From: Jeff Shultz 

On Tue, 31 Dec 2002 20:36:26 -0600, Bill Lucy  wrote:

>Out of darkness, Jeff Shultz says...
lucyandi{at}spamcop.net>
>> wrote:
>>
>> >There were more morale problems in Korea than in Vietnam. We
committed to
small
>> >positions (Pusan, Inchon), then decided in a short time to
"eliminate" the
enemy.
>> >Our intelligence was so bad we added to the morale problems and then
practically
>> >dared CCF troops to cross the Yalu. We underestimated the
strength of the
ROC
>> >troops, we chose innumerable indefensible positions.
>>
>> I've got news for you. The intel wasn't faulty - McArthur's
>> egotistical belief in his own infallibility, even when faced with
>> supported opposing viewpoints, was.
>
>This is a little jumbled, but here are a few examples:
>
>At the beginning, NK troop strength was overrated. For almost a year, CCF
troop
>strength was underrated. Enemy force artillery from fortified positions was
>accounted for at company level, but hardly ever made it intact at higher
levels.
>Squabbles among services (esp. Marine and Army) resulted in non-sharing of
>intelligence. Truman ignored many CIA reports early on. MacArthur ignored
British
>Intelligence reports that China was going to support NK. MacArthur was
listening to
>Chiang Kai Sek (who was still wanting mainland China back under his control).
1st
>Marine at the Chosin Reservoir actually saved themselves from annihilation by
>ignoring the "intelligence" he was getting from MacArthur. Because of
MacArthur's
>carpet bombing, he was getting little "in-country"
intelligence. NK troops,
who had
>been hiding, cutoff retreating US after the "home by
Christmas" CCF attack.
>
>There are many, many more.
>

So you agree that it wasn't an intelligence failure, it was a command failure?

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