John Edser wrote:

> PR:-
> I think this thread has missed a little detail. The 
 > primary reason for aggression in animals pertains to
 > physical needs. In man, aggression is 9 times out of
 > tend a matter of defending one's EMOTIONAL TURF, i.e,
> one's need to maintain a sense of self-worth, 
 > significance, esteem, etc.
> 
> JE:-
> The trouble with most psychological explanations
> is that they mostly require a biological grounding.
> In the end, much of psychology becomes a subset of
> biology, which of course means: evolutionary
> theory.
> 

I couldn't agree more.   :)



        A Sketch of a Divergent Theory of Emotional Instability


Objective: To account for self-worth related emotion (i.e., needs for
    love, acceptance, moral integrity, recognition, achievement,
    purpose, meaning, etc.) and emotional disorder (e.g., depression,
    suicide, etc.) within the context of an evolutionary scenario; i.e., to
    synthesize natural science and the humanities; i.e., to answer the
    question:  'Why is there a species of naturally selected organism
    expending huge quantities of effort and energy on the survivalistically
    bizarre non-physical objective of  maximizing self-worth?'

Observation: The species in which rationality is most developed is
    also the one in which individuals have the greatest difficulty in
    maintaining an adequate sense of self-worth, often going to
    extraordinary lengths in doing so (e.g., Evel Knievel, celibate monks,
    self endangering Greenpeacers, etc.).

Hypothesis: Rationality is antagonistic to psycho centric stability (i.e.,
    maintaining an adequate sense of self-worth).

Explanation #1: In much the manner reasoning allows for the subordination
    of lower emotional concerns and values (pain, fear, anger, sex, etc.)
    to more global concerns (concern for the self as a whole), so too,
    these more global concerns and values can themselves become
    reevaluated and subordinated to other more global, more objective
    considerations. And if this is so, and assuming that emotional
    disorder emanates from a deficiency in self-worth resulting from
    precisely this sort of experientially based reevaluation, then it can
    reasonably be construed as a natural malfunction resulting from
    one's rational faculties functioning a tad too well.

Explanation #2:  Being the blind arational process that she
    is, mother nature instills in all her creatures a sense of their own
    importance (or of the importance of their needs) that is rationally
    inordinate.  And, as a species reaches a certain stage in its rational/
    cultural/memetic development, its members increasingly come to question
    this inordinancy, and increasingly come to require reasons for
    maintaining it (needs for love, acceptance, moral integrity, purpose,
    meaning, status, wealth, etc.).


    "Special concern for one's own future would be selected by
     evolution: Animals without such concern would be more likely
     to die before passing on their genes.  Such concern would
     remain, as a natural fact, even if we decided that it was not
     justified.  By thinking hard about the arguments, we might
     be able briefly to stun this natural concern.  But it would
     soon revive...  The fact that we have this attitude cannot
     therefore be a reason for thinking it justified.  Whether
     it is justified [i.e. rational] is an open question, waiting
     to be answered." (Derek Parfit)


Normalcy and Disorder: Assuming this is correct, then some
    explanation for the relative "normalcy" of most individuals would
    seem necessary. This is accomplished simply by postulating
    different levels or degrees of consciousness.  From this perspective,
    emotional disorder would then be construed as a valuative affliction
    resulting from an increase in semantic content in the engram indexed
    by the linguistic expression, "I am insignificant", which all
persons of
    common sense "know" to be true, but which the "emotionally
    disturbed" have come to "realize", through abstract thought,
    devaluing experience, etc.

Implications: So-called "free will" and the incessant activity presumed
    to emanate from it is simply the insatiable appetite we all have for
    self-significating experience which, in turn, is simply nature's way of
    attempting to counter the objectifying influences of our rational
    faculties. This also implies that the engine in the first
"free-thinking"
    artifact is probably going to be a diesel (i.e., the cure produces
    more of the disease).


    "Another simile would be an atomic pile of less than critical size: an
    injected idea is to correspond to a neutron entering the pile from
    without. Each such neutron will cause a certain disturbance which
    eventually dies away. If, however, the size of the pile is sufficiently
    increased, the disturbance caused by such an incoming neutron will
    very likely go on and on increasing until the whole pile is destroyed.
    Is there a corresponding phenomenon for minds?" (A. M. Turing).


