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Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley
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For Immediate Release Office of the Press Secretary June 26, 2008

Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley James S. Brady
Press Briefing Room

˙˙Press Briefings


9:23 A.M. EDT

MR. HADLEY: Good morning. I think you probably all heard the President's
statement this morning about developments in the six-party talks involving
the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. I wanted to provide a little
more detail on some of the things that the President talked about, and then
I'd be delighted to answer questions.

First, let me talk a little bit about what the North Korea -- North Korea
has done, and this really involves implementing a series of agreements that
began in September of '05, a follow-on and more refinement in February of
'07, then again in October of '07, and in the first and second phase of the
process outlined in those documents.

North Korea was to disable its nuclear facilities, beginning with the
plutonium facilities at Yongbyon. And that process is coming along pretty
well and pretty far along. That process has been overseen by
representatives of the six-party talks. The United States has been very
much involved with support as we go forward with the IAEA. And that process
continues.

The second thing that North Korea was to do in the so-called second phase
was to declare its nuclear activity. And what provoked, of course, the
President's statement this morning was that the North Koreans did provide
to the Chinese, who have been the convener, if you will, of this six-party
effort, their declaration. This will describe their nuclear activity. It is
a good first step in getting the kind of disclosure and transparency into
North Korea's nuclear activities as part of and a step towards their
disablement, dismantlement and termination of those activities.

The North Koreans, as part of that process, have indicated that the
six-party representatives will have access to their facilities, including
the reactor core, including waste sites. They will make available
documents, records, operating manuals and the like -- they've already made
available over 19,000 pages of documents -- and that the six parties will
have access to personnel involved in their nuclear programs.

This is important because it is part of this process to be able to verify
the declaration that the North Koreans have filed. And I want to emphasize,
this is not something that's being imposed on the North Koreans. They have
agreed to this process, and they have agreed to make available the things
that I've described. And we are looking for, in the next days ahead, to the
six parties agreeing on verification principles, a verification protocol,
and to the monitoring mechanism that will oversee this process. And we
expect these things to be in place in the next 45 days.

Now, the premise of these documents I described in this six-party process
has been, as the President said, action for action. And in these prior
agreements, the six parties committed that if North Korea would take these
steps in Phase Two, then the United States would take two actions: One,
there would -- and these are the actions that the President announced this
morning -- one is a proclamation that lifts the Trading with the Enemy Act
as it applies to North Korea. And I want to come back to that and describe
a little bit what that means. And secondly, the President was committed and
did today notify the Congress of his intent to lift North Korea's status as
a state sponsor of terror within the next 45 days.

In addition, part of this Phase Two has also been the delivery of fuel oil
or the economic equivalent. That is something that was committed to -- fuel
oil to North Korea -- and that obligation is being carried out.

In terms of the lifting of the status of North Korea under the Trading with
the Enemies Act, it has the following consequences. There are certain --
really, three categories of sanctions that are in place in part because of
this legislation that will be lifted. They involve some requirements of
licensing for Americans who want to import goods from North Korea into the
United States; there are some provisions that affect U.S. persons
participating in shipments of third countries to North Korea; and finally
there are some prohibitions with respect to certain financial transfers by
the North Korean government.

These will expire so far as they look to the Trading with the Enemies Act
as the statutory basis for their being imposed, and these will be lifted.

There are two other prohibitions that result from North Korea being on the
Trading with the Enemies Act that are going to be kept in place by an
executive order that the President also signed today, and these involve the
interaction of U.S. persons with ships that are flagged under the North
Korean flag, and secondly the freezing of certain kind of assets that were
first frozen in 2000.

So these are symbolic acts -- that is to say, getting North Korea off the
Trading with the Enemies Act, and also the prospect of lifting their status
under the state support to terror. They have some consequences in terms of
easing sanctions. I will tell you, and the North Koreans understand, that
the degree of easing of sanctions is relatively minor. North Korea remains
one of the most sanctioned regimes not only by U.S. bilateral sanctions,
but also under the U.N. Security Council resolution 1718, and actions taken
by other countries.

The prospect for North Korea, of course, is this is in response to the
actions they are taking, and the prospect that as they take further actions
to carry out the commitments they made in September of '05, then sanctions
will lift, and some benefits will start coming to North Korea, such as the
fuel oil that was part of Phase Two.

We appreciate the declaration, obviously, that North Korea has provided to
China today, and that will be ultimately circulated to the six parties.
That said, we have some concerns that will be addressed as part of this
verification and monitoring process that we talked about today.

