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G. PRESUMED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to Supreme Court
bearing heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.
Heller v. New York, N.Y. 1973, 93 S Ct 2789, 413 US 483, 37 L.Ed 2d 745,
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on remand 307 N.E. 2d 805, 33 N.Y. 2d 314, 352 N.Y.S.2d 601; See also
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Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 103 S. Ct. 3524; New York Times Co.
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v. U.S., 91 S Ct 2140; Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,
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91 S Ct 1575; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 83 S Ct 631
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The guarantees of freedom of expression are not an absolute prohibition
under all circumstances, but the barriers to prior restraint remain high
and the presumption against its use continues intact.
Norton v. Matthews, 427 US 524, 96 S Ct 2771, 49 L.Ed 2d 672
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H. STATE CARRIES BURDEN OF PROOF.
For a system of prior restraint by the government controlling speech and
press to be valid, burden of proving that the material is unprotected must
rest on the censor, the procedures of censorship must not lend an air of
finality to the action of the censor, and statutory scheme must provide a
prompt, final judicial decision.
United Artists Corp. v. Wright, D.C. Ala. 1974, 368 F. Supp. 1034
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Censorship is a form of infringement upon freedom of expression to be
especially condemned; while the constitutional protection even against a
previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited, limitation will be
recognized only in exceptional cases; the state has a heavy burden to
demonstrate that such a restraint presents an exceptional case.
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 US 495, 72 S Ct 777, 96 L.Ed 1098
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I. CENSORSHIP SYSTEM IS PRIOR RESTRAINT ABSENT JUDICIAL DETERMINATION
THAT SPEECH IS UNPROTECTED
When a state directly impinges upon interests in free speech or free
press, an opportunity for a fair adversary hearing must precede the action,
whether or not the speech or press interest is clearly protected under
substantive First Amendment standards.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 US 564, 92 S Ct 2701, 33 L Ed. 2d 548
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System of prior restraints avoids constitutional infirmity only if it
takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate dangers of
censorship system.
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd v. Conrad, Tenn, 1975, 95 S Ct 1239, 420 US
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546, 43 L Ed 2d 448
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In order to avoid constitutional infirmity, a scheme of administrative
censorship (1) must place the burdens of initiating judicial review and of
proving that the material is unprotected expression on the censor, rather
than requiring the distributor of the material to assume the burden of
proving that the material is protected expression; (2) must require prompt
judicial review - a final judicial determination on the merits within a
specified, brief period - to prevent the administrative decision of the
censor from achieving an effect of finality; and (3) must limit to
preservation of the status quo for the shortest, fixed period compatible
with sound judicial resolution, any restraint, imposed in advance of the
final judicial determination.
Blount v. Rizzi, 400 US 410, 91 S Ct 423, 27 L Ed 2d 498
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J. PENALTY AFTER SPEECH CRIME ORDINARILY ADEQUATE.
Ordinarily, constitutionally permissible interests of the state are
adequately served by criminal penalties imposed after freedom to speak has
been so grossly abused that its immunity is breached.
Carroll v. President and Com'rs of Princess Anne, Md 1968, 89 S Ct 347,
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393 US 175, 21 L Ed 325
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K. ORDER AND PRESENT TENSE CLAUSE OF SUPERVISION CONTRACT ARE CONTENT
CONTROL.
Above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content; the people are guaranteed the right to express any thought,
free from government censorship.
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 US 92, 92 S Ct 2286, 33 L Ed 2d 212
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The special vice of a prior restraint on expression is that communication
will be suppressed, either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the
speaker, before an adequate determination that is unprotected by the First
Amendment.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Com. on Human Relations, 413 US 376,
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93 S Ct 2553, 37 L Ed 2d 669
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