Guy Hoelzer  wrote in message
news:...
> in article b6fmmi$2ris$1{at}darwin.ediacara.org, Jim McGinn at
> jimmcginn{at}yahoo.com wrote on 4/2/03 2:02 PM:
> 
> > Guy Hoelzer  wrote
> > 
> >> In my lexicon, processes have physical existence, but are not entities.
> > 
> > What objective (measureable) criteria, if any, are you
> > employing to come to the conclusion that a process is
> > not or cannot be an entity?  (I'm not concerned with your
> > lexicon.  I'm concerned with what you can demonstrate
> > rationally.)
> 
> The bounds of natural processes can objectively determined because the
> dynamics of natural processes are determined by the nature of internal
> interactions driven by mechanisms of positive feedback that have no links to
> anything outside the system.

I don't see how anything you are saying here is, supposedly, 
inconsistent with my supposition that all processes are, or 
can be considered, entities.

> 
> >> As I see it, processes and entities are the only things that
are manifested
> >> in the universe, but they are different kinds of phenomena. 
As I use the
> >> terms, entity refers to structures composed of matter;
> > 
> > Do processes not have structure?
> 
> They do; although the structure of processes reflects sequences of
> interactions among entities, rather than the shapes of entities themselves.

I can't make sense of this.  And even if, so what?  It still 
fits your definition of an entity indicated above, 
" . . . structures composed of matter . . ."  

> 
> > Are they not comprised of matter?
> 
> I can't think of a process that does not involve matter, but processes are
> primarily about the flow of energy, which may or may not be in the form of
> matter.

Processes must have physical existence or they are not 
processes or anything at all.

> 
> > I think it's obvious that the answer to both of the questions is, no.
> > Therefore I don't see why you would object to my supposition that processes
> > are or can be considered entities.
> 
> I don't think it is unreasonable to think of processes as entities or, more
> accurately, to assert that the distinction between process and entity
> represents a false dichotomy.  This is an interesting point of view.  I
> don't agree, however, that this is the only reasonable point of view one can
> adopt.  I for one find it enlightening to consider the interplay between
> process and entity, given my definitions of these terms.

I don't disagree with your definition.  In fact, if I 
remember correctly, I've defined it similarly (I don't 
remember if I did so in this NG or in my notes).  

> 
> >> processes are
> >> constituted by dynamical interactions among structural entities.
> >> 
> >> I understand that this distinction can be somewhat artificial
> > 
> > Uh huh.
> 
> I also think this distinction can be real.  Convection is a process.  A
> convection cell is an entity.

Anything that's got boundaries, so I agree.  (And boundaries 
can only be relatively discreet.)

  Our understanding of nature would be
> frustrated if we could not consider the process of convection independently
> of convection cell entities.  For example, the process of convection
> develops in ways that are important to recognize before a convection cell
> has been manifested.

I think you're just saying we can model it, analogize it, 
in our minds.  I don't disagree.  But I don't see how this 
give us any reason to come to the conclusion (a conclusion 
that, frankly, is spiritualistic IMO) that, therefore, a 
process can actually exist and not be comprised of matter.

> 
> >> in regarding
> >> the physics of natural systems, because entities are
established through
> >> self-organizing processes, and processes self-organize
through constraints
> >> on the nature of interactions among entities.  Nevertheless, I find it
> >> useful to distinguish structure from process with these terms.
> > 
> > Useful?  If it's not accurate then it's usefulness can only be to
> > mislead.
> 
> I never said it was inaccurate.  I said the distinction was somewhat
> arbitrary.  This is my opinion because entities are always created and
> maintained by processes.

I don't know what the phrase, "distinguish structure from 
process," means.  So maybe my concern is not with its 
accuracy but its logic.  All in all, I still don't see how 
this brings you to the conclusion that a process can 
actually exist and not be comprised of matter.  Or maybe 
you have no backed off from that assertion.  I'm not 
exactly sure where you stand now.

> 
> [snip]
> 
> >>> If that that causes "genetic drift" and that
that causes natural
> >>> selection are one and the same (entities interacting with their
> >>> environment) and they are otherwise indistinguishable
then why do we
> >>> distinguish between them?
> >> 
> >> I have answered this directly before.  IMHO the validity of
this distinction
> >> is based on the perceptive scope of the target population.
> > 
> > Perceptive scope?  (I think you are just digging yourself in deeper.)
> 
> Maybe, but I don't think so.  I think you are missing my point.

I'm not.  It's easy to show that events that are plainly within 
the realm of NS are outside the "perceptive scope."  (Does a 
deer always know wether or not a tiger lurks behind the tall 
grass?)  In other words, the distinction you purport has no 
objective existence.  It's plainly subjective.

> 
> >> If the nature of
> >> the perturbation (causation) cannot be perceived by the
population, then the
> >> population cannot adapt to that kind of environmental factor.
> > 
> > Why would you say this?  Why can't they adapt?
> 
> This is a good question.  I have never had to articulate an answer to this
> particular question, and I have never seen it directly addressed by others.
> Populations cannot adapt to sources of perturbation that have no structural
> relationship to the population.