One of those, of course, is just exactly how much plutonium has North Korea
produced, and the access to records and personnels and to sites that the
North Koreans have said the six parties will have will help answer that
question, because understanding how much plutonium North Korea has
produced, of course, is the step to ultimately having that plutonium
removed from North Korea as part of the denuclearization of the Peninsula
to which North Korea has agreed.

Secondly, there's concerns about the uranium enrichment program. This was
something that was really discovered in 2001-2002 time frame. The North
Koreans initially affirmed the program; they subsequently denied it. They
have basically said that they are not now engaged in any enrichment
activities, and they will not be engaging in uranium enrichment activities
in the future.

That said, our intelligence community has some concerns about their past
activities and has some concerns about potentially ongoing activities. And
we have been learning more about these potential activities, as part of
this six-party process. That's one of the things that has been useful about
it. And the second thing is that it provides a framework for us to be able
to pursue these concerns with North Korea and to get to the bottom of this
issue of the uranium enrichment program, because it would be one of the
programs that North Korea has agreed to end as part of the six-party
process -- because, remember, it is a denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, and the ending of all nuclear programs and activities by North
Korea. That's what North Korea has agreed to; that's what this process is
about.

Obviously we're concerned about their proliferation activities. Everybody
knows about the activity with respect to Syria and North Korea assistance
in building a nuclear reactor in Syria. We want to get to the bottom of
that so we understand what that activity was to make sure there is not
continuing activity going on between North Korea and Syria, or activity
with respect to other locations as well.

And that is why, of course, the verification and monitoring regime that we
talked about -- the verification and monitoring protocol is so important,
and we believe it will -- using the access that North Korea has agreed to
give us, will allow us over time to get to the bottom of these questions.
But I want to emphasize the "over time." This is a process. It is going to
take time. This is an important step today. I think it marks some real
progress in this process that we have had -- not had before, but as the
President emphasized, it needs to be followed by a series of other steps.
And this is going to take some time.

So a good day. More to do. And I'd be delighted to answer any questions.
Terry.

Q Could you clarify -- does North Korea come clean about its cooperation
with Syria on its nuclear program? Does it document how many nuclear bombs,
nuclear weapons that it has? And does it come clean about uranium
enrichment? You said that these are things you need to get to the bottom
of.

MR. HADLEY: Right.

Q Are they not in this accounting?

MR. HADLEY: What they -- the accounting they have given is, we are not now
engaged in any enrichment program or any proliferation activities and will
-- we will not in the future. But, of course, part of being able to confirm
that they're not now engaging in these activities is to be able to
understand what they did in the past, because that is the only way we can
be able to say we understand what was done in the past, we have seen that
being wound down, and we therefore have confidence that they are not
undergoing that activity.

So the declaration they've made, what the disclosure they made is, we're
not engaged in this activity now, will not engage it in the future. We've
made it very clear in this process and in the documents that constitute the
declaration, that we have concerns about their past activities in Syria and
in the enrichment area, and that raises questions about whether they have,
in fact, are engaging in none of that activity today.

We've made those concerns clear. The North Koreans acknowledge those
concerns. They know we are going to want to be pursuing them in this
six-party process, and that's, of course, what is ahead of us.

You had a second part --

Q About the stockpiles. Do they acknowledge -- do they say what's in the
inventory, how many bombs --

MR. HADLEY: They do. They don't say it in terms of number of bombs. That is
something that is a so-called Phase Three issue that we will get to, the
process by identifying and moving the plutonium out of the country, whether
in bomb form or not. What they agreed to do, and what they do in the
declaration, is say how many kilograms of plutonium their activities to
date have produced. And one of the things, of course, we want to do is to
be able to verify the accuracy of that number, and the North Koreans have,
as I said, made very clear that they will give us the access to the
facilities and documents, the persons that will hopefully allow us to do
that.

Q Does that tell you, then, that -- does that amount, what they say, does
that tell you how many bombs they had? If they say, we have X --

MR. HADLEY: Yes, it's pretty easy to do the math, because we generally know
-- have some sense of the weapons that they tested, generally know what
kind of plutonium -- how much plutonium is required to make a nuclear
device. So it's a good starting point, but obviously we have more to do.

Bill.

Q You say that you are aware, or that they are aware of your concerns about
these other issues not addressed today.

