William Morse  wrote in message
news:...

> I also remember a very interesting 
> article in Scientific American last year discussing research on policing, 
> in which one person could determine the split of a pot of money between 
> the two subjects and the second person could accept the split (with both 
> receiving the split share) or reject the split (with both receiving 
> nothing). It was made clear that this was a one time interaction, so 
> there was no incentive for the second subject to reject based on a future 
> negotiation with the first subject. Under game theory the first subject 
> should propose a lopsided split in their favor, and the second subject 
> should accept such a split (also note that the amount of money was enough 
> to represent a significant windfall for many of the participants). In 
> fact the first subjects typically proposed splits close to 50:50 and the 
> second subjects rejected splits that were significantly lower than that. 
> The only reasonable explanation for this behavior has to be based on 
> group selection.

But where are the groups?  As far as I can see, we have a group of two
individuals, behaving in a manner which reduces the group's success. 
If group selection is at work, the second player should always accept,
as their dyad generates a payoff rather than not generating a payoff.

I assume that you refer to group selection in our past, having shaped
the human psyche in such a spiteful manner. So really what you are
suggesting is that the subjects are behaving irrationally, and haven't
really divorced this artificial situation from the context in which
they have evolved.  You seem to suggest that at some level they
perceive the existence of a group which will ultimately benefit from
this decision.  Why should this perceived beneficiary be a group?  Why
rule out the possibility that player two, at some irrational level,
perceives that (s)he will benefit from this course of action due to a
possible run in with player 1 in the future?  Because player two is
told by the experimenters that the game is a one-off?  I'm concerned
that in order to accept your conclusion I have to simultaneously
believe that humans are irrational products of their evolutionary past
(i.e. they believe that being spiteful in a two player interaction in
a research institution can somehow enhance the fitness of their social
group), yet their rationality reappears so that they able to fully
comprehend the meaning of a one-off game, even though these games must
have occurred very infrequently during the social evolution of early
humans.

Also, can we really rule out fear of retaliation?  I assume that the
studies were carried out with complete anonymity, but can the subjects
really be 100% sure that what their behaviour in that room, and their
identity, will not be released in such a way as to impair their social
standing at some point in the future?  Even if there is absolute
assurance, should the subjects trust the experimenters?  And again,
this is such an artificial set up, bearing no relation to any kind of
social encounter in our evolutionary past.  Even if the subject is
really convinced that there will be no consequences of their actions
other than the monetary payoff, they may be religious and believe that
some deity is looking on, ready to pass judgement.

I'm not the sort of person who criticises abstract models on the
grounds that they are abstractions.  However, on this occasion, I feel
that the whole experimental setup is, perhaps unavoidably, flawed.
---
þ RIMEGate(tm)/RGXPost V1.14 at BBSWORLD * Info{at}bbsworld.com

---
 * RIMEGate(tm)V10.2áÿ* RelayNet(tm) NNTP Gateway * MoonDog BBS
 * RgateImp.MoonDog.BBS at 11/1/03 6:08:53 AM