This contradicts the supposition, for example, that mammals 
emerged as a direct result of the KT boundary meteor impact.

  Another way to say this is that many kinds
> of perturbations (e.g. causes that change allele frequencies) can change
> gene pools in ways that cause the adaptive structure (vis a vis the
> environment) of the gene pool to deteriorate, rather than to be further
> constructed.  To the extent that a kind of perturbation occurs repeatedly
> over the period of systemic "memory", the potential for
adaptive change by
> the system (restructuring of the gene pool to become more robust in the face
> of this kind of perturbation, or even to use this type of perturbation as a
> resource) is increased.  Still, particular gene pools are better able to
> respond adaptively to particular kinds of perturbations than to others.  For
> example, I would predict that organismal gene pools would generally not be
> able to adapt to potential effects of antimatter effects that might
> influence something like which copy of a locus in a diploid system makes it
> into a particular gamete during meiosis.  This effect may be a rare one in
> the midst of many other sorts of causes that determine which locus copies go
> into particular gametes.  At the level of the gene pool, the result of all
> those causes occurring at scales much much smaller than that at which the
> gene pool is manifested, combine to generate stochastic effects at the scale
> of the gene pool.  Consequently, the gene pool adapts to this set of causes
> as if it were a single category of effect that we call stochasticity.

Which means nothing since *all* effects are potentially 
describable as stochastic.

> 
> The gene pool would not be able to adapt to my hypothetical antimatter
> incident because its effect is too small, too rare, and invisible at the
> scale of the gene pool.  Instead, this effect would be a component of what
> the gene pool would adapt to as the combined effect of random Mendelian
> segregation.  If you follow my argument, you will see that I am not claiming
> the absence of effect a the gene pool scale from the antimatter cause in a
> particular incidence.  On the contrary, I am arguing that the process of
> drift is composed of many such individual effects.  However, I am also
> arguing that the organismal population cannot adapt to these individual
> causes.  They can, however, more efficiently adapt to the combined effects
> of this category of causes by relying on the stochasticity of the set of
> effects.  This is why I think that drift manifests as a real and coherent
> process in gene pools.

All I'm getting from this is that, in your opinion, large 
effects are natural selection and small effects are drift.  
And then you make subjective judgements about where to draw 
the line between small effects and large effects.  Obviously 
I'm not going to buy into this.


> 
> >> One way this
> >> can happen, for example, is that the period between perturbations from
> >> particular source might be so great that the responding
system retains no
> >> memory of the previous event
> > 
> > Does the Biota not maintain the memory?  (It does.)
> 
> The influence of particular events on a gene pool diminishes over time,
> because those effects get erased by subsequent events.

The biota remembers best what is most important to achieving 
its goal:

The biggest problem the biota faces is catastrophic events, 
most notably meteor impacts which can, potentially, wipe out 
life altogether.  (In other words, the biota is an algorithm 
[and entity] that continually calculates [memory is involved 
with calculation] a design [morphology] and location of its 
respective parts [at all scales: lifeforms, populations, cells, 
ecosystems, DNA] that increases the probability that life will 
survive into eternity [by way of increasing the probability 
that it, the biota, can continue to calculate the same into 
eternity].  In other words the biota is an eternity algorithm.)  
A perfect example of this is the emergence of mammals as a 
result of the KT boundary impact at 65 mya.  (Another example 
of this is the cooling trend which is a direct result of the 
memory of the biota which has since changed the climate on 
this planet to better reflect the realites--the "nuclear 
winter" effect--that directly followed the KT boundary impact.)  
The biota remembers and prepares for all eventualities that it 
calculates will threaten its goal to achieve eternity.  Natural 
selection is this calculation process.  

  A small number of
> effects can also get amplified through the dynamics of the system, and this
> also squelches the memory of other effects.  All dynamical systems have the
> quality of memory, but not all effects are remembered equally or forever.

I agree.  As I indicated above, it remembers best what most 
threatens its goal.

> 
> [snip]
> 
> >> I hope that I successfully corrected this misimpression
above.  It is my
> >> opinion that real processes do have physical existence, but I
would not call
> >> them entities.  Let's not get bogged down in differences in
word usage.  We
> >> agree that processes have physical manifestation.
> > 
> > Aha!  I was wondering when you were finally going to come clean on
> > this point.  So you no longer maintain that the causation associated
> > with GD is the result of a non-physical process.  You now realize that
> > the causation is the result of the interaction of lifeforms with their
> > environment, like a said previously.
> 
> Aha, I was wondering when you would finally begin to understand what I have
> been saying all along.  So you no longer maintain that my position invokes
> metaphysics.

I'm not sure.  But it does seem you position has moved closer 
to mine.  Am I right in this assessment?

Jim
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