Additional Implications: Since the explanation I have proposed
    amounts to the contention that the most rational species
    (presumably) is beginning to exhibit signs of transcending the
    formalism of nature's fixed objective (accomplished in man via
    intentional self concern, i.e., the prudence program) it can reasonably
    be construed as providing evidence and argumentation in support of
    Lucas (1961) and Penrose (1989, 1994). Not only does this imply
    that the aforementioned artifact probably won't be a computer,
    but it would also explain why a question such as "Can Human
    Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?" (Cohen, 1981)
    has led to controversy, in that it presupposes the possibility
    of a discrete (formalizable) answer to a question which can only
    be addressed in comparative (non-formalizable) terms (e.g. X is
    more rational than Y, the norm, etc.).  Along these same lines,
    the theory can also be construed as an endorsement or
    metajustification for comparative approaches in epistemology
    (explanationism, plausiblism, etc.)


    "So even if mathematicians are superb cognizers of mathematical
    truth, and even if there is no algorithm, practical or otherwise,
    for cognizing mathematical truth, it does not follow that the power
    of mathematicians to cognize mathematical truth is not entirely
    explicable in terms of their brain's executing an algorithm.  Not
    an algorithm for intuiting mathematical truth --  we can suppose that
    Penrose [via Godel] has proved that there could be no such thing.
    What would the algorithm be for, then?  Most plausibly it would be an
    algorithm -- one of very many -- for trying to stay alive ... " (D. C.
    Dennett).


Oops!  Sorry!  Wrong again, old bean. [me again]


    "My ruling passion is the love of literary fame" (David Hume).


   "I have often felt as though I had inherited all the defiance and
    all the passions with which our ancestors defended their Temple
    and could gladly sacrifice my life for one great moment in
    history" (Sigmund Freud).


    "He, too [Ludwig Wittgenstein], suffered from depressions and for long
    periods considered killing himself because he considered his life
    worthless, but the stubbornness inherited from his father may have
    helped him to survive" (Hans Sluga).


    "The inquest [Alan Turing's] established that it was suicide.  The
    evidence was perfunctory, not for any irregular reason, but because
    it was so transparently clear a case" (Andrew Hodges)



                               REFERENCES

1. Cohen, L. Jonathan, Can Human Irrationality be Experimentally
    Demonstrated?, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1981, 4, 317-370.

2. Lucas, J. R., Minds, Machines and Godel, Philosophy, Vol XXXVI (1961).
    Reprinted in Anderson's, Minds and Machines, and engagingly explored
    in Hofstadter's Pulitzer prize winner, Godel, Escher, Bach: An
    Eternal Golden Braid.

