From: "Rich" 

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   No more or less than passwords, TLS/SSL, smart cards, tokens, or =
anything else someone wants to make a mandatory part of any process they = choose.

Rich

  "Geo"  wrote in message
news:434921c2$1{at}w3.nls.net...
  But the feature being discussed can not only "be used" for DRM, it can =
be used to FORCE DRM on those who don't want it and to prevent =
competition on the OS market by not allowing an OS that doesn't force = drm
to be used.

  Geo.
    "Rich"  wrote in message news:434839da$1{at}w3.nls.net...
       My objection to your use of the term DRM is that it doesn't apply =
and diverts the discussion away to off topic, often silly, emotionally =
charged claims.  A claim that something could be used for DRM could = apply
to anything as there is no limit to what someone might use.  = Passwords
can be used for DRM.  They are today.  TLS/SSL can be used for = DRM.  It
is today. Smartcards, tokens, or anything to identify the = entity to which
rights were granted can be used.

       None of this helps for secure boot whose purpose is to validate =
the software environment and has no need to identify the user or the = machine.

    Rich

      "John Beckett" 
wrote in =
message news:7roek156s13jun0lt9u808ahvmc20pbmrj{at}4ax.com...
      "Rich"  wrote in message news::
      >    Your reply falls apart immediately after "as you well know".
      >  In fact you have it exactly backwards.

      Maybe you're answering in automatic mode??

      Just because I mentioned the terms "Geo" and
"DRM" in the same =
message
      does not mean I am supporting all or any of Geo's assertions re =
DRM.

      In fact, I was pointing out that trusted computing is capable of =
good
      things, and I predict that with the rising sophistication of =
malware,
      companies really will need trusted computing systems for their =
laptops if
      the laptops are allowed to connect to the normal company network.

      I claim that the same features of trusted computing that provide =
the
      benefit of secure remote access are also capable of providing DRM. =
I am
      not commenting on whether that is good or bad.

      I would appreciate a clear correction if I have made a mistake in =
the
      above (i.e. which words are wrong, and briefly why).

      > What you approve is up to you and if you use it can provide you =
with
      > a degree of trust not available without secure boot.

      I understand that.
      =20
      > Many of george's opinions on DRM are ...

      That's an issue for another thread, IMHO.

      John

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   No more
or less than =
passwords,=20
TLS/SSL, smart cards, tokens, or anything else someone wants to make a = mandatory=20
part of any process they choose.
 
Rich
 

  "Geo" <georger{at}nls.net>">mailto:georger{at}nls.net">georger{at}nls.net>
wrote=20
  in message news:434921c2$1{at}w3.nls.net...
  But the feature being discussed can =
not only "be=20
  used" for DRM, it can be used to FORCE DRM on those who don't want it =
and to=20
  prevent competition on the OS market by not allowing an OS that =
doesn't force=20
  drm to be used.
   
  Geo.
  

    "Rich" <{at}> wrote in message news:434839da$1{at}w3.nls.net...
       My
objection to your =
use of the=20
    term DRM is that it doesn't apply and diverts the discussion away to =
off=20
    topic, often silly, emotionally charged claims.  A claim that =
something=20
    could be used for DRM could apply to anything as there is no limit =
to what=20
    someone might use.  Passwords can be used for DRM.  They =
are=20
    today.  TLS/SSL can be used for DRM.  It is today. =
Smartcards,=20
    tokens, or anything to identify the entity to which rights were =
granted can=20
    be used.
     
       None
of this helps for =
secure boot=20
    whose purpose is to validate the software environment and =
has no=20
    need to identify the user or the machine.
     
    Rich
     
    
      "John Beckett" <FirstnameSurname{at}com=">mailto:FirstnameSurname{at}compuserve.com.omit">FirstnameSurname{at}com=
puserve.com.omit>=20
      wrote in message news:7roek156s13=
jun0lt9u808ahvmc20pbmrj{at}4ax.com..."Rich"=20
      <{at}> wrote in message >   =20
      Your reply falls apart immediately after "as you well =
know".> =20
      In fact you have it exactly backwards.Maybe you're =
answering in=20
      automatic mode??Just because I mentioned the
terms "Geo" =
and "DRM"=20
      in the same messagedoes not mean I am supporting all or any of =
Geo's=20
      assertions re DRM.In fact, I was pointing out
that trusted =

      computing is capable of goodthings, and I predict that with =
the rising=20
      sophistication of malware,companies really will need trusted =
computing=20
      systems for their laptops ifthe laptops are allowed to connect =
to the=20
      normal company network.I claim that the same features of =
trusted=20
      computing that provide thebenefit of secure remote access are =
also=20
      capable of providing DRM. I amnot commenting on whether that =
is good=20
      or bad.I would appreciate a clear correction if I have =
made a=20
      mistake in theabove (i.e. which words are wrong, and briefly=20
      why).> What you approve is up to you and
if you use it =
can=20
      provide you with> a degree of trust not available without =
secure=20
      boot.I understand
that. > Many of george's =

      opinions on DRM are ...That's an issue for
another thread, =

      =
IMHO.John

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