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Fact Sheet: Defending Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism
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For Immediate Release Office of the Press Secretary December 3, 2008

Fact Sheet: Defending Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism
Commission Report Endorses Administration Initiatives and Calls for
Continuation of Successful WMD Policies to Address Increasing Threat

ÿÿWhite House News


Today, President Bush was briefed on the Commission on the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation and Terrorism report on
U.S. progress against the threat of WMD proliferation and terrorism.ÿ
President Bush welcomes the Commission's report and findings on the
greatest threat to our national security and notes their affirmation of
past and current Administration efforts, which provide the foundation on
which the next Administration can build. The Administration worked closely
with the Commission during the course of its review and agrees that the
threat of global terrorist organizations acquiring or developing WMD and
using them against our homeland and interests abroad remains dangerously
real.ÿ
  þ After September 11, 2001, the President recognized the need to change
    our strategy to address the new challenges of terrorism and
    proliferation. ÿIn 2002, the President put forth a comprehensive
    strategy to combat WMD, and in 2006, he established objectives tailored
    to meet the threat of WMD Terrorism (WMD-T):
      þ Determine terrorists' intentions, capabilities, and plans to
        acquire and develop WMD.
      þ Deny terrorists access to the materials, expertise, and other
        enabling capabilities needed to develop WMD.
      þ Deter terrorists from employing WMD.
      þ Detect and disrupt terrorists' attempted movement of WMD-related
        materials, weapons, and personnel.
      þ Prevent and be prepared to respond to WMD-related terrorist
        attacks.
      þ Develop the capability to determine the nature and scope of a
        terrorist-employed device.
  þ To effectuate this strategy, the Administration launched numerous
    initiatives including:
      þ The Proliferation Security Initiative;
      þ The Global Initiative for Combating Nuclear Terrorism;
      þ Threat reduction programs with countries in the former Soviet
        Union; and
      þ Intelligence community reforms. ÿ

