From: Ad 

A good example:

http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,118865,00.html?wh=wh

"Army and Air Force officials are exploring whether they will wield
aerial tankers to carry Warfighter Information Network-Tactical payloads in
order to free up satellite resources, according to the WIN-T program
manager.

"Since they're flying overhead, in the theater of operation, it would
not be a significant burden for them to have a radio that's providing a
relay capability [which] reduces the fuel and maintenance costs of having a
separate aircraft in the air just to do comms relay," Army Col. Angel
Colon told Inside the Army Nov. 3.

Although the services are only in the "concept discussion and
exchanges level," Colon said he does not anticipate a redesign to the
comms payload. "It would be just a matter of getting the other
services to accept that this is a viable payload that they can carry."

WIN-T, projected to cost about $14.2 billion, is supposed to help the Army
tap into enough bandwidth to provide mobile, tactical communications to
soldiers and their commanders. WIN-T is key to the Future Combat System
because FCS will depend on the network to link its 18 different platforms
and all of its associated computer-based applications.

If the Air Force allows WIN-T on its tankers, Colon said there would be two
"immediate benefits." First, the Air Force would be off-loading
traffic from satellites, which would mean more bandwidth would be available
for other services. And second, it would reduce leasing costs associated
with using commercial satellites.

"As you can imagine, if we are not consuming as much satellite
resources then other users can use that resource," Colon explained.

To date, the Army is expected to integrate WIN-T on its Warrior unmanned
aerial vehicles and the FCS class IV UAV. However, the Government
Accountability Office has questioned whether the service will have an
adequate number of UAVs with the comms payload to successfully execute its
strategy.

More specifically, GAO said in a July 2005 report that key difficulties
facing the WIN-T program include a lack of mature technologies and a
planned reliance on systems that are on shaky ground (ITA, June 27, 2005,
p12). For instance, WIN-T plans to use UAVs to help relay connections that
will enable sustained, on-the-move communications, but the Warrior is not
funded well enough for the communications capability. "

Nice big airliners tooling about {at} 35K feet....useful assets. Many many uses.

You can give em a bombay as well such that you can have something which
potters about in a circuit armed with gps bombs as a form of fire support
while also being a network hub & indeed as such being in good comms
wiht those down below who may wish to feed in gps coords for the bombs.

Imagine the "support" a 747 could supply & then when required
it could also be a tanker, a troop carrier, an elint platform etc.etc.

Lot's of laid up airliners out in the American desert so......

Compare & contrast with:

http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jdw/jdw061106_2_n.shtml

"Senior US Air Force (USAF) officials have confirmed to Jane's that
the Core Component Jammer (CCJ) concept - a second attempt to transform
some of the Boeing B-52H bomber fleet into long-range jamming platforms -
has so far not succeeded.

The loss potentially leaves fighter and bomber crews more vulnerable to a
new class of enemy air-defence systems after 2012.

"We have a capability gap," Brigadier General Andrew Dichter,
deputy director, operational capability requirements, said in a 2 November
interview. "Does that mean we can't penetrate enemy airspace? No.
There is just more risk."

Since 2002, the USAF and Department of Defense have advocated a system of
systems approach to the electronic-warfare mission, with different
platforms performing the stand-in, penetrator, escort and stand-off jamming
roles. That concept created a requirement for the CCJ's aborted predecessor
- the B-52 Stand-off Jammer System (SOJS).

The SOJS was originally focused on defeating the early-warning radar
threat, but ran into trouble as requirements expanded to cover mid- and
high-frequency radar threats as well as address a growing set of
counter-insurgency needs, including improvised explosive device defeat. By
August 2005, the SOJS had cost estimate more than tripled to USD6.9
billion. "

Why use a difficult to support 50+ year old airframe when a surplus
ex-airline 747 or even 767-ER would do the job better & cheaper & n
a multi-role capacity? All fighters are now "swing role" i.e. one
minute "air dominance" then a bit of sead & then some mud
moving.

So why not the big aircraft?

Adam

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