From: Julie Dawson 
Subject: Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TXT  (fwd)
colleagues do, in this case they wanted to scrutinize the bill
individually.  
     The House cosponsorship drive was less successful than that
in the Senate 33 percent of all senators and 19 percent of all
representatives were cosponsors on May 9.  But Congressman Coelho
secured a crucial commitment from Congressman Steny H. Hoyer
(D-MD).  The two members had become close friends since Coelho,
as Chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee,
had assisted Hoyer in his first campaign.  At Coelho s request,
Hoyer assumed the role of managing the ADA in the House.  This
meant organizing committee deliberations, serving as the
principal negotiator, and leading floor deliberations.  Out of
respect for Coelho s commitment to the ADA, Hoyer called himself
 chief cosponsor,  and continued to identify Coelho as the ADA s
sponsor.  Like so many other members of Congress, the ADA had
personal significance for Hoyer: his wife had epilepsy.  He
became a zealous advocate for the ADA.
           A Bird s Eye View of the House Deliberations
     By the time the ADA reached the House committees, the basic
goals of the bill had been widely affirmed.  Many members,
however, viewed the legislative process as an incremental one,
whereby major policies would be assembled step by step over many
years.  Passing the ADA was especially challenging because, as
Rochelle Dornatt of Coelho s staff observed,  we were creating a
whole new set of rights . . . a whole new set of civil rights.  
The principal focus in the House was not the needs of persons
with disabilities, which had already been well-established by the
Senate, but, rather, the bill s effect on  covered entities.   As
Melissa Schulman of Congressman Hoyer s office explained:  What
the House was doing . . . was making the bill more acceptable to
business.  Coelho often noted that  the trick  in the legislative
process was  to find that magic number, that 218, to get the bill
passed.   With the ADA, advocates were trying to get much more
than that, but it required extensive work at the committee level
to satisfy members concerned with covered entities in their
districts.
     House consideration of the ADA was different and more
complicated than the Senate s for several reasons.  First, the
committee structure was more complex.  In the Senate, the bill
went only to one committee and one subcommittee.  There it was
considered primarily as a civil rights bill and did not undergo
the technical scrutiny of the commerce and transportation
committees.  In the House it went to four committees (Education
and Labor, Public Works and Transportation, Energy and Commerce,
and Judiciary), and six subcommittees (Select Education;
Employment Opportunities; Surface Transportation;
Telecommunications and Finance; Transportation, Tourism, and
Hazardous Materials; and Civil and Constitutional Rights).  In
addition, the Committee on Small Business held a non-legislative
hearing to generate information that could be used by other
committees or during floor deliberations.  These multiple
committee referrals meant that the ADA would have to withstand
the scrutiny of various technical experts, especially with regard
to transportation.  Moreover, 164 representatives, compared with
16 senators, and many more House staff than Senate staff reviewed
the bill in committee.  This increased the chance of a committee
altering, delaying, or even killing the bill and posed a major
challenge to coordinating the deliberative process and keeping
the bill intact..  All indications suggested that a bill would
pass.  But, as Neas explained,  there was always the possibility
that having to go through four committees . . . could endanger
some of the best and strongest provisions.   According to Arlene
Mayerson, it was  an overwhelming strategic nightmare. 
     A second factor also complicated the House deliberations. 
In the Senate, the chief sponsors of the bill, Senators Kennedy
and Harkin, were chairmen of the full committee and subcommittee
with jurisdiction.  In the House, however, Congressman Hoyer was
not even a member of any of the committees reviewing the bill. 
He was  responsible for shepherding . . . the bill through the
process,  explained Schulman, even though he had to do it without
committee authority, relying on forming relationships with
chairmen who often guarded their committee jurisdiction
jealously. Keeping everything together was a challenging task
indeed.  But Hoyer rose to the challenge.  As Neas said, he  put
on one of the best legislative shows of all time.   One cannot
underestimate Hoyer s importance.   Unless you have somebody who
is going to take responsibility for seeing that it all gets done
and there is some cohesion in the process,  Schulman said,  it
never would have happened.   
     Unless you have somebody who is going to take responsibility
for seeing that it all gets done and there is some cohesion in
the process, it never would have happened. 
          Melissa Schulman    Congressman Hoyer and staff member
Schulman were central players, if not the leaders, in every
aspect of the bill s development in the House cosponsorship,
hearings, committee review, negotiations, committee and floor
amendments, interactions with the White House, floor delibera
tions, conference proceedings, and crisis management.  They
feared that the committees might signif icantly weaken the bill,
and that the disability community might walk out of the process
in frustra tion.  Hoyer thus committed to meeting with any member
who wanted to discuss the bill. He even walked through a Giant
Food store with concerned parties to explore the practical impact
of the ADA.  Schulman remained confident that the bill would
pass.  But at times, she said,  it just looked next to
impossible. 
     The legislative process in the House also differed in a
third respect: the roles assumed by the business and disability
communities and the Bush administration.  The ADA went through
the Sen ate like a  blitzkrieg.   This had compelled many
business lobbyists essentially to throw in the towel with respect
to the Senate and strategