Valor - By John L. Frisbee, Contributing Editor
                       The Only Way Out
    When China entered the Korean War in November 1950, several
 thousand US troops were entrapped near the Chosin Reservoir in
 North Korea. Their rescue was imperative.
     On Sept. 15, 1950, United Nations forces staged a successful
 landing at Inchon on the west coast of Korea in a drive to out-
 flank the North Korean army. UN forces then advanced rapidly into
 North Korea.
     Gen. Douglas MacArthur predicted that North Korea would be de-
 feated and the war ended by Thanksgiving.  He thought there was
 little likelihood that China would intervene to save its Communist
 neighbor.
     While UN and South Korean forces were advancing, the Chinese
 were surreptitiously moving more than a hundred thousand troops
 into position west of the Yalu River. It was one of the most suc-
 cessful clandestine maneuvers of military history. After a few mi-
 nor feelers by small numbers of "volunteers," the Chinese struck
 in force on Nov. 27.
     With virtually no support from air, armor, or artillery, some
 120,000 Chinese troops overwhelmed the 12,000 Marines of the 1st
 Marine Division and the four Army battalions numbering about 3,000
 men.
     The human wave attack left thousands of dead Chinese as the UN
 forces fought a courageous retreat in subzero weather to the vicin-
 ity of Hagaru-ri, a small village at the south tip of the Chosin
 Reservoir. There, they were surrounded by an estimated 70,000 enemy
 troops. Marines and Navy fighters kept the Chinese at bay.
     The Marines and Army gathered their wounded and those suffering
 severe frostbite, to care for them as best they could.  Encumbered
 by several hundred incapacitated men, there was no way out. The only
 solution was air evacuation.
     Under fire from the surrounding hills, the Marines scraped out a
 2,500-foot strip from the frozen ground. A dike at the north end
 made it a two-way strip with landings to the north and takeoffs to
 the south.
    Maj. Gen. William H. Tunner, commander of the Far East Air Forces
 Combat Cargo Command, was assigned the perilous task of evacuation
 to the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, based at Itazuke, Japan. Eleven
 of its C-47s, the only available aircraft that could operate from
 the primitive strip and carry a respectable load, were moved to K-27
 on the east coast of Korea. They would haul supplies into Hagaru-ri,
 then fly the wounded back to K 27 for airlift in C-54s to hospitals
 in Japan.
     Tunner's C-119s, which could not operate from the strip, dropped
 additional supplies to the besieged men. Marine and Navy fighter air-
 craft provided continuous coverage during daylight hours.
     Operating from the strip called for skilled, experienced crews.
 The strip was a bowl, surrounded by mountains. There were no reli-
 able local weather reports, no navigation aids, and unpredictable
 braking conditions on the frozen runway.  The strip could be used
 only during the few hours of daylight. Approach was over enemy oc-
 cupied mountains and departure through a narrow valley with hundreds
 of Chinese snipers concealed in caves.
     Most of the C-47s were hit more than once, but none was downed
 by enemy fire. One pilot had his elevator cables severed by a lucky
 shot but, by coordinated use of trim tabs and throttles, made it
 safely back to K-27. One C-47 lost was In a takeoff accident in
 which there were no serious injuries.
     The more or less standard load for evacuation flight was 35 men,
 compared to 19 or 20 for commercial DC-3s. That standard often was
 stretched to crowd in a in a few who otherwise would have to be left
 in the cold until another flight arrived.  One C-47 mushed off the
 runway with 46 aboard.
     One of the many hazards faced by crews was poor winter visibil-
 ity, especially in the early morning when the strip could be blan-
 keted by smoke and fog. On one morning vertical visibility was fair
 but forward visibility near zero.  A pilot circling over the strip
 announced that he could provide a controlled approach if anyone
 wanted to try it. He then directed the approach of a volunteer,
 telling him when to turn to final approach, then giving directional
 corrections on final. It worked until ground visibility improved.
     The evacuation continued for six days, with crews often flying
 several missions a day to the point of exhaustion. When the last of
 the wounded and dead had been flown out, the tally showed that those
 11 C-47 crews of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron had evacuated 4,608
 wounded and 87 dead.
     Those totals included some evacuations from Koto-ri, a second
 strip hacked out to support the able-bodied who fought their way out
 on foot when the air evacuation was completed.  In total, the 1st
 Marine Division had suffered 8,700 casualties. Army losses were even
 heavier.
     On their inbound flights, the C-47s had delivered 547,000 pounds
 of supplies, supplemented by air drops from C-119s that could not
 operate from either strip.
     The C-119s also parachuted several spans of a bridge to replace
 one south of Koto-ri that the Chinese had destroyed. The center-piece
 of the evacuation was the 21st Sguadron, however. That squadron was
 one of the first three units of the war to be awarded the Distin-
 guished Unit Citation for its "conspicuous gallantry and heroism
 that distinguished it from other units in the Korean campaignų"
 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1997
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