it comes to
>>>>getting a female off the hook no one considers
>>>>that the genetic predisposition might be in the
>>>>mother rather than in the child? Most
>>>>importantly, this would also follow in the
>>>>family for exactly the same reason that the
>>>>genetic predisposition to spontaneously die would.
>>>
>>>
>>>There's your problem - "might" - as in "...it
_might_ equally be a
>>>genetic predisposition of the mother to kill."   And now
you're ready
>>>to tip a wink at genetic disposition to behaviour - something vastly
>>>more shakey than physical genetic traits.
>>
>>Absolutely. The whole thing is insubstantial; it
>>is riddled with might this; might that; and
>>might the other. This is whyI am saying that the
>>appeals should have failed; there is no
>>substantial evidence to undermine the original
>>verdict. It is all weak.
>
>
> I see your point, about the strength of argument necessary to overturn
> a verdict, rather than sway one in the first place.   The central
> point, of course, is a "fact" said by an "expert"
was no such thing.
>
You are right. The *fact* that Meadow offered is
no longer *fact*. My problem is that the
evidence that was offered is not the right
evidence to undermine Meadow's position.

A argument based on a supposed genetic
predispostion - as was the case for Trupti
Patel's appeal is not an argument of substance.
The correct argument - in my view - should have
been the baceria and gas argument.

>
>>Your point then would be that a genetic
>>predisposition to die (a physical fault) would
>>be much more plausible than a genetic
>>predisposition to kill (shakey as you put it).
>>
>>Well, James, you might be horrified to hear
>>that. in the twentieth century, tens of
>>thousands of people were locked up in this
>>country on the basis of the psychiatrist's
>>belief that genetic predispositions govern
>>behaviour. Also, I have heard someone say on
>>television in the last few years that crime and
>> mental illness are genetic.
>
>
> Could be true... one needs look no further than the ruling classes.
> Of course, much of that could be put down to inbreeding, but where
> does one separate inbreeding and intrinsic genetic disfunction.
>
Agreed. There is no doubt about the problems
that can arise where inbreeding is concerned. A
number of studies of the Amish people in USA are
interesting in this respect. But, I don't think
there is an inbreeding question involved here.
For Trupti Patel it is purely a matter of a
genetic predisposition argument which I am
maintaining is insufficient to effect the appeal.

> People were not only locked up, they were put to death by the million
> for their genetic (or racial) disposition in the 20th Century.  That's
> not to say any stock should be put by such practice.
>
Of course. I was thinking of UK, and to some
degree USA, when I referred to people being
locked up. I am aware that in Germany during the
thrid Reich they were sent to the gas chambers
along with many others.

>
>>Also see Jessel, D., and Moir, A. (1995) *A Mind
>>To Crime* London. Mchael Joseph. Although this
>>book does nod in the direction of brain damage
>>resulting from child abuse the central thesis is
>>that we are born with a milieu of neuro-
>>chemicals that will make us who we are. Jessel &
>>Moir refer to them as *the hand of cards* that
>>we are dealt by our genetic fate.
>>
>>There are still plenty of people around who take
>>the view that genes'r'us.
>>
>>
>>>We don't convict people on a "might" - even "on
the balance of
>>>probabilities" is insufficient to secure murder convictions.
>>
>>I am not questioning the conviction I am
>>questioning the appeal.
>
>
> ok.
>
>
>>>But you certainly don't make of a case by rubbishing physical genetic
>>>disposition on one point, and then assuming and arguing the case for
>>>behavioural genetic disposition on the very next point.
>>
>>I am playing devil's advocate. Let me make it
>>clear; I personally do not hold that genetic
>>predisposition influences complex (higher)
>>bahaviour patterns. It plainly does govern some
>>aspects of life; the automatic *knee jerk*
>>response for example; the autonomic region which
>>can be difficult to control consciously. But for
>>the more complex behaviours, such as the
>>decision to and excution of, a murder - no I
>>don't think these things are the consequence of
>>genetic predisposition.
>>
>>My point above was not that I support the case
>>for genetic predisposition but that if you can
>>argue genetic predisposition one way then you
>>can argue it the other way. In which case the
>>family history of frequent deaths could be
>>understood as a genetic predisposion to kill in
>>the mothers.
>
>
> Your points seemed to argue in either direction as suited.
>
They will appear to. I am not arguming my
beliefs about *what is* here. I am arguing that
the appeal was not substabtiated in my view. For
that purpose I argu which everway. If the
appellant councel can argue genetic
pr4edisposition for the thendency of the child
to die; I can argue for a genetic predisposition
in the mother to kill.

I am not sustaining my personal view in this but
simply arguing against the appeal - to test it
and make the case here, if you will.

