From: Julie Dawson 
Subject: Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TXT  (fwd)
rights movement to the civil rights movement of the 1960s. 
Additional speakers included I. King Jordan, President of
Gallaudet University, Evan Kemp, Chairman of the EEOC, and James
Brady, former press secretary for President Ronald Reagan.
     Auberger was the final speaker.  He, too, likened the
efforts of those gathered to earlier movements for equality.  He
described the plight of people with disabilities and urged that
disability activists must remain steadfast in demanding civil
rights.  Then, sitting in his wheelchair at the base of the
Capitol steps, Auberger observed that the steps  were a symbol of
discrimination against the disabled.   Yet, he said, he would not
let them continue to be an obstruction.  We will not let any
barrier prevent us from the equality that is rightfully ours.  
As he concluded his speech in front of television cameras, many
individuals left their wheelchairs behind to climb the Capitol
steps a symbol of their fortitude in surmounting barriers. 
     On Tuesday, March 13, ADAPT continued its campaign by
meeting with House Speaker Foley (who assumed the House
leadership position after Congressman Wright s resignation),
Republican Leader Michel, and Congressman Hoyer in the Capitol
Rotunda.  Leaders of the protest insisted on immediate passage of
the ADA.  When Foley informed the crowd that two months was a
likely time frame, more than 100 demonstrators began chanting:
 ADA Now!   Foley and Michel subsequently departed.  Hoyer stayed
a little longer and departed with a thumbs-up signal.  Then,
Capitol police told the demonstrators to leave, as demonstrating
in the Capitol is against federal law. Most demonstrators
refused, however, and formed a tight circle; many chained their
wheelchairs together.  They chanted:  Access is a civil right! 
and  The people united will never be defeated!  But police
officers, many protected with riot gear, began using
chain-cutters and torches to break through the links
demonstrators had fashioned.  For about two hours, police
reportedly arrested 104 people whom charged them with
demonstrating in the Capitol building.  The next day, Wednesday,
March 14, protesters assembled in Congressmen Shuster and Fish s
offices.  Others crowded the Energy and Commerce Committee
mark-up session.  Numbers dwindled over the rest of the week,
however, as many were appearing in court. 
     The  Wheels of Justice  campaign did not bring immediate
passage of the ADA.  And the ADAPT demonstration in Atlanta did
not result in an executive order that required the purchase only
of accessible transit buses.  Yet the protesters were more
concerned with demonstrating the lengths to which persons with
disabilities would go to secure their rights.  In that sense they
succeeded.  The events were also an indication that further
demonstrations could follow if the ADA got stuck in a quagmire. 
Combined with the other education and lobbying efforts of the ADA
coalition, these activities underscored the nationwide, grass
roots demand for passage of the ADA.
     Although such demonstrations reflected unity within the
disability community, there was not complete unanimity among all
people with disabilities.  The National Federation of the Blind
(NFB), for example, was outspoken in its reservations about the
ADA.  At its 1989 convention in Denver, Colorado, NFB passed a
resolution declaring that if the ADA  could not be amended to
cure its weaknesses, it should be opposed.   Early in 1990,
Kenneth Jernigan of NFB wrote a brief,  Reflec tions on the
Americans with Disabilities Act,  to explain NFB s position.  The
primary concern, he said, was that the ADA might create
additional problems for blind people as it attempted to eliminate
other problems.  In particular, NFB feared that the ADA might
force people with disabilities  to accept the special
accommodations mandated by the bill and . . . [prevent people]
from using the same facilities and services that are available to
others.   Such accommodations, Jernigan said, may themselves
become discriminatory, and make the ADA  a source of
unintentional discrimination against some persons with
disabilities. 
     For instance, NFB cautioned that the provision of
specially-equipped rooms in hotels might require blind persons to
use specific rooms and prevent them from staying near friends. 
To NFB, the alleged need for this accommodation (or for street
corners with audible sounds for crossing and specially-designated
seats on buses) was based on  the false assumption that sight is
essential for successful performance of most tasks.   Blindness,
said Jernigan,  is not generally disabling.  Consequently,
unwanted accommodations falsely portrayed blind people  as
limited in ways that they are not  and imposed unfair and unequal
restrictions.