MR. HADLEY: Well, addressed in the sense, Bill, of they say they're not
engaged in these activities now and won't in the future. They also have
acknowledged in writing that we have raised concerns about their enrichment
activities in the past and their actions with respect to Syria. And they
have, as you've noticed, have not been out publicly denying that -- or
discounting these concerns. So we're in a situation of not quite admitting,
not denying, but opening the door for us to be able to try and get greater
clarity.

Q Is this, does anything in the present agreements obligate them to come
clean on these issues? You know what your critics are saying, that they
will continue to evade, prevaricate and otherwise avoid full answers.

MR. HADLEY: Well, we will see. We've made it clear that in order for this
process to go forward, which has further obligations by them, but also
further benefits for them in terms of ultimately moving to normalization of
relations and the like, we've made it very clear that for us to move
forward, we are going to need to be able to get to the bottom of these
issues with respect to plutonium enrichment and proliferation.

Q But they're not obliged to give you all of these answers.

MR. HADLEY: Well, we've -- they've set up a process; they've said we will
have access. We've said we were going to be making the questions, and that
we need to get answers and be satisfied or we aren't going to be able to
move forward. It's pretty clear.

Sir.

Q Secretary Rice said that the U.S. has the information to verify the
dismantlement of the nuclear program, but isn't nonproliferation a
different issue? Isn't that something that's going to be very difficult to
monitor in the future, as it has been in the past?

MR. HADLEY: Yes. Yes. This is a very closed regime. And part of this
process is to see if we can get this regime to open up with respect to the
nuclear issues. And our hope, of course, is that -- and it's in the
September '05 document -- that the opening up that we hope the regime will
do on the nuclear issues in order for us to get satisfaction on these three
issues will be part of a gradual process of opening this regime, because we
think that is the way, ultimately, we're going to be able to do something
which is something all of us would like to do, and that the President
talked about today -- have this regime open up and provide a better life to
their people.

Q Is there anything in this process that makes pursuing their proliferation
in the future easier for you to follow on?

MR. HADLEY: Yes, there is a monitoring mechanism, and we have the
commitments from the North Koreans for the kind of access that I described.
One of the things, for example, that will be very important is to get a
better understanding of their uranium ore and processing activities up
front, how much uranium ore were they able to pull out of the ground,
because that will tell you how much they might have had available for
proliferation for a plutonium program, for an enrichment program, and
potentially, proliferation overseas, which, of course, would be extremely
troubling.

The thing that will be difficult to get our hands around is other
arrangements like they had with Syria, other facilities either in Syria
that we have suspicions about, perhaps, or other facilities and patterns of
cooperation with other countries. That's why access to the people involved
in the nuclear program is going to be very important, because in the end of
the day, those are programs driven less by material and more by brains, and
brains are in the hands of their people. And so that's why we think access
to their personnel is going to be very important.

Sir.

Q Once the Trading with the Enemy Act provisions are lifted and North Korea
is removed from the terrorism black list, what kind of business and trade
opportunities would there be for U.S. companies? You said the lifting of
the sanctions will be a relatively minor impact.

MR. HADLEY: Right. At this phase, very little, very little. There are all
kinds of reasons why, for most companies, North Korea is not particularly
attractive at this point in time. And secondly, there are a whole series of
sanctions that are in place because of North Korean human rights activity,
because of their 2006 nuclear tests, because of their proliferation
activities of various sorts. So, this is not opening the door, at this
point in time, for commercial relations.

Now, as we move forward in implementing the September '05 agreement, and as
this process moves into later phases, that is one of the prospects that is
open. But in terms of economic benefits now, substantial economic benefits,
relaxation of trading, we're too early in this process at this point.

Q Is this more of a symbolic type of move?

MR. HADLEY: I think it is symbolic. I think, for the North Koreans, I think
it is important to them not to be on a list that says "enemies," and not to
be on a list as supporters of terror. And that's what they asked for, and
we've said, again, in terms of this step-by-step process, action for
action, if they took these actions, we would take the action that the
President took today.

Steven Lee.

Q How many kilograms did they declare in their thing? And do you believe
that that's a complete accounting? And is it fair to say that you've been
willing to accept a less than thorough or complete declaration in order to
keep this process moving forward?

MR. HADLEY: One, I have not seen the declaration. It is going to be
released by the Chinese today. It is, so far as I know, not yet back in
Washington. I know what they have talked about, and it is a number that is
in -- within the range of our intelligence community, but our intelligence
community does have a range. And one of the things we will be trying to do
is to be able, with this process, to narrow that range to get to the point
where we think, yes, they've -- where we want to be is, yes, we think with
pretty good confidence they've disclosed all the plutonium they produced.

