From: Bill Lucy 

Out of darkness, Tony Ingenoso says...
adam{at}NOSPAMsoftfab.com> wrote in message
news:3e101ee8{at}w3.nls.net...
> > Arguably the NK/SK is all internal.
>
> Until the 38th parallel was crossed way back when, then it became a UN thing
and continues to be so today because of lack of
> official end to that hostility.

We made so many tactical and strategic mistakes in that situation that we
are guided by it to this day. Just a partial list: keep your troops near
enemy positions well-trained and well-equipped; verify the need to take a
position before
committing troops; be careful of committing troops to positions where the enemy can
pound you with artillery.

There were more morale problems in Korea than in Vietnam. We committed to
small positions (Pusan, Inchon), then decided in a short time to
"eliminate" the enemy.
Our intelligence was so bad we added to the morale problems and then practically
dared CCF troops to cross the Yalu. We underestimated the strength of the
ROC troops, we chose innumerable indefensible positions.

Then we tried to "correct" these errors at Ponmonjam.

If we had consolidated a position at the 38th parallel, as the UN wanted, MacArthur
wouldn't have had to give his farewell speech at West Point.

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