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| subject: | Re: whoami /priv |
From: "Rich"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
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What OS are you running and where did you get whoami.exe? The output =
on Windows XP and Windows Server 2003 should look like
C:\>whoami /priv
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------
Privilege Name Description =
State
=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D =
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D =
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking =
Enabled
SeSecurityPrivilege Manage auditing and security log =
Disabled
One reason for privileges to be disabled by default is so that an =
application can not unintentionally exploit a privilege. It is not to =
protect against malware which if running code on your system can do =
anything you can do.
Beyond enabling and disabling, there is a mechanism to remove privileges =
from a token. When a privilege is removed it can not be restored. This =
is a defense in depth. If that process is exploited the removed =
privilege can not be used. I describe this as defense in depth and not =
anything stronger because it may not be difficult to work around if the =
exploited process can get another process to do its dirty work for it. =
It can't use a new child process as that will inherit the same token but =
it may be able to use one already running.
Rich
"John Beckett"
wrote in message =
news:ftv2c2dt8he6n2al2d21pagi0hnkhg0l54{at}4ax.com...
I'm trying to understand the output of 'whoami /priv'.
For example, for a member of Administrators:
C:\> whoami /priv
(X) SeChangeNotifyPrivilege =3D Bypass traverse checking
(O) SeSecurityPrivilege =3D Manage auditing and security log
...(other lines omitted)...
Apparently:
(X) means I have that right, and it is enabled.
(O) means I have that right, but it is currently disabled.
If I ran a program to manage auditing, that program should:
- Enable SeSecurityPrivilege (abort if error).
- Manage auditing.
- Disable SeSecurityPrivilege to restore setting, when finished.
I understand "defense in depth", and the common sense of only =
switching
the safety catch off when you need to use the gun, but is there any =
more
behind the reason that most privileges are disabled?
I'm wondering if there is a scenario that provides a real security =
benefit
from having various privileges disabled (apart from requiring malware =
to
have an extra couple of lines of code to first enable the privilege).
Perhaps if I spawn a process or thread, that process or thread would
default to NOT have the privilege under some circumstances??
John
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What OS
are you running =
and where did=20
you get whoami.exe? The output on Windows XP and Windows Server = 2003=20
should look like
C:\>whoami
/priv
PRIVILEGES=20
INFORMATION----------------------
Privilege=20
=
Name &nb=
sp; =20
=
Description &n=
bsp; &nb=
sp; =20
=
State=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=20
=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=20
=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3DSeChangeNotifyPrivilege &nbs=
p; =20
Bypass traverse=20
=
checking  =
; =20
=
EnabledSeSecurityPrivilege &=
nbsp; =20
Manage auditing and security=20
log =20
Disabled
One reason for privileges to be =
disabled by default=20
is so that an application can not unintentionally exploit a =
privilege. It=20
is not to protect against malware which if running code on your system = can do=20
anything you can do.
Beyond enabling and disabling,
there is =
a mechanism=20
to remove privileges from a token. When a privilege is removed it
= can not=20
be restored. This is a defense in depth. If that
process is=20 exploited the removed privilege can not be used. I
describe this = as=20
defense in depth and not anything stronger because it may not be = difficult to=20
work around if the exploited process can get another process to do its = dirty=20
work for it. It can't use a new child process as that will inherit = the=20
same token but it may be able to use one already running.
Rich
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