From: "Robert Comer" 

So we had all we needed to make a sane decision about Iraq...

--
Bob Comer


"Monte Davis"  wrote in message
news:apvrk2lp9tjvjj0t3ssv7bdc5jjf29lmkv{at}4ax.com...
> "Mark"  wrote:
>
>>But those guys are the height of hypocrisy to support a given direction,
>>then to wimp out unceremoniously after only a few years
>
> Mark, you've been so clear-minded and eloquent first about the
> publicity-seeking, book-pimping former generals...
>
> ...and now about the flip-flopping, "I knew it all along" neocons...
>
> That I can't wait to hear your opinion of these America-hating
> cut-and-runners --- lefty moles deep in CENTCOM -- who were doing
> their post-mortem four years *before* the invasion.
>
> ===
>
> WASHINGTON (AP) Nov. 5 -- The U.S. government conducted a series of
> secret war games in 1999 that anticipated an invasion of Iraq would
> require 400,000 troops, and even then chaos might ensue.
>
> In its "Desert Crossing" games, 70 military, diplomatic and
> intelligence officials assumed the high troop levels would be needed
> to keep order, seal borders and take care of other security needs.
>
> The documents came to light Saturday through a Freedom of Information
> Act request by the George Washington University's National Security
> Archive, an independent research institute and library.
>
> "The conventional wisdom is the U.S. mistake in Iraq was not enough
> troops," said Thomas Blanton, the archive's director. "But the Desert
> Crossing war game in 1999 suggests we would have ended up with a
> failed state even with 400,000 troops on the ground."
>
> ...A spokeswoman for U.S. Central Command, which sponsored the seminar
> and declassified the secret report in 2004, declined to comment
> Saturday because she was not familiar with the documents.
>
> The war games looked at "worst case" and "most
likely" scenarios after
> a war that removed then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power.
> Some are similar to what actually occurred after the U.S.-led invasion
> of Iraq in 2003:
>
> -"A change in regimes does not guarantee stability," the 1999 seminar
> briefings said. "A number of factors including aggressive neighbors,
> fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines, and chaos created
> by rival forces bidding for power could adversely affect regional
> stability."
>
> -"Even when civil order is restored and borders are secured, the
> replacement regime could be problematic - especially if perceived as
> weak, a puppet, or out-of-step with prevailing regional governments."
>
> -"Iran's anti-Americanism could be enflamed by a U.S.-led intervention
> in Iraq," the briefings read. "The influx of U.S. and other western
> forces into Iraq would exacerbate worries in Tehran, as would the
> installation of a pro-western government in Baghdad."
>
> -"The debate on post-Saddam Iraq also reveals the paucity of
> information about the potential and capabilities of the external Iraqi
> opposition groups. The lack of intelligence concerning their roles
> hampers U.S. policy development."
>
> -"Also, some participants believe that no Arab government will welcome
> the kind of lengthy U.S. presence that would be required to install
> and sustain a democratic government."
>
> -"A long-term, large-scale military intervention may be at odds with
> many coalition partners."
>
>
>
> Monte Davis
> http://montedavis.livejournal.com

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