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2511 (2) (a) (i) IT SHALL NOT BE UNLAWFULL under this chapter FOR AN
OPERATOR of a switchboard, OR an officer, EMPLOYEE, or agent OF A
PROVIDER OF wire or ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE, whos facilities
are used in the transmission of a wire communication, TO INTERCEPT,
DISCLOSE, or use that communication in the normal course of his
employment while engaged in an activity which is a necessary incident to
the rendition of his services or to the protection of those rights
or property of the provider of that service, except that a provider
of wire communication service to the public shall not utilize service
observing or random monitoring except for machanical or service
quality control checks.
The above section is based upon the way it has always been in the
telecom industry which states that a provider can monitor communications
so long as its in the course of duty.  Telephone lineman have always
had the ability to clip onto phone lines (and even listen in) for
service work as well as the technicians in the frame room had that
same ability. The only difference is that the ECPA seems to add a little
bit of privacy protection which cuts abuse. The exceptions are that
the telco cant randomly monitor peoples calls for the hell of it
(this was a big BELL scandal in the 1970's which involved a sting
operation which nailed dozens of operators who were arrested for
randomly monitoring lines.  As a result it was made so that a tone
must be injected onto a phone line when an operator drops in.) This
seems to take things take things a bit further to protect from
not only abuse by Operators but also telco personell as well as
"dirty" law enforcement operations where lines can be monitored
without a warrant under the guise of  "normal telephone maintenance".
So long as its in the course of legitimate duty to track down problems
and insure that the system is working to planned efficiency, etc.
the telco personell can listen into either WIRELINE, or CELLULAR
converstions on any channel or line pair they so choose.
In additon, any agent, employee (etc..) of a communications provider
may divulge any unintentionally intercepted conversation which was of
an alleged ilegal or criminal nature to a proper law enforcement
agency who can then investigate and such interception could be used
in a court of law under 2511-B-3(b)-iv.
It is also interestig to note the catch phrase  "public provider"
which was either unintentionally used, or was used in a very deliberate
and devious manner.  This seems to excuse any gov/military telephone
communication systems, as well as public providers who have special
phone networks (secured networks) set up for government use. That means
if a legitimate Telco employee heard agregiously illegal activity occuring
through government transmission lines while in the course of
legitimate line maintenance, the telco employee could not report that
illegal act to anyone, because I guess apparently the government is
above the law and the govt has adequate protection in place to prevent
any government agent, employee for being held accountable for their
illegal acts... but hey, what the hell do I know, thats only what the
law says in plain black and white.
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2511 (2) (B) (e)  Notwithstanding any other provision of this title
[18 USCS .. 1 et seq.] or Section 705 or 706 of the Communications
Act of 1934 [47 USCS .. 605 or 606], it shall not be unlawfull for
an officer, employee, or agent of the United States in the normal
course of his official duty to conduct electronic surveillance, as
defined in Section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 [50USCS .. 1801], as authorized by that Act [50USCS-1801et-seq.]
This is a real comlicated provision, although it appears simple enough
in itself, the reference to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
is just 1 of the many laws which must be cross referenced in order
to actually understand what this article means. Its one big spiders web
which takes along time to unravel unless your familiar with the
Surveillance and Espionage laws as well as the activities of ceartain
intelligence agencies and agencies which conduct counterintelligence (FBI).
In sum, this provision gives the NSA and the CIA much the same powers
as the FCC is granted seperately under the ECPA as well as other FCC
applicable laws.  Those powers being the ability to intercept any
frequency including cellular, as well as any microwave links which
transmit telephonic communication through a repeater site, sattelite
uplink downlink site, etc.. and to monitor the conversations on such
channels so long as it is in the course of 'duty' which in the case of
domestic interception means they can  "test"  their receiving equipment
by monitoring any channel they so choose to make sure their equipment
works to receive properly on those channels.  So the NSA has
the same powers as does the Telecommunications Companies and the
FCC in regard to "test and quality insurance checks" of reception eqpt.
The NSA and CIA also have other monitoring abilities domestically under the
Surveillance Laws.... one of which, is the NSA can monitor telephonic
transmissions (BOTH WIRELINE and CELLULAR, etc..) in the domestic
United States with the provision that their target(s) are non-citizens
of the United States.  This can mean that the NSA can intercept
telephonic communications which are traveling internationally to
other countries, or from what I understand can also be intercepted
domestically in the U.S. if the call is going to a foreign embassy, etc..
(which is technically considered "non-US soil".).  The NSA is also claimed
to have other powers,  but I really like most people in this FIDONET
echo am not in such a position as to speak authoritatively on what
other powers the NSA has so I'll skip further speculation.
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2518 - 3 (Procedure for Interception of Wire, Oral or Electronic Comms)
2518 - 3 Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order,
as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire,
oral or electrnic communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court in which the judge is sitting (and outside that jurisdiction but within
the United States in the case of a mobile interception device authorized by a
Federal court within such jurisdiction), if the judge determines on the basis
of the facts submitted by an applicant that -
The above provision states that the federal government can monitor electronic
communications (telephone conversations, etc..) through the use of "mobile
interception equipment" and that any phone tap NEED NOT! be directed soely
at one point of origin such as at a TELCO C.O. or CEllular MTSO Office, etc..
This means that cellular communications can be intercepted with a
SCANNER, SCANNING RECEIVER or any other device capable of targeting the
individual in question while not intercepting any unintentional transmissions
from others who may use the same frequency such as in a short range
transmission or frequecy reuse systems such as cellular and/or cordless.
Normally, in mobile interception, law enforcement would not use a
"SCANNER" per se' as that would likely unintentionally pick up the wrong
target,  but instead uses a device called a "cellular phone interception
system" which is a device composed of a SCANNER (or more sophisticated
dedicated receiver) and a COMPUTER with INTERFACE SOFTWARE. The device as
a whole has the ability to remotely control the scanner, so that it will
automatically track only a specific user (the target) and that unit will
hand-off frequencies the same as a cellular site would hand-off frequencies
by controlling the scanner through automatic software.
This dispells yet another myth, that all taps must be made at some
central point (such as a telecommunications provider.). That has never
been the case, especially in the past.  Although laws regarding such
were toughened in the late 1970's to combat FBI illegal bugging, wiretap
activites, the laws have recently been severely weakened due to a panic
over influences such as "organized crime" and "drugs" and "weapons".
As such the laws were weakened so that taps can be done without any warrant
so long as an "emergency" exists (and the word "emergency" is somewhat
questionable in itself) so long as the warrant is properly applied for
within a given period of time thereafter the initial tap.) That time
period being 48 hours.   Being able to perform taps through "mobile"
means is especially important for law enforcement in cases where
the individual in question may travel alot (hint: hint: big time criminals
who galavant across the country on "business trips"). In such cases a
cellular tap at the targets local telecom provider would be completely
useless as it would not be able to intercept the conversations as the
person travels in other states or telecom regions.
Warrants for communications interception are generally issued
by providing the intercepted targets name, as well as how long the
interception shall take place for, the means of interception, and
where the interception is to take place (which can be specified as
"mobile" if the LEOs need that capability).   Communications Intercept
warrants are NOT like search warrants.  Under the ECPA you do not
need a street address, or other "fixed" information. You merely need
a name, and a reason for intercept. As such the LEO's are allowed to use
any interception means they so desire so long as it is specified
in some detail in the request. (that is, the LEO's can use "any" technique
they so choose as long as they tell the judge in the request that other
means of investigation turned up no evidence and that this method
is a necessity and a last resort.)
[End of File]
--- GEcho 1.00
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