I think one of the things we did in this process, to be honest, is I think
we learned a bit. I think what we learned was the notion that they could,
in December, provide a document which on its face would be so compelling
that we could say it's complete and correct, no further work required, was
probably unrealistic. And that is why we have emphasized, and have worked
with our six parties and with the North Koreans -- I want to emphasize that
-- this has been a cooperative process. This is not something we're
imposing on the North Koreans, it is something that they have agreed to and
will be part of in the six-party process.

What we really needed to have is a declaration that is verifiable, that
will allow us in a process of verification and monitoring to gain
confidence over time that what they've told us is true. And I think we
signed on for a two-dimensional process, and I think we learned over time
we need a three-dimensional process that's going to take place over time.

The second thing I would say on that is we also want to -- while that
process goes forward, and assuming the North Koreans participated in good
faith -- we also want to be able to move forward in the process of moving
from disablement to dismantlement, and ultimately getting the plutonium,
whether in weapons form or otherwise, corralled and given up in some form,
because, again, that's what the North Koreans agreed to in September of
'05.

Yes, ma'am.

Q Two questions. The President this morning in his remarks said that if
North Korea makes the wrong choices, doesn't fully disclose and end their
plutonium enrichment, their proliferation efforts, he said the U.S. and the
other members in the six-party talks would respond accordingly and there
would be further consequences. What exactly would those be?

MR. HADLEY: The six-party framework in which we have been operating has
always had two heads to it, sort of a Janus face. One is, when the North
Koreans are willing to cooperate and to negotiate, it is a forum for
negotiation. But in those periods over this process where they have stepped
away from the negotiations, it has also been a forum for coordinating
pressure on North Korea. And it's really been from the very beginning this
notion that North Korea has a strategic choice to make: If it cooperates,
carries forth on its commitments, then it has the prospect for improving
its relations with the international community, ultimately normalization of
relations, economic benefits, trades, and all the rest. But if they make
the other choice of confrontation and being unwilling to carry out their
obligations, then there will be consequences.

To the extent applicable, and to the extent we can do it legally, we would
reimpose past sanctions. We would also have the option to get additional
sanctions. But it, again, would not be just the United States; it would be
all the countries of the six-party talks, and both acting individually, but
also with respect to U.N. Security Council sanctions, because, as you know,
there is -- Resolution 1718 authorizes such sanctions.

Q If the tough diplomacy worked this time in relation to North Korea, and
that included talking to North Korea, why not use the same approach with
Iran?

MR. HADLEY: We largely are.

Yes, ma'am.

Q Steve, how does this compare to the deal the North Koreans made in the
last months of the Clinton administration, which they eventually went back
on? And do you think in any way they are doing this now because they think
it can play -- they can play with the American political calendar?

MR. HADLEY: I don't think so. This has been a pretty ongoing process. Let
me say a little bit about the -- this is the '94 framework agreement under
the prior administration. I would say that was a good-faith effort to deal
with this problem, and -- but it went awry. And unbeknownst to that
administration, while they were moving forward under the framework
agreement to deal with North Korea's plutonium program we discovered North
Korea was pursuing a uranium enrichment program, which is one of two paths
to get the nuclear material you need for a bomb, either through the
plutonium path, uranium enrichment.

The '94 agreement assumed and thought it had agreement by North Koreans to
give up both paths. The only one that was known at the time was the
plutonium path. And unbeknownst to the administration, while they were
moving on the -- to implement that agreement, North Korea was pursuing an
enrichment program.

We confronted them with it in 2002. They, as I mentioned earlier, initially
acknowledged and then subsequently denied. In any event, they walked out of
the six-party framework.

So what we tried to do was learn the lessons from that effort to try and do
it better this time. That's what we would -- you would expect us to do. And
there are really three or four things we learned. One is that the bilateral
relationship was not going to have enough weight to get this job done; that
if you were going to get North Korea to make the decision to give up its
nuclear programs, you were going to need to have coordinated effort, both
diplomacy and potentially sanctions, from all those countries on which
North Korea depends. And that's why we went into the multilateral framework
involving China, Russia, Japan and South Korea.

Secondly, we learned a little bit about how to structure the negotiations.
There were considerable benefits that North Korea was going to get up
front, in terms of the financing and construction of a light water reactor,
really before they moved into dismantling their nuclear infrastructure. And
we thought that, in the end of the day, did not work out. And that's why we
have this action for action, as -- rather than give them benefits on the
expectation they will carry out their commitments, we got the commitments
up front, and asked them as they carried out their commitments, then they
would get some benefits -- initially lifting of sanctions over time and
increasing benefits over time.