     As a solution, NFB proposed an amendment stipulating that
people with disabilities had the right not to participate in
programs or activities specially designed for disabled persons. 
During the fall of 1989, NFB worked with John Wodatch of the
Justice Department to elicit the backing of the administration. 
Following a meeting with White House staff on January 19, 1990,
NFB representatives were confident that they would obtain their
proposed amendment.  But, Jernigan said, if the amendment is
rejected,  we must oppose the bill as vigorously as we can . . .
we will do anything we can to slow it down and block [the ADA s]
passage.   He concluded his  Reflections  with the cautionary
statement:  Simply because a thing calls itself civil rights,
that does not mean that it is civil rights.   NFB eventually
attained its goal through an additional clause to the ADA:  an
individual with a disability shall not be denied the opportunity
to participate in . . . programs or activities that are not
separate or different.   Subsequently, NFB did not oppose the
ADA.
          The ADA and the House Committees: Three Phases
     Part of the master strategy for passing the ADA involved
organizing the committee deliberations in the House.  Leading ADA
supporters among Democrats, including Congressmen Coelho, Hoyer,
and Owens, wanted to start the bill in a committee that was
familiar with and favorable to civil rights.  In consultation
with each of the committee Chairs Augustus F. Hawkins (D-CA), for
Education and Labor; John D. Dingell (D-MI), for Energy and
Commerce; Glenn M. Anderson (D-CA), for Public Works and
Transportation; and Jack Brooks (D-TX), for Judiciary they
decided to begin with Education and Labor.  Several factors made
this a logical choice.  First, most of its Democratic members
supported disability rights.  Second, Democratic leadership
included Congress man Owens, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Select Education, who had created the Task Force on the Rights
and Empowerment of People with Disabilities and was a strong
advocate of civil rights and grass roots activism.  Third, the
ranking Republican for the Subcommittee on Select Education was
Congressman Bartlett, who had a strong record on disability
policy and was instrumental in shaping the mission of NCD. 
Bartlett, in fact, urged Republicans on other committees to
promote letting Education and Labor go first.  Fourth, Pat
Morrisey, a leading Republican staff member, had also worked
extensively with disability policy and, in addition, had a
disability.  Ideally, the Education and Labor Committee would
complete its review of the ADA as a starting point for the rest
of the committees.
     Although committees operate differently, they tend to follow
a similar process of delibera tion.  The committee chair and
committee members give overall guidance to their staff regarding
what they would desire to achieve.  Then, hearings are scheduled,
designed, and held. The purpose of hearings is to solicit
justification and document the need for the bill, as well as to
hear and discuss reservations about the bill.  As much as
possible, staff try to settle issues raised by the hearings on
their own, which is generally the vast majority of a given bill. 
For issues that remain unresolved, however, there is a ladder of
conflict resolution.  Usually, the first step the staff take is
to prepare memos for their congressmen about the issues in
dispute and then obtain the member s feedback, which can be used
in negotiations.  If this proves inadequate, members meet
directly with one another.  Finally, issues that members cannot
settle get carried to committee mark-up sessions where they can
be introduced as amendments for member voting.  Typically,
mark-up sessions begin with the consideration of one collective
amendment that incorporates all the agreed upon changes.  Then,
members proceed to discuss and vote upon individual amendments
concerning the disputed issues.
     Although the activities of all four committees often
overlapped (see Appendix C for a chronology), there were three
distinguishable phases in the committees  review process. 
Delibera tions by the Education and Labor Committee marked the
first phase.  A focus on transportation provisions by two
committees, the Energy and Commerce Committee and the Public
Works and Transportation Committee, constituted the second phase. 
Activities by the Judiciary committee represented the third and
final phase before moving the deliberations to the House floor. 
              phase I: education and labor committee
     The Education and Labor Committee conducted the most
thorough evaluation of the bill, at least with respect to the
volume of testimony received.  Two subcommittees had jurisdiction
over the bill: Select Education, chaired by Congressman Owens,
and Employment Opportunities, chaired by Matthew G. Martinez
(D-CA).  In the interest of facilitating rapid consideration of
the ADA, Owens negotiated with Martinez to have Employment
Opportunities yield to Owens s Select Education Subcommittee. 
