From: "Geo" 

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Yes, in cases of security I think the default should be to assume the =
user is an idiot and if not then they can prove it by googling to find =
out how to turn the option to the setting they want.

The problem with prompting is that the prompt never gives enough =
information for the average home user to make an informed decision.

Note, I'm not saying make it impossible like executable attachments in =
Outlook where you could only turn the blocking off if you had an = exchange
server, I'm saying just require that the user be intelligent = enough to
find the default settings and change them to their liking.

A prompt that says "this is dangerous, are you sure?" is just
asking for = trouble.

Geo.
  "Rich"  wrote in message news:450437bd{at}w3.nls.net...
     The default is to prompt.  Are you claiming the default should be =
to not give users a choice?

  Rich
    "Geo"  wrote in message
news:4503c7eb{at}w3.nls.net...
    If some people always want to make the decision and others always =
want the computer to make the decision, then the checkbox should be for =
those two choices. They do this all the time in IE, deny, prompt, allow, =
I happen to think that's a great solution. The problem is which should = be
the default and with all the security issues I think deny should be = for
about 95% of the things.

    Geo.
      "Rich"  wrote in message news:4501a233{at}w3.nls.net...
         You can either give users a choice or not.  Someone will =
complain either way.  There is no single best answer.  In the scenarios =
where code signing applies, if the signature is valid it is intended for =
the user to make his own choices.  This is not a safe vs. unsafe choice =
where you might be able to excuse bias toward the safe option.

      Rich
        "Antti Kurenniemi"  wrote in =
message news:45019edc{at}w3.nls.net...
        I didn't mean that signing is not necessarily untrustworthy, I =
mean that=20
        implementing Yet Another Thingamajick Everyone Should Understand =
is *not* an=20
        improvement in security because who the hell can keep up with =
all these=20
        things? The more "security improvements" there are that require =
the end user=20
        to understand and make decisions, the less they help security. =
For example,=20
        take a look at the windows update website: if you have the IE =
download=20
        blocker enabled, the website displays very friendly and helpful =
information=20
        about how to disable it and download the file. Nice and helpful, =
yes? No, it=20
        totally and utterly sucks, because it requires the user to have =
a grasp of=20
        reality and understand *why* there is such a thing as a download =
blocker,=20
        and *why* this particular site should be allowed to bypass it, =
and so on. I=20
        bet more than half the users could be simply informed how to do =
the same and=20
        install any worm or virus in the world, as long as the website =
had as easy=20
        to follow information.

        The answer to security is not to require the user to make every =
choice,=20
        that's only shifting the problem from the producer to the =
consumer.


        Antti Kurenniemi
        (no, I don't know what *is* the answer, and even if I did I'm =
too drunk to=20
        write much more now)

        "Rich"  wrote in message news:4500ee78$1{at}w3.nls.net...
           No.  You look at the signing certificate to see if you trust =
both the=20
        signing party and the certification path.  If you do not, do not =
trust the=20
        signed entity.  If something is not signed, you don't have even =
this option.=20
        How do you choose what to trust?

           The average Joe relies on the identity of the signing party =
alone and=20
        assumes that the certification authorities that are not =
distrusted have been=20
        vetted.

           In practice, have you ever known this to be a problem with =
signed code?=20
        How much actual malware do you hear of that is signed?  I can't =
think of any=20
        that wasn't some PR stunt by someone that signed a demo which he =
released=20
        under his own name anyway.

        Rich

          "Antti Kurenniemi" 
wrote in =
message=20
        news:450054c1{at}w3.nls.net...

          The concept of "signed" executables / activex / whatnot makes =
me want to
          slap someone every time I see it mentioned. Yeah, sure, it's =
signed - now
          what? Should I visit Redmond to ask someone if they really =
signed this, or
          if this is just a trick - a message box saying this executable =
is signed?
          The rate at which these new "improvements" keep popping up is =
such that no
          average Joe can ever really know if he's being fooled or if it =
really is
          legit...


          Antti Kurenniemi



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Yes, in cases of security I think the =
default=20
should be to assume the user is an idiot and if not then they can prove = it by=20
googling to find out how to turn the option to the setting they=20
want.
 
The problem with prompting is that the =
prompt never=20
gives enough information for the average home user to make an informed=20
decision.
 
Note, I'm not saying make it
impossible =
like=20
executable attachments in Outlook where you could only turn the blocking = off if=20
you had an exchange server, I'm saying just require that the user be = intelligent=20
enough to find the default settings and change them to their=20
liking.
 
