gmsizemore2{at}yahoo.com (Glen M. Sizemore) wrote 


> operant behavior (which is synonymous with purposeful 
> behavior) involves causation produced by one entity that 
> produces effects in another entity.  Now we're getting 
> somewhere.



> JM: I'm very much in agreement with the mechanistic nature 
> of your approach that is indicated here.
> 
> > In any event, operant behavior is
> > "directed toward the future," even though its causes lay in
>  the past (as
> > causes must).
> 
> JM: Yes.  I use somewhat different terminology but I agree.  
> We have to employ the future tense.
> 
> GS: Hmmm. I was focusing more on the fact that the past is the
> locus of explanation - or at least a large part of it. The current
> environment certainly exerts an effect (as in operant stimulus
> control), but these discriminative stimuli are effective because
> of the role they have played in the organism's past.

I'm having a hard time figuring out how this gets us closer to 
defining purpose.  

> 
> JM: Putting it all together and along the same lines of 
> what you stated above, I would say that purposefulness 
> involves causation being produced by one entity, the 
> purposeful entity, that will (future tense) produce 
> effects in the effected entity.
> 
> GS: Well, this is not necessary. 

Not necessary?  If you are saying it's not necessary to be explicit?

(It's necessary, trust me.)

If I reinforce a few responses,
> and then disconnect the feeder, the organism will continue to
> respond for some time despite the fact that responses no
> longer produce the reinforcer. But, certainly, operant
> conditioning evolved as a process because conditioned
> behavior allows the organism a more fruitful interchange with
> the environment. 

This isn't getting us anywhere.  Nothing you're saying here 
is getting us beyond the problem of the circularity of our 
definition of purpose. 

> 
> JM: Now the big question.  
> What is different about the effected entity after it 
> recieves the causation produced by the purposeful entity.  
> And it's important to keep in mind that this has to be 
> applicable to all entities that we consider to be 
> purposeful.  In other words, the question is what is 
> different about all effected entities after they are 
> effected by the causation produced by their respective 
> purposeful entities?  
> 
> 
> GS: I'm not sure what you are driving at here Jim. The
> environment is changed....that is what it means for the
> organism's behavior to have consequences (but the organism
> itself might have to be considered a "part of the environment"
> as when welearn to manipulate variables that alter our own
> behavior). Certainly the organism's behavior is changed in
> turn by the consequence....this is the definition of operant
> behavior. Presumably the brain is also changed and this is
> certainly a legitimate scientific subject matter. However,
> behavior may be treated as a subject matter in its own right. 
> 
> JM: When we answer this question we will have defined
> purpose.
> 
> GS: Can't say as I agree but, as I said, I'm not certain what you
> are driving at.
> 
> JM: (I should also mention, in order to achieve the most
> scientifically accurate definition of purpose we have to 
> employ relativistic rather than absolutistic notions of 
> such things as what is or is not an entity, causation, etc.)
> 
> GS: Not really sure as to what you are driving at here, either.
> 
> Cordially,
> Glen

Does purpose involve causation coming from an entity and 
to another or not.  Just answer this question.

Jim
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