Moreover, Congressman Hawkins, Chairman of the full committee,
essentially deferred to Owens for leading the committee s
consideration.  In addition to the two hearings held in 1988, the
Subcommittee on Select Education hosted four hearings between
July 18 and October 6, 1989, two of which were joint hearings
with the Employment Opportunities Subcommittee.
     Congressman Owens welcomed Hoyer as the leader in committee
negotiations, because it gave Owens an opportunity to be a  Watch
Dog  for the disability community.Perhaps the most significant of
the four hearings was the field hearing of the Subcommittee on
Select Education held on August 28, in Houston, Texas.  Lex
Frieden and Justin Dart had recommended such a hearing to
Congressman Owens due to concerns that Congressman Bartlett might
not be fully supportive of the ADA be cause of his close
associations with such busi ness groups as NFIB.  Owens approved
of the idea and enjoyed playing the role of bringing the U.S.
Congress to local communities.  The purpose of the field hearing
was to demonstrate to Bartlett that his own constituents strongly
supported the ADA.  Hundreds of persons with disabilities
attended the hearing and an open forum that followed.  At the
hearing, businessmen, government officials, and transit
authorities gave a ringing endorsement to the ADA.  And dozens of
people with disabilities spoke about their personal experiences
at the forum.  The proceedings appeared to have a significant
impact on Bartlett.  Later that evening, he told Frieden and
others that he had been  kind of a skeptic  of the ADA.  But the
day of discussions  made me a believer,  and he pledged to do
what he could to support the legisla tion.
     Contrary to the typical committee process, where staff
settle most disagreements following the hearings, negotiations
for the Committee on Education and Labor were led by Congressmen
Hoyer and Bartlett in a lengthy series of member-to-member
meetings.  This was also a unique circumstance because Hoyer was
not even on the committee.  Although Chairman Hawkins could have
exercised his authority over the full committee, he  graciously, 
as Ralph Neas described it, allowed Hoyer to take the lead.  This
gave Hoyer, the House manager of the ADA, an opportunity to set
the tone for the rest of the House deliberations.  Congressman
Owens welcomed Hoyer as the leader of committee negotiations,
because it gave Owens an opportunity to be a  Watch Dog  for the
disability community: he could help ensure that negotiations did
not result in a net loss for people with disabilities.
     Congressman Hoyer spoke mostly on behalf of Democrats and
the disability community, Congressman Bartlett mostly on behalf
of Republicans and the business community.  But they shared
enough in common to produce extraordinarily productive
negotiations.Congressmen Hoyer and Bartlett represented different
parties and different clien tele Hoyer spoke mostly on behalf of
Dem ocrats and the disability community, Bartlett mostly on
behalf of Republicans and the bus iness community.  But they
shared enough in common to produce extraordinarily produc tive
negotiations.  Bartlett wanted to foster business development. 
His position as Republican point man was to prepare a bill that
could gain the support of Republicans and the business community. 
Hoyer shared similar goals.  As Schulman explained:  we weren t
interested in creating a new right and doing it in such a way
that it would have been impossible for the private sector, for
employers and businesses, to meet their responsibili ties.  
Rather, in meeting the needs of persons with disabilities, Hoyer
wanted to ensure that businesses knew what was expected of them,
that language was clear and fair, and that the bill did not
impose an undue burden on business.  By working together, the two
congressmen were able to help craft legislation that would be
acceptable to both sides of the aisle and foster a level of
bipartisanship comparable to what had developed in the Senate. 
The meetings were  the most productive and satisfying legislative
negotiations that I had ever been involved with,  said Bartlett. 
     Throughout October, Congressmen Hoyer and Bartlett met
extensively and negotiated fourteen amendments that would later
be brought up for a vote in committee.  Although the committee
had jurisdiction mainly over portions of the Employment and
Public Accommodations titles, some of their proposed amendments
affected the entire bill.  The most significant amendment
concerned the application of  undue hardship  and  readily
achievable.   Business lobbyists wanted precise dollar figures to
determine exactly how much businesses had to spend on
accommodations and modifications.  Rather than offer a price cap,
the Senate bill specified that three factors should be evaluated
in determining whether an accommodation was  reasonable  or a
structural modifica tion was  readily achievable  the size of a
business, the type of operation, and the cost of the
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