A prompt that says "this
is dangerous, =
are you=20
sure?" is just asking for trouble.
 
Geo.

  "Rich" <{at}> wrote in message news:450437bd{at}w3.nls.net...
     The
default is to =
prompt.  Are=20
  you claiming the default should be to not give users a =
choice?
   
  Rich
  

    "Geo" <georger{at}nls.net>=20">mailto:georger{at}nls.net">georger{at}nls.net>=20
    wrote in message news:4503c7eb{at}w3.nls.net...
    If some people always want to make =
the decision=20
    and others always want the computer to make the decision, then the =
checkbox=20
    should be for those two choices. They do this all the time in IE, =
deny,=20
    prompt, allow, I happen to think that's a great solution. The =
problem is=20
    which should be the default and with all the security issues I think =
deny=20
    should be for about 95% of the things.
     
    Geo.
    

      "Rich" <{at}> wrote in message news:4501a233{at}w3.nls.net...
         You
can either give =
users a=20
      choice or not.  Someone will complain either way.  There =
is no=20
      single best answer.  In the scenarios where code signing =
applies, if=20
      the signature is valid it is intended for the user to make his own =

      choices.  This is not a safe vs. unsafe choice where you =
might be=20
      able to excuse bias toward the safe option.
       
      Rich
      
        "Antti Kurenniemi" <NOantti{at}SPAManttikPLEASE.com=">mailto:NOantti{at}SPAManttikPLEASE.com">NOantti{at}SPAManttikPLEASE.com=
>=20
        wrote in message news:45019edc{at}w3.nls.net...I
=

        didn't mean that signing is not necessarily untrustworthy, I =
mean that=20
        implementing Yet Another Thingamajick Everyone Should =
Understand is=20
        *not* an improvement in security because who the hell can =
keep up=20
        with all these things? The more "security improvements" =
there are=20
        that require the end user to understand and make decisions, =
the less=20
        they help security. For example, take a look at the windows =
update=20
        website: if you have the IE download blocker enabled, the =
website=20
        displays very friendly and helpful information about how to =
disable=20
        it and download the file. Nice and helpful, yes? No, it =
totally and=20
        utterly sucks, because it requires the user to have a grasp of=20
        reality and understand *why* there is such a thing as a =
download=20
        blocker, and *why* this particular site should be allowed to =
bypass=20
        it, and so on. I bet more than half the users could be =
simply=20
        informed how to do the same and install any worm or virus in =
the=20
        world, as long as the website had as easy to follow=20
        information.The answer to security is not to
require the =
user to=20
        make every choice, that's only shifting the problem from the =

        producer to the consumer.Antti
Kurenniemi(no, I =
don't=20
        know what *is* the answer, and even if I did I'm too drunk to =
write=20
        much more now)"Rich"
<{at}> wrote in message news:4500ee78$1{at}w3.nls.net...=
  =20
        No.  You look at the signing certificate to see if you =
trust both=20
        the signing party and the certification path.  If you =
do not,=20
        do not trust the signed entity.  If something is not =
signed,=20
        you don't have even this option. How do you choose what to=20
        trust?   The average Joe
relies on the =
identity of the=20
        signing party alone and assumes that the certification =
authorities=20
        that are not distrusted have been =
vetted.   In=20
        practice, have you ever known this to be a problem with signed =
code?=20
        How much actual malware do you hear of that is signed?  =
I can't=20
        think of any that wasn't some PR stunt by someone that =
signed a demo=20
        which he released under his own name=20
        anyway.Rich 
"Antti Kurenniemi" <NOantti{at}SPAManttikPLEASE.com=">mailto:NOantti{at}SPAManttikPLEASE.com">NOantti{at}SPAManttikPLEASE.com=
>=20
        wrote in message news:450054c1{at}w3.nls.net...=
 =20
        The concept of "signed" executables / activex / whatnot makes me =
want=20
        to  slap someone every time I see it mentioned. Yeah, =
sure,=20
        it's signed - now  what? Should I visit Redmond to ask =
someone=20
        if they really signed this, or  if this is just a trick =
- a=20
        message box saying this executable is signed?  The rate =
at=20
        which these new "improvements" keep popping up is such that =
no =20
        average Joe can ever really know if he's being fooled or if it =
really=20
        is 
legit...  Antti=20
      =
Kurenniemi

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