BA>>>> had more important things to do, apparently.  This not
to say that
 BA>>>> 9/11 would
 BA>>>> not have happened anyway (the domestic investigatory
errors that have
 BA>>>> come to light
 BA>>>> were bureaucratic problems that weren't - and aren't - the
 BA>>>> administration's fault), but
 BA>>>> it is to say that the Bush administration can be blamed for being
 BA>>>> blindsided; they were
 BA>>>> blindsided because they weren't looking - and should have been.

 JH>>> Horseshit, Bob!  There were no CREDIBLE warnings given.

 BK>>  Just Clinton's then Bush's counterinsurgency director. Just
 BK>>  reports straight to the president.

 JH>>> Gorelick's wall between agencies was still in place during

 BK>>  Gorelick did not create any wall between agencies. Gorelick did
 BK>>  not have the authority to create any such wall. The so called
 BK>>  wall was created under Reagan, who signed the order. Gorelick
 BK>>  just wrote a clarification of the rules that *DID* allow sharing
 BK>>  information.

 JM> Another opinion:

 Another load of BS. Who was the original author of that?

 Weldon lost his seat in congress, probably because he was such a
 nut case, and liar.

 The actual Gorelick memo is 4 pages in length. I have a copy I
 downloaded from National Review online. I don't know if it's
 still there. It is .pdf.

 There is a copy at

 snipurl.com/gorelickmemo

 However, only the first 4 pages are the Gorelick memo. The rest
 is the exchange of faxes and emails that led to the development
 of the actual rules for exchange between the FBI and DOJ
 criminal division.

 Note two things:

 The actual Gorelick memo applies *ONLY* to the investigations of
 the First WTC bombing and a plot to blow up Philipine airliners.
 Nothing more.

 The final rules, that did included much of the language of the
 Gorelick memo, and that *ONLY* applies to exchanges of
 informatin between the FBI and the Criminal division of the DOJ.
 Which is in the document.

 At the bottom I will post the Aug 2001 memo by Gorelick's
 successor in the GW Bush administration as asst Attorney
 General, Larry Thompson, in which he reviews and reaffirms the
 Clinton administration rules.

 IOW, no one outside Abel Danger knows what Abel Danger really
 did, but we do know the accusations of a wall preventing sharing
 the intel is a Bush administration attempt to dodge their
 responsibility.

 JM> 9/11 HIJACKERS KNOWN IN ADVANCE

 JM> Republican Congressman Curt Weldon from Pennsylvania has
 JM> made the explosive allegation that more than a year before
 JM> the attacks on 9/11, Clinton administration intelligence
 JM> officials knew who four of the hijackers were, including
 JM> ringleader Mohammed Atta. So why wasn't anything done?

 JM> Because information wasn't allowed to be shared between
 JM> federal agencies, thanks to 9/11 commissioner and former
 JM> Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick (not pronounced the
 JM> way it's spelled.) She instituted rules that forbade
 JM> sharing of intelligence between, for instance, the CIA and
 JM> the FBI. She was reportedly hired at the insistence of The
 JM> Hildabeast. Thank you Hillary Clinton.

 **************************************************************************
------------------------------------------------------------------------


          U.S. Department of Justice
          Office of the Deputy Attorney General
          Washington, DC 20530

    August 6, 2001

    MEMORANDUM

    TO:

          Criminal Division:
          Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General
          Bruce Swartz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
          Jim Reynolds, Chief, TVCS
          John Dion, Chief, ISS

          Office of Intelligence Policy and Review:
          James Baker, Counsel for Intelligence Policy

          FBI:
          Thomas Pickard, Acting Director
          Larry Parkinson, General Counsel
          Neil Gallagher, Assistant Director, NSD
          Dale Watson, Assistant Director, CTD
          David Knowlton, Assistant Director, INSD

    From: Larry D. Thompson

    Subject: Intelligence Sharing

    This memorandum clarifies current Department of Justice policy
    governing intelligence sharing, and establishes new policy. On July
    19, 1995, the Attorney General adopted Procedures for Contacts
    Between the FBI and the Criminal Division Concerning Foreign
    Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations (1995
    Procedures ). The 1995 Procedures remain in effect
    today. On January 21, 2000, the Attorney General adopted additional
    measures regarding intelligence sharing in response to the Interim
    Recommendations proposed by Special Litigation Counsel Randy Bellows
    (Interim Measures ). The Interim Measures also remain
    in effect today. The purpose of this memorandum is to restate and
    clarify certain important requirements imposed by the 1995
    Procedures and Interim Measures, and to establish certain additional
    requirements. This memorandum does not discuss all of the current
    requirements, and the fact that a particular requirement is not
    discussed here does not mean that it is no longer in effect.

