From: Bill Lucy 

Out of darkness, Jeff Shultz says...
lucyandi{at}spamcop.net>
> wrote:
>
> >There were more morale problems in Korea than in Vietnam. We committed to
small
> >positions (Pusan, Inchon), then decided in a short time to
"eliminate" the
enemy.
> >Our intelligence was so bad we added to the morale problems and then
practically
> >dared CCF troops to cross the Yalu. We underestimated the strength of the
ROC
> >troops, we chose innumerable indefensible positions.
>
> I've got news for you. The intel wasn't faulty - McArthur's
> egotistical belief in his own infallibility, even when faced with
> supported opposing viewpoints, was.

This is a little jumbled, but here are a few examples:

At the beginning, NK troop strength was overrated. For almost a year, CCF
troop strength was underrated. Enemy force artillery from fortified
positions was accounted for at company level, but hardly ever made it
intact at higher levels.
Squabbles among services (esp. Marine and Army) resulted in non-sharing of
intelligence. Truman ignored many CIA reports early on. MacArthur ignored
British
Intelligence reports that China was going to support NK. MacArthur was listening to
Chiang Kai Sek (who was still wanting mainland China back under his control). 1st
Marine at the Chosin Reservoir actually saved themselves from annihilation
by ignoring the "intelligence" he was getting from MacArthur.
Because of MacArthur's
carpet bombing, he was getting little "in-country" intelligence.
NK troops, who had
been hiding, cutoff retreating US after the "home by Christmas" CCF attack.

There are many, many more.

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