DB> On 02-09-98 Mark Bloss wrote to Day Brown...
 MB> A classic Homeric metaphor is the "perfect resemblance of two relations
 MB> between totally dissimilar things".
 MB> but the all too human concourse of the will itself.  The key to the
 MB> answer (why this comparison between the Will and the Wave is NOT a
 MB> classic metaphor) is the the Will and Wave are not dissimilar things
 MB> -but rather are precisely the SAME THING. ...  Thereby, Neitzsche is not
 MB> comparing resemblances between two dissimilar things - but concluding
 MB> that a wave in the sea is PRECISELY THE SAME THING as the will in the
 MB> soul of a human.  In other words, the appearances of the world have
 MB> become a mere symbol for inward experiences, with the consequence that
 MB> the _metaphor_ (originally designed to bridge the gap between the
 MB> thinking - or willing - ego, and the world of appearances) collapses!
 MB> Neitzsche was quite fond of using fundamental anthropomorphisms.  For
 MB> example: "All the presuppositions of mechanistic theory - matter,
 MB> pressure and stress, are not 'facts-in-themselves' but interpretations
 MB> with the aid of physical fictions."
 DB> Pretty cute Mark. tanx. I havta wonder what Friedrich would have made of
 DB> the idea of 'virtual reality' or a 'holodeck', or whether he had ever
 DB> read the Bagavad Gita's idea that the world was just an idea or dream of
 DB> God's.  From that standpoint, he is right on target- the forms we see
 DB> are the *effect* of the software that is generating them in three
 DB> dimensions.  therefore, whether the form in question is a man or a wave,
 DB> at a calcuable integral of time, or the process over time of it's
 DB> motivation, is moot.
 DB> In both cases, I see a dynamic dance of the form adapting to all the
 DB> other forms affecting it, and see my own ego, or that of any other man,
 DB> as just part of the same vast sea of 'wills', all of us togather riding
 DB> on the surface of God.  Where the world of the appearances does not
 DB> collapse, is in the fact that the software that generates it does exist
 DB> [god], and that each subroutine is a unique thought form.  If you can
 DB> perceive that, you have an kind of 'appearance' that is inviolate and as
 DB> Pythagoras suggested, is the true essence of things.
   I hear you, Day, but then what will you say about the humanity fostered
within this mysterious reality by those who have considered that "God" is not
a neutral producer of software, uncaring as to its effects, but rather,
actually on THEIR side in wanting to eliminate the genuine evil of the world?
I'm NOT talking about the hypocrits.  Are they to be discarded as mere
embarrassments or not sufficient in number to count?  I'm not baiting you.  
y
question is a sincere one - for me at any rate.  The writer(s) of the Gospel
of John, for example, were NOT writing for the modern Fundamentalist as even
the Fundamentalists are sooner or later going to discover.  What is to be 
one
with a Francis of Assisi, a Meister Eckhardt or an Albert Schweitzer after
their personal eccentricities and fallibilities have been fully taken into
account.  Do they indicate nothing of consequence?  
   Or could it be that Nicolas Berdiaev, who tried out the communist form of
ideology and rejected Christian fundamentalism still is worth hearing when he
pours over philosophical reasoning and concludes that in the face of the
admitted mysteriousness of the reality in which we are condemned to live the
world in which we must live, absent the possibility of redemption, is 
ttterly
bereft of ANY meaning.  He said that if Muri (his pet cat) is not be be
redeemed then HE didn't care to be redeemed either!  
Sincerely, 
                                     Frank
                                                                              
                                                       
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