The United States Has Made Significant Progress in Implementing Each Pillar
Of This Strategy
  þ The Administration has reorganized and integrated the Intelligence
    Community under the Director of National Intelligence to provide a
    clearer picture of terrorist capabilities and intentions, including
    with respect to WMD.ÿThe Administration established the National
    Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and it also created a National
    Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) to cover the entire range of
    proliferation challenges.ÿ At the State Department, the WMD-T office
    was created to help partner nations assess risks from WMD and work with
    foreign governments to ensure continuous improvement in our collective
    capabilities to reduce risks from WMD-T.ÿ
  þ The Administration is denying access to the materials and capabilities
    required to develop WMD through unparalleled international outreach and
    cooperation. ÿThe President has created strong international
    partnerships such as the 2005 Bratislava Initiative, which accelerated
    and expanded bilateral nuclear security cooperation in five areas:
    emergency response, best practices, security culture, conversion of
    Russian-origin research reactors in third countries, and Russian
    nuclear security. ÿIn addition:
      þ The Administration provided assistance to Russia and other states
        of the former Soviet Union to improve security and accounting of
        nuclear weapons and materials.ÿ In addition, U.S. and Russian
        nuclear stockpiles have been reduced.
      þ The Administration has created international partnerships and
        helped convert 51 nuclear reactors in 29ÿcountries from highly
        enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium, which cannot be used to
        produce nuclear weapons. The United States has also secured more
        than 600 vulnerable sites around the world that together contain
        enough material to make about 8,000 radiological, or "dirty" bombs.
      þ In 2004, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was
        developed, accelerating efforts to identify, secure, and remove
        high-risk vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the
        world. We have redirected former Soviet biological weapons
        scientists to peaceful, sustainable employment and reconfigured
        former facilities to accelerate drug and vaccine development for
        infectious diseases.
      þ In 2006, the United States and Russia launched the Global
        Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which is helping to build
        international capacity to prevent, defend against, and respond to
        nuclear terrorism. Today, 75 nations are working under this
        initiative.
      þ The Administration has been at the forefront of efforts to enhance
        the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). ÿThe
        United States has developed an active, "real-world" work plan and
        developed model legislation on BWC prohibitions and pathogen
        security.
  þ The United States is working to detect and to disrupt terrorists'
    attempted movement of WMD-related materials, weapons, and personnel
    through innovative initiatives. ÿUnder the President's leadership, the
    United States launched:
      þ The Proliferation Security Initiative to stem the flow of illicit
        materials used for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
        systems. ÿMore than 90 nations are now partners in this effort. ÿ
      þ The Container Security Initiative (CSI) to detect the movement of
        dangerous materials in foreign countries and stop them before they
        are placed on vessels destined for the United States. ÿ
      þ The Megaports Initiative to provide key ports around the world with
        radiation detection equipment.
      þ The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to improve the
        Nation's capability to detect and report nuclear or radiological
        material intended for use against the Nation. As part of a layered
        defense strategy, the Administration also effectively doubled the
        national response capacity to disable improvised WMD.
      þ The Nuclear Materials Information Program to provide an enduring,
        centralized, and properly vetted source of information on nuclear
        materials worldwide.
  þ The Administration is employing an effective deterrence strategy
    tailored to the WMD-T threat by putting the terrorists, their
    facilitators, and their sponsors on notice of the United States'
    response in the event of an attack, to include holding any state,
    group, or non-state actors fully accountable for supporting or enabling
    terrorist efforts to obtain or use WMD. The Administration has also
    established a national technical nuclear forensics center within the
    DNDO and the National Bioforensics Center within the National
    Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center in the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) in order to facilitate forensic investigation
    and attribution of WMD-related materials.
  þ The Administration has recognized the need to build our prevention and
    response capabilities in the event of a WMD-related terrorist attack.
    Through new technologies, assistance to State and local health
    professionals, and an unprecedented Federal funding commitment, the
    Administration launched the following:
      þ The Department of Homeland Security, Environmental Protection
        Agency, and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
        deployed the first ever bioaerosol monitoring system _ Biowatch _
        to more than 30 major metropolitan areas to provide early warning
        of an attack and enable quick response.
      þ HHS created a laboratory response network of approximately 170
        public health laboratories nationwide to assist in detecting
        disease outbreaks that could be associated with bioterrorism
        attacks.
      þ The Defense Secretary has certified 53 National Guard WMD civil
        support teams stationed across the United States, including the
        District of Columbia and the U.S. territories.
      þ President Bush has expanded funding for anti-bioterrorism research
        at the National Institutes for Health from $53 million in 2001 to
        more than $1.7 billion annually to study threat agents and other
        novel or emerging pathogens.
      þ Project Bioshield was launched in 2004 with $5.6 billion in funding
        over 10 years for the acquisition of medical countermeasures, and
        in 2006, the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority
        was created to manage the development and acquisition of needed
        vaccines, drugs, and diagnostic tools.
      þ The President revitalized the Strategic National Stockpile,
        increasing funding more than ten-fold since taking office, from $51
        million in 2001 to more than $550 million annually, a total
        investment of more than $3.5 billion.
      þ The Administration has stockpiled enough smallpox vaccine for every
        American and more than 60 million 60-day courses of preventive
        antibiotics and 5.6 million vaccines regimens against anthrax.
      þ HHS has provided $5.2 billion in grants to improve State, local,
        and tribal health preparedness and mass casualty response
        capabilities and $3.1 billion in grants to increase hospital
        preparedness.
  þ The Administration has led international efforts to detect, prevent,
    and mitigate the threat of biological terrorism.ÿWorking with at-risk
    countries, the United States has improved global capabilities to
    detect, diagnose, and report bioterror attacks and potential pandemics
    and consolidate and secure their dangerous pathogen collections into
    safe national-level facilities. ÿThe United States has also worked to
    improve biosafety and biosecurity worldwide; eliminate biological
    weapons infrastructure; and focus strategic partnership research to
    identify and map extremely dangerous indigenous pathogens.ÿ In
    addition, President Bush and his Administration:
      þ Expanded efforts to assist countries in the Middle East, South
        Asia, and Southeast Asia that face significant risks from
        transnational terrorist groups, have poorly secured biological
        laboratories and culture collections, and experience frequent
        outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases.ÿ
      þ Promoted improved diagnostics and biosurveillance in key regions;
        enhanced U.S. response and host nation capabilities to respond to a
        biological incident overseas; and trained foreign partners in
        forensic epidemiology as a key to respond to bioterrorism incidents
        globally.
      þ Eliminated bio-weapons-related infrastructure and equipment in
        Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan; Tabakhmela, Georgia; and Vozrozhdeniye
        Island, Uzbekistan; consolidated dangerous pathogen collections and
        research in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan, with efforts
        underway in Kazakhstan and Ukraine. We have also transferred
        dangerous pathogens from Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and
        Uzbekistan to U.S. biodefense research laboratories.
  þ Since 2001, the President has continued to strengthen domestic lab
    security. ÿThe Administration has instituted laboratory safety and
    security guidelines to manage the risks posed by accidental infection
    of researchers, intentional theft, or diversion of materials that could
    enable a catastrophic bioterrorism attack.
      þ HHS and the Department of Agriculture have identified those select
        agents and toxins that present significant bioterrorism risk and
        increased security requirements accordingly.
      þ The Administration created the National Science Advisory Board for
        Biosecurity (NSABB) to advise the U.S. government on strategies for
        minimizing the potential for misuse of information and technologies
        from life sciences research, taking into consideration both
        national security concerns and the needs of the research community.
        ÿThe NSABB currently is developing recommendations to enhance
        personnel reliability practices at domestic institutes that store
        or work with select agents and toxins.
      þ Since the inception of the Select Agent Program in 2002, the
        Centers for Disease Control and Animal and Plant Health Inspection
        Service (APHIS) have executed inspections and re-inspections for
        all of the approximately 400 registered entities in the United
        States working with designated Select Agents pathogens and toxins.ÿ

While Significant Progress Has Been Made, Challenges Remain

America must continue to build upon this progress and remain vigilant in
our efforts to meet this dynamic threat.
  þ The United States must accelerate the implementation of ODNI and NCTC
    initiatives to refine our intelligence on nuclear and biological WMD
    terrorism threats, trends, and related issues.
  þ The United States also must take steps to reinvigorate our aging
    nuclear expertise and supporting infrastructure to ensure we have an
    enduring capability to support nuclear intelligence, technical
    forensics, and attribution activities.
  þ Through U.S. leadership, we must maintain the world's focus and
    attention to ensure that WMD and the means to deliver them do not reach
    the hands of the world's most dangerous enemies.

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