Third, that agreement was premised on a freeze during the period that the
light water reactor was going to be constructed. The problem with a freeze,
of course, is that it's just a freeze. And when the North Koreans walked
out of the framework agreement in 2002-2003, it was a few months before
they were back in the business of producing plutonium.

So that's why we called, in the first and second phases, for a disablement,
which is ongoing, which we -- our objective has been that if the process
breaks down, it would take at least a year for them to get back into the
business. But it was also disablement on the road to and in contemplation
of dismantlement, and that's what we want to get to, not have a long phase
-- certainly not a freeze, but even a long phase of disablement before you
get into the dismantlement process.

So this is not a criticism. The '94 agreement was a good-faith effort.
Unfortunately, the North Koreans did not want it to succeed. We have tried
to learn from that. We think we have constructed a better framework that
has been more effective, and that is what we will hand over to the next
administration, and hopefully they will be in a position to continue this.

Yes, sir.

Q What is your response to criticism that, in effect, a term paper is being
accepted that isn't complete because the most contentious issues -- the
highly enriched uranium and the proliferation activity with regard to Syria
-- are not in this report?

MR. HADLEY: Well, I think the most serious issues are front and center.
Because, remember, as best we can understand, it is the plutonium program
that produced plutonium that was in the weapons that North Korea tested in
2006. And it is the plutonium infrastructure that can, if it is not
dismantled, churn out additional nuclear materials for nuclear weapons. So
we think getting our hands around that program, knowing exactly how much
plutonium was produced, getting that at some point given up, or as we say,
abandoned by the North Koreans, and getting that infrastructure disabled
and dismantled is the most immediate source of nuclear material for North
Korea and the most threatening source.

So we think that's a priority. But at the same time, we have recognized
that we do have a declaration by the North Koreans on these other items --
that is to say their assertions that they're not engaged in either
proliferation or uranium activity and will not in the future. But we also
have a mechanism that will allow us to get satisfaction, we hope, over
time, of the concerns we have.

So this is not accepting a passing grade. In some sense it is we're passing
the paper back and asking the student to come in and work with us
cooperatively to resolve the questions we have about their draft. That's
what we're trying to do.

Sir.

Q Mr. Hadley, does today's action by North Korea really mean that it is no
longer a state sponsor of terrorism? Or is that something the U.S.
government is just willing to say now?

MR. HADLEY: No, the statutory requirement is that in the prior six months
the country engaged in support to terrorist activity, defined as activities
by individuals or groups that is a terrorist incident. And we do not have
any evidence, and it is the -- and this is -- we've taken a look at this
question in terms of our own intelligence -- we do not have any evidence
that North Korea has engaged in that kind of support.

So, by the book, in terms of the statutory language, they are entitled to
get off that list. It is not a concession that we've made, or a
determination we made for other political reasons. This was done by the
book.

Q Does President Bush still regard North Korea as part of an "axis of
evil"?

MR. HADLEY: Well, one of the things he said in his statement this afternoon
is we have a lot of problems with North Korea. We have problems about how
they treat their own people. This is a country that is -- where the people
are in difficult straits. And as you know, we've entered into arrangement
to provide food assistance, and we think it's a good thing that North Korea
has worked with us so we can provide that assistance. We've been very
concerned about human rights in North Korea, the lack of freedoms by the
people in North Korea. We're obviously concerned about their nuclear
activities. We're concerned about their ballistic missile activities. We're
concerned about the threat they potentially pose to their neighbors because
of their ballistic missiles and because the large conventional forces they
make.

So we have a long agenda with North Korea. And as the President made clear
today, we are in the process of addressing the nuclear issue, but before we
can have the kind of relationships we would like with North Korea, and like
with the North Korean people, these other issues are going to have to be
addressed.

Q Can you just shed a little more light on the level of plutonium
production? And you mentioned the math is fairly straightforward -- I mean,
you know that in terms of determining the number of bombs -- what is the
range that you think this is going to fall into? And what does it equal in
terms of weapons?

MR. HADLEY: I don't -- I'm not sure we've declassified that, so I can't
give it to you. And let me be clear this way: We think you can get a sense
of the number of weapons, but the big point is we want to understand the
amount of plutonium and have a process by which that plutonium is taken out
of circulation.

If you know you got all of the plutonium and you have a process by which
it's all going to be brought forward and taken out of circulation, in a
way, how much of that was actually in bombs and how much of it was still on
the staff -- shelf, in a way, is less important so long as you know you're
getting all of it. And that's the point.