>
>>>>"Sixthly, Another feature that would be expected
>>>>to follow in the family is the sociologically
>>>>induced trait. It is fairly well known that
>>>>women who are subject to Munchausen's Syndrome
>>>>by Proxy come from abusive, restrictive and
>>>>oppressive backgrounds that have resulted in a
>>>>weak and insecure personality in the adult
>>>>woman, who then seeks attention by making the
>>>>child ill. We also know that precisely the kind
>>>>of personality in the mother induces the same in
>>>>the child, during upbringing. Thus, we should
>>>>expect that, once again, the trait would follow
>>>>in the family. E.g., if the trait was socially
>>>>induced as a consequence of upbringing you would
>>>>expect exactly the same data to result from a
>>>>family history study.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>The women prosecuted under Meadow's discredited guidelines were not
>>>all weak, insecure adults by a very long way.   Simply describing what
>>>MSP is supposed to be does not make it applicable in these cases, in
>>>fact it leads one away from such a "beyond reasonable doubt"
>>>conclusion.
>>>
>>
>>What I am doing here is demonstrating the
>>argument that the flow through the generations
>>can be psychological.
>
>
> Looked more like a slur - an entirely false one - on the women you
> were targeting, actually.
>
No, no, no. I have the feeling that you are
mistaking argument for statements of truth. They
are not - they are only arguments. When I
suggest that there could be a psychological
tendency in the family to kill children I am not
saying *there is* such a tendency; I am saying
there could be.

Again I am but arguing *against* the appeal on
the grounds that the appellant has to sustain
the argument.

In these arguments you would be mistaken to take
it that I actually believe in the points being
made as if they were of scientific merit. I
don't necessarily belive in the points; I simply
argue against the appeal.

Take Galileo's *Two New World Sciences.* He did
not *believe* in all the points he made; he
simply argued them. This is what lawyers do in
court all the time.
>
>>You are faulting me the same way that you did
>>when you said that I was criticising genetic
>>predisposition in one senetence then depending
>>upon it in the next sentence.
>>
>>MSP is but an example of the way in which
>>psychological features can travel from one
>>generation to the next. I am not saying that
>>these women  specifically were MSP cases though
>>it is clear that they might have been.
>
>
> Right.  So you can give an illustration of how pathetic and cowardly
> these women are likely to be, and if they aren't, that doesn't bother
> your hypothosis in the slightest.  Not really very scientific.
>
The way you put it, science isn't even in the frame.

You have twisted what I said almost out of
shape. I did not say pathetic or cowardly. I
merely took MSBP as an example of the way in
which psychological characteristics could be
passed down the generations by inducing,
typically, insecurity in such women. Thus, the
same key feature: the deaths of children would
follow in the family also.

>
>>Also, when you say that these women were not
>>weak, insecure personalities that you can know
>>this is suspect. Numerous psychologically
>>problematic people have maintained respectable
>>careers and only been found out after many many
>>years.
>
>
> Anyone - *anyone* - can be undermined enough by discreditable
> coverage.
>
I know. I can speak for myself on that score.
But it does not change what I said. The key here
is not to confuse suggestion with actuality.

In court lawyers argue possibilities all the
time even though they are not actualities and,
even, unlikely to be.

I am arguing that the appeal should not have
been granted on the grounds that the appeal case
was insufficuiently well substantiated., And I
take as an example of the difficulty of gaining
a successful appeal from the cases of the
Birmingham Six and others like it.

Seeing how easily these females were released is
in my view highly suspicious.

>
>>1. One nurse (whose name I cannot remember) was
>>jailed a few years ago for killing several children.
>
>
> Juliet Allett, or something like that?   Yeah - she was crackers
> alright.  Was eating her own extcreta in her padded cell, I heard.  A
> true nut.  Not your typical mother at all.  Certainly not like at
> least a couple of these women I've heard of more in depth.
>
Allett kept up appearences for a long time.
That, again, is the point. That even extremely
disturbed people can maintain appearences for a
very long time and no one will realise what is
really going on.

You say that Allett is not like at least two of
these women - how do you know? That is the
point. Before Allett was finally caught she was
a respectable nurse etc., etc., etc.

There are numerous cases of peadophiles who have
gone on for decades and no one suspected.
>
>>2. George Carmen was one of the most respected
>>and feared QCs in the country until after his
>>death when it came out that he was a wife beater.
>>
>>3. A look at [Feldman, M. D., and Ford, C. V.
>>(1994) *Patient and Pretender*. London. John
>>Wiley & Sons.] gives an insight into how
>>effective these liars can be while people believ
>>in them completely. So you believe in these  women.
>>
>>4. Another superb example is that of Harold
>>Shipman.
>>
>>Outward appearances indicate nothing. If you
>>know these people personally by all means say so.
>
>
> I'm very familiar with the concept.  That's why these people are
> successful in their dreadful exploits, wouldn't you agree?  I mean, if
> they were spitting blood, swinging axes and chewing the carpet all the
> time, we'd spot them that much sooner.
>
Exactly. That is my point. And that is why I
don't think you can be too confident about these
women being wonderful. I am simply saying that
you don't know and can't be sure.

>
>>>>"Given all of the above, the case presented in
>>>>Appeal on behalf of these females has no
>>>>legitimately at all. The data could result from
>>>>genetic or social causes; and, even if it were
>>>>genetic it does not distinguish between a
>>>>genetic predisposition to die and a genetic
>>>>predisposition to kill.
>>>
>>>
>>>Why not?  Because you say so?
>>>
>>
>>No. Becuase the appeal is lacking in any substance.

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