3. Penrose, Roger, The Emperor's New Mind, 1989; Shadows of the Mind,
    1994.





> One of the greatest contributions to the debate
> on the biological functionality of aggression,
> was V. C. Wynne-Edwards. His book: "Animal 
> Dispersion In Relation To Social Behaviour" 
> was first printed in 1962. He assumed group 
> selection as his main inductive premise, 
> which was a pity because it is just 
> logically, false. However, this does not 
> detract from the worth of the book. The 
> range of observations he assembles is 
> enormous. The pattern that emerges is
> simple and straight forward. One sex,
> mostly but not exclusively the male,
> divides an area up into reproductive 
> territories. The other sex, mostly 
> the female, compete for the males
> with the better territories, on which 
> to rear their young to adulthood. 
> 
> Watson  and Moss, who worked with Edwards at 
> the university of Edinburgh documented grouse
> biology re: aggression and territory 
> formation. Male grouse aggression
> levels were found to be linked to food quality
> and abundance. Grouse eat heather tips 
> which vary considerably from year to year 
> in their nutrient content. The less nutrient 
> in the heather tips, the more aggressive the 
> male grouse become and the larger grouse
> territories become. Increased aggression 
> levels could be experimentally elicited by
> injections of male hormones. Some males
> so treated, gained territories only because 
> of their aggression level increases.
> 
> Larger grouse territories are required 
> to feed a grouse family in a poor heather 
> year but smaller grouse territories are
> required to feed the same family in
> a good year. Thus it is commonsense that males
> stake out larger territories in poor years
> and smaller territories in good years.
> Thus, the correct level of male aggression
> is the key. If aggression is too high
> then both the grouse and the heather suffer
> an avoidable loss in fitness because grouse
> breeding territories become too large
> (the higher the male aggression levels are 
> the larger the territories become). Grouse 
> end up reproducing less adults than they 
> could have done. The heather ends up with 
> less fertilizer than it could have had. 
> If male grouse aggression levels decrease 
> too much, then territories become too small 
> to feed a grouse family so grouse fitness 
> may be reduced. Again, both the heather 
> and the grouse can lose out. Selection
> is searching for the highest mutual fitness
> that the environment can support. Here the 
> heather is preserved from over grazing 
> by, amazingly,  "selfish grouse" producing 
> territories large enough to support a
> maximal grouse family so the heather can
> enjoy the maximal amount of fertiliser.
> 
> Grouse faecal waste from the grouse,
> produce heather nutrients. Thus the 
> problem that nature is addressing was: how 
> do the grouse and the heather manipulate 
> each other such that each gets a maximum
> of what it requires at minimal cost? The 
> best possible result is for both is 
> to maximally increase their respective 
> populations within  environmental 
> limitations, so that both are assured of 
> a maximum  availability of what they both 
> require at a minimum access, cost.
> 
> If the grouse eats just the right amount of
> heather tips, then heather fitness will not 
> be reduced but will be increased. Allowing
> more grouse to be raised to adulthood 
> allows more heather fertiliser and thus 
> more heather, i.e. its a win/win situation 
> only as long as Darwinian fitness remains 
> mutualised. 
> 
> If the grouse over eat the heather, then
> heather fitness can be lowered but the 
> fitness of the grouse in the following 
> season may also be lowered increasing
> competition between grouse, further 
> decimating the heather. Since both
> the heather and the grouse can live 
> to breed more than one season (note
> that many grouse die over winter) then
> Darwinian fitness: the total number 
> of adult (fertile) forms reproduced 
> per parent, is very sensitive to the 
> reproductive results of _more_ than 
> just one season.
> 
> If the number of grouse in the next 
> season are reduced, then heather 
> fertiliser also becomes reduced and 
> so may heather fitness. Thus, over
> eating OR under eating heather 
> tips by the grouse should be selected 
> against because of selection acting
> on both i.e. selective forces on 
> both the grouse and the heather will 
> attempt to mutualise their respective 
> fitnesses. This view contrasts with 
> Van Valen's popular, Red Queen view
> (at Swift's Mad Hatter's Tea
> Party, the Red Queen has to run hard 
> just to remain on the same spot). 
> Van Valen visualised a fitness war.
> 
> According to Van Valen's view, the more the grouse 
> exploit the heather, the more the heather must "fight 
> back", i.e. invest to protect the heather against 
> grouse exploitation, leading to a costly armaments 
> war between the grouse and the heather. 
> This fitness war can end up just reducing the 
> absolute  fitness of both, i.e. reduce the total 
> number of fertile, organism reproductive totals 
> per parent, on a mutual basis. Relative fitness 
> (a comparison of absolute fitnesses) can 
> hide this cost, leading to the "winner"
> actually _losing_ on an absolute fitness 
> basis, i.e. as one wins over the other,
> both spiral downwards towards the extinction
> of both. Such is the final cost of all wars...
> 
> Fitness mutualisation is more efficient than
> fitness warfare. Watson and Moss did not
> assume fitness mutualisation, they assumed
> group selection. This moves the level of
> selection from the Darwinian organism level 
> up to, the organism population level.
> Thus grouse aggression was supposed by
> Watson and Moss to be a group selected trait
> which optimised grouse density in order to
> preserve heather fitness for other grouse,
> i.e. it assumes the assumption of organism 
> fitness altruism, a Darwinistic no, no. 
> 
> Today, it's "selfish genes" that are 
> supposed to produce the same organism 
> "altruistic fitness" behaviour. Both are 
> logically incorrect inductions (false
> general explanations of "why"). An 
> additive in fitness entity cannot be 
> selected as a single entity and all genes
> are protected from independent selection 
> by the central dogma of biochemistry.
> 
> Fitness mutualisation has never been seriously
> considered as a process within nature, yet
> it remains the only possible logical induction
> and the most efficient mechanism, available.
> 
> 
> Regards,
> 
> John Edser
> Independent Researcher
> 
> PO Box 266
> Church Pt
> NSW 2105
> Australia
> 
> edser{at}ozemail.com.au
> 
> 
> 
>
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