Q Steve?

MR. HADLEY: Yes, sir.

Q Two questions. One, what happens if, over the next, say, 45 days, you are
dissatisfied with what you are learning from the North Koreans? And sort of
a follow-up, to use your Janus example, this is a hopeful day perhaps in
one sense, but on the other sense, look, skeptics will say, they cheat all
the time, time and time again. And how do you get to the point where you
feel like, okay, maybe this a more hopeful circumstance versus here we go
again; haven't we seen this play before?

MR. HADLEY: Well, part of it is that we're not resting on hope or faith.
We're asking for disclosures and a process of monitoring and a verification
protocol which will allow us to be able to judge the truth and completeness
of those answers. So we're not depending on faith. Second of all, this --
and that is, of course, what we hope will be the vehicle for truth.

And secondly, you have to ask yourself, what are the alternatives to this
process? If your goal is to denuclearize the nuclear -- the Korean
Peninsula and to try to do it in a framework that over time gives you
opportunities to address the other threats that North Korea poses to its
neighbors, you know, what's the alternative to this Korean program? And we
took a look at whether there were alternatives that offered the prospect of
getting progress on these accounts.

As the President said today, we concluded -- he concluded -- that
multilateral diplomacy that is tough-minded, that is action for action,
that is not based on faith but has a process available for monitoring and
verification, offers the best prospect of dealing with this problem.

Q If you're dissatisfied, though, over the next 45 days, then what happens?

MR. HADLEY: Well, what the President said clearly is that we obviously have
-- we'll be watching what North Korea does in the next 45 days. We'll be
monitoring their activity. One of the -- our real priority is to get the
verification principles and the verification protocol in place in this 45
days, and actually get some steps underway. We are hopeful that that can
happen in that 45-day period.

And as the President said to you, we'll sort of look and see where we are
in 45 days. Our expectation is that we will move forward, we will make the
progress, and that he will be able to, in 45 days, go ahead and -- the
process for finally lifting the status as a state sponsor of terror will go
forward.

But again, he has this 45-day period and he's made very clear that we will
be watching and we will be working very hard with our others in six-party
talks to get this verification protocol and framework in place.

Sir.

Q Steve, inevitably this process, this announcement, along with the Middle
East peace talks, will be contrasted with the way that this administration
handled Iraq. And I'm not asking you to say that, you know, being able to
succeed diplomatically was the reason you went through this process. But
how important was it to the administration, to the President, to yourself,
to be able to succeed, or be seen succeeding, diplomatically in light of
what happened with Iraq early on in the administration?

MR. HADLEY: I don't think we see it in that framework, partly because we
see, and the President sees, what he did in Iraq in very much as a -- in a
multilateral context. It was actually action taken to enforce 16 U.N.
Security Council resolutions, one of which said there will be serious
consequences if Saddam Hussein did not disclose the truth about his nuclear
and other activities. It did not address terrorism, did not address the
treatment of his own people, did not address the threat he posed to his
neighbors. So we went through, I think, 16 U.N. Security Council
resolutions, and we had the support of most of the European countries, but
not all, and had a coalition of well over 30 nations, many of whom are
still with us in Iraq.

So I think the point is we have tried to use the multilateral instrument,
but it's also been clear that if multilateral diplomacy works -- is going
to work -- there has to be consequences if countries do not go along with
the will of the international community. That was something we saw in Iraq,
and that is something we see in the six-party talks in terms of the
willingness of the six to move to a sanctions mode if North Korea decides
to elect for confrontation rather than cooperation with the international
community.

MS. PERINO: I think we should just take one or two more.

MR. HADLEY: One or two more.

Terry, did you have a follow-up?

Q Do you think now that North Korea is serious about nuclear disarmament,
and is willing to give up its weapons?

MR. HADLEY: You know, I think what I would go back to is really the
philosophy under the six-party talks, action for action. We'll see. Did
they do the things -- did they take the steps they talked about in Phase
Two in terms of disablement and filing a declaration? Yes, they did. Are
there concerns and questions we have? Yes, there are. Will we pursue them?
Yes, we will. Do we have a framework for doing that? Yes, we think we do.
So kind of on to the next step, but I think, you know, we're not in a
position to make kind of broad assertions.

What I think the President said -- he had it right: Today is a step. If
this process is going to succeed, we have more steps. On balance though, it
was a pretty good day.

Thank you very much.

END 10:04 A.M. EDT

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