Those who sought to destabilize Iraq have succeeded in 
humpty-dumptyizing the place, in spades. Those who seek
to put it back together again aren't having as much success.

==================================================================

The Origins of al Qaeda's Ideology: Implications for U.S. Strategy

    "The fight against the enemy nearest to you has precedence over
the fight against the enemy farther away. . . . In all Muslim
countries the enemy has the reins of power. The enemy is the present
rulers." --Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, tried and hanged in connection
with the 1981 assassination of Anwar al-Sadat1

    "Victory for the Islamic movements . . . cannot be attained unless
these movements possess an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab
region." --Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden deputy, 20012

    "We do not want stability in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and even
Saudi Arabia. . . . The real issue is not whether, but how to
destabilize. We have to ensure the fulfillment of the democratic
revolution." --Michael Ledeen, American Enterprise Institute, 20023

The leader of Sadat's assassins, Bin Laden's chief ideologue, and a
leading American neoconservative supporter of Israel all call for a
revolutionary transformation of the Middle East. However, the United
States, the existing Arab regimes, and the traditional Sunni clerical
establishments all share an interest in avoiding instability and
revolution. This shared interest makes the establishments in the Sunni
world America's natural partners in the struggle against al Qaeda and
similar movements. If American strategists fail to understand and
exploit the divide between the establishments and the revolutionaries
within Sunni Islam, the United States will play into the radicals'
hands, and turn fence-sitting Sunnis into enemies.  

[... ...]

Source: "Parameters" Spring 2005
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05spring/henzel.htm


Cheers, Steve..

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