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| subject: | Re: An open source guy on the MS SQL fiasco |
From: Mike '/m'
Probably the most rational commentary/observation/analysis that I've seen so far.
Thanks for posting it.
/m
On Wed, 29 Jan 2003 18:00:20 -0600, "Joe Barr"
wrote:
>
>An open source guy on the MS SQL fiasco
>
>
>From: "Karsten M. Self"
>To: linux-elitists{at}zgp.org
>Subject: Re: [linux-elitists] MS SQL WORM IS DESTROYING INTERNET BLOCK PORT
1434!
>Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2003 23:17:57 +0000
>
>on Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 01:26:39PM -0800, Don Marti (dmarti{at}zgp.org) wrote:
>> begin Michael Bacarella quotation of Sat, Jan 25, 2003 at 02:11:41AM -0500:
>>
>> > All admins with access to routers should block port 1434 (ms-sql-m)!
>>
>> Anybody who has _any_ relational database server directly connected
>> to the Internet please save some of whatever you're smoking for me.
>
>A few further points on this issue.
>
>Looking over the BUGTRAQ and NANOG lists, a few trends start to emerge.
>
>Apologies if this is fundamental knowledge -- if I'm duplicating
>well-known summaries, please post links as followup as I'm unaware of
>them.
>
> - Attacks worldwide appear to start at 05:29:30 UCT, give or take a
> few seconds. The launch of this attack *does* appear to be highly
> coordinated. I've seen reports of up to several minutes later, but
> nothing earlier.
>
> - University of Dartmouth registers 10k independent sources within the
> first 30 minutes of the attack, and a peak of 16k independent
> sources, speaking for extremely rapid propagation. Early
> propagation appears to be from many widely dispersed sites, though
> large colo facilities (e.g.: Hurricane Electric) appear in several
> reports. Other references speak of ~19k distinct sources. Whether
> or not this represents the maximum scope of the attack isn't clear,
> but let's presume that the total number of infected hosts were <
> 100k. Current estimates of total Internet nodes tend to range in
> the 200m - 400m range, though I don't have good numbers on this.
> I'd be interested in same if anyone has a reference.
>
> - Another number I've been pulling out of /dev/ass (mostly because
> nobody's provided anything more useful) is that there are 10m Win2K
> systems in existence.
>
> - This means that the infected hosts were on the order of 1% of all
> potential hosts. That is, Microsoft users were attaining a 99%
> patch and/or secure rate of systems publicly visible to the worm.
> This is a pretty good compliance rate. It was also wholly
> inadequate in preventing this attack.
>
> - Several NANOG sources report prior scans of the 1434 port across
> systems earlier in January, particularly on the 16th and 19th. This
> may have been preparatory work for the sort of rapid-propagation
> exploit attack that was hypothesized last summer.
>
> - The MS SQL engine is incorporated into a large number of MSFT
> products. While not absolving guilt, it does help to explain why
> so many exposed systems existed. The overhead of knowing what
> services exist on a given system, and of keeping these systems
> patched, increases consequently.
>
> http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/MSDEapps.asp
>
> - In balance, the level of infection for this attack was *small*, not
> large. The effects were disproportionate to the number of directly
> infected systems. Calling this the result of a widespread software
> monoculture may not be appropriate (IMO it is, for complex reasons,
> but that's a longer discussion). A similar vulnerability in a
> widely deployed free software utility could produce similar results,
> and the GNU/Linux & free software communities shouldn't enjoy
> excessive schadenfreude over this incident.
>
> I recall (but can't locate) a reference, possibly following the
> Mindcraft Apache / IIS rigged shootout, in which it was observed that
> raw webserving capacity was a poor performance metric, as a score or
> so Sun workstations would be more than sufficient to flood major
> Internet backbone links.
>
>
>While it's fun (however unsporting) to blast away at Microsoft for its
>security deficiencies, IMO the free software world should view the
>Sapphire / Slammer worm as more a cautionary tale. This is the sort of
>attack which _could_ potentially hit GNU/Linux or another 'Nix. I feel
>that the likelihood is lower than that for legacy MS Windows, though
>there are a large number of likely poorly maintained GNU/Linux and other
>'Nix systems live on the Net.
>
>Smugness kills.
>
>Peace.
>
>--
>Karsten M. Self
http://kmself.home.netcom.com/
> What Part of "Gestalt" don't you understand?
> The truth behind the H-1B indentured servant scam:
> http://heather.cs.ucdavis.edu/itaa.real.html
> http://www.zazona.com/ShameH1B/
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