Petitioners did not (and do not) contest this characterization of
the published record regarding Bendectin. Instead, they responded to
respondent's motion with the testimony of eight experts of their own,
each of whom also possessed impressive credentials. These experts had
concluded that Bendectin can cause birth defects. Their conclusions
were based upon -in vitro- (test tube) and -in vivo- (live) animal
studies that found a link between Bendectin and malformations;
pharmacological studies of the chemical structure of Bendectin that
purported to show similarities between the structure of the drug and
that of other substances known to cause birth defects; and the -
reanalysis- of previously published epidemiological (human
statistical) studies.
The District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment.
The court stated that scientific evidence is admissible only if the
principle upon which it is based is -`sufficiently established to have
general acceptance in the field to which it belongs.'- 727 F. Supp.
570, 572 (SD Cal. 1989), quoting United States v. Kilgus, 571 F. 2d
508, 510 (CA9 1978). The court concluded that petitioners' evidence
did not meet this standard. Given the vast body of epidemiological
data concerning Bendectin, the court held, expert opinion which is not
based on epidemiological evidence is not admissible to establish
causation. 727 F. Supp., at 575. Thus, the animal-cell studies, live-
animal studies, and chemical structure analyses on which petitioners
had relied could not raise by themselves a reasonably disputable jury
issue regarding causation. Ibid. Petitioners' epidemiological
analyses, based as they were on recalculations of data in previously
published studies that had found no causal link between the drug and
birth defects, were ruled to be inadmissible because they had not been
published or subjected to peer review. Ibid.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
951 F.2d 1128 (1991). Citing Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46,
47, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923), the court stated that expert opinion
based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique
is -generally accepted- as reliable in the relevant scientific
community. 951 F. 2d, at 1129-1130. The court declared that expert
opinion based on a methodology that diverges -significantly from the
procedures accepted by recognized authorities in the field . . .
cannot be shown to be `generally accepted as a reliable technique.'-
Id., at 1130, quoting United States v. Solomon, 753 F. 2d 1522, 1526
(CA9 1985).
---
---------------
* Origin: Williamsburg, VA U.S.A. (1:271/124)
|