    1. Sharing Information.

    The 1995 Procedures require the FBI to notify the Criminal Division
    when "facts or circumstances are developed" in an FI or FCI
    investigation "that reasonably indicate that a significant federal
    crime has been, is being, or may be committed." This notification
    requirement is mandatory and is to be followed by the FBI absent a
    specific exemption for a particular investigation granted by me or
    the Attorney General after discussions with the Core Group (see Part
    4). Several aspects of the notification requirement bear emphasis.

    First, the "reasonable indication" standard as used in the 1995
    Procedures is identical to the "reasonable indication" standard in
    the Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
    Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations, which use
    it as the standard for the initiation of federal criminal
    investigations. Those guidelines explain that term as follows: "The
    standard of ?reasonable indication' is substantially lower than
    probable cause. In determining whether there is reasonable
    indication of a federal criminal violation, a Special Agent may take
    into account any facts or circumstances that a prudent investigator
    would consider. However, the standard does require specific facts or
    circumstances indicating a past, current, or impending violation.
    There must be an objective, factual basis for initiating the
    investigation; a mere hunch is insufficient."

    Second, the term "significant federal crime" should be understood to
    include any federal felony. Thus, for example, the term includes
    various offenses that fall under the jurisdiction of the Criminal
    Division's Internal Security Section, such as espionage (18 U.S.C.
    793, 394) and unauthorized removal of classified material (18 U.S.C.
    1924). It also includes various offense that fall under the
    jurisdiction of the Criminal Division's Terrorism and Violent Crime
    Section, such as use of a weapon of mass destruction (18 U.S.C.
    2332a) and providing material support to a designated foreign
    terrorist organization (18 U.S.C. 2339B).

    Third, when notification is required under the "reasonable
    indication" standard, it is required without delay. Notification
    should be made to the appropriate Deputy Assistant Attorney General
    in the Criminal Division with oversight review of the Terrorism and
    Violent Crime Section or the Internal Security Section. Where
    appropriate, immediate notification (by secure telephone if
    necessary) should precede a more complete discussion at a monthly
    briefing (see Part 3).

    Fourth, in keeping with paragraphs A.1 and B.3 of the 1995
    Procedures, the FBI shall inform OIPR before it contacts the
    Criminal Division pursuant to the notification provisions in any FI
    or FCI case, whether or not FISA activity is being conducted. OIPR
    shall be given a reasonable opportunity to be present for such contacts.

    2. LHMs.

    All Letterhead Memoranda (LHMs) in FI or FCI cases, and all FBI
    memoranda requesting initiation or renewal of FISA authority, shall
    contain a section devoted explicitly to identifying any possible
    federal criminal violation meeting the 1995 Procedures' notification
    standards (see Part 1).

    The FBI will provide to OIPR two copies of all LHMs in FI or FCI
    cases involving U.S. persons or presumed U.S. persons. This
    requirement includes LHMs in both espionage and terrorism cases, and
    is therefore an expansion of the Interim Measures. OIPR will make
    one copy of these LHMs available for pickup by the Criminal
    Division. The Criminal Division shall adhere to any reasonable
    conditions on the disclosure of the LHMs that the FBI or OIPR may
    require.

    3. Monthly Briefings.

    The FBI shall provide monthly briefings to the Criminal Division
    concerning all FI and FCI investigations that meet the 1995
    Procedures' notification standards (see Part 1).

    Prior to each briefing, the Criminal Division shall, based on the
    LHMs received under Part 2, identify for the FBI the investigations
    about which it requires additional information. The FBI shall
    provide the Criminal Division with that information at the briefing.
    In addition, the FBI shall brief the Criminal Division on any other
    matters that meet the current notification standards (see Part 1)
    and that, for whatever reason, the FBI did not previously disclose
    to the Criminal Division.

    OIPR shall be provided with reasonable advance notice of these
    briefings and may attend them.

    4. Core Group.

    The Interim Measures established a Core Group consisting of the FBI
    Assistant Directors for the Counterterrorism and National Security
    Divisions, the Counsel for OIPR, and representatives of the Office
    of the Deputy Attorney General. The Core Group is to resolve
    disputes concerning application of the 1995 Procedures in particular
    cases. Thus, for example, if the FBI or OIPR is uncertain whether a
    particular case satisfies the "reasonable indication" standard for
    notifying the Criminal Division, the matter shall be brought to the
    attention of the Core Group. Other disagreements that arise from
    application of the 1995 Guidelines shall also be brought to the
    attention of the Core Group. The Core Group will then make a
    recommendation to me or to the Attorney General for a final decision
    on the matter.

 **************************************************************************

BOB KLAHN bob.klahn{at}sev.org   http://home.toltbbs.com/bobklahn

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