Perplexed in Peoria  wrote:

> "John Wilkins"  wrote in message
> news:car9d3$2log$1{at}darwin.ediacara.org...
> [big snip]
> > Human intentions may be the results of NS processes (and they surely
> > are), but they do, and most other NS processes don't, have narrative
> > structure. The worst categorial error one can make is to think that what
> > we do heuristically must be a fact of the things we learn *about*.
> > Aristotle made that error; it's time to drop it.
> 
> Hmmm.  So, if I understand you, the process whereby a human designer
> designs an aircraft wing has narrative structure.  But the process
> by which Nature/NS quasi-designs a bird's wing does not have
> narrative structure.
> 
> But even if I got that right, I still don't understand you.  What
> is "narrative structure"?

We think of sequences of events as being significant, as implying
agency, and as being of moral - that is, value-based, importance. In
short, we tell ourselves stories to make sense of our social
interactions.

When we ask what some designer has worked to achieve, or what the
artifact is for, we are asking, in effect, for a story: what was in his
or her mind when the object was designed, what is the purpose they had
or we are to have, and so forth. An aircraft wing has a story behind it.
The designer wanted to maximise lift, reduce drag and keep fuel costs
low. The bird's wing, though, merely resembles human designed wings - it
was not designed to reduce drag or maximise fuel efficiency. Those that
did better than others and were hereditable spread to fixation in some
ancestral population. There *is* no design here. There is nothing wrong
with a high drag wing in evolution, so long as it maximises locally the
reproductive fitness of that allele.
> 
> It is certainly true that the "inventor" of the aircraft wing was
> trying to create a machine that flies.  And one would certainly be
> foolish to conclude from this that Nature/NS was "trying" to
> create a flying animal when she "invented" the bird's wing.  But
> it would be equally foolish, I think, to claim that there are
> not analogies between the way a human designer improves a
> suboptimal aircraft wing design and the way Nature/NS improves
> a suboptimal bird wing quasi-design.  Both, it seems to me, are
> maximizing an objective function subject to constraints that are
> not well-understood at the outset.

There are physical constraints in common, to be sure. But the analogy
between NS and design lies in the process by which variant forms are
tested, so to speak, in the field. We test in order to ensure that the
design meets the goals for which the design was undertaken. NS merely
allows things to do what they do - there is no goal (not even survival:
selection can drive populations extinct), and certainly no "knowledge"
in an NS process.
> 
> If I use the word "design" for both processes, there is the
> possibility that I will be led astray by the analogy - or metaphor
> or category error; whatever you want to call it.  No big deal.
> Someone is sure to point out that Nature/NS doesn't necessarily
> do "design" in the way I have assumed.  Do I protect myself
> from being led astray by carefully writing "quasi-design" for
> Nature/NS's process.  I don't think so!  I am still going to
> want to use the analogy, because the analogy is so frequently
> useful.
>
Unfortunately, history is against you. Everybody *says* they are
"really" talking about some process that is not intentional or forward
looking, etc. But the language they use misleads them anyway, when they
draw conclusions in ordinary terms. I think this occurred throughout the
discussions of eugenics from Galton to Ed Wilson, for example.

> But maybe the real reason why I should use the word "quasi-design"
> is to reduce the risk of being misinterpreted by the heathen.
> Perhaps.  However, there aren't many heather hereabouts.  The only
> person that seems to be misinterpreting is you, John.

I'm not, as I noted, concerned with the heathen (that is another,
slightly less interesting, issue) - I'm concerned with what the
"pro"-synthesis and modern evolutionary theorists do with it. For
instance, I think Gould was mislead this way when he talked about
morphometric space and Cambrian diversity. I think Dawkins is rife with
it. George Williams is less so, Maynard Smith not at all AFAIK, although
people misread the use of game theory.
-- 
Dr John Wilkins
john_SPAM{at}wilkins.id.au   http://wilkins.id.au
"Men mark it when they hit, but do not mark it when they miss" 
                                               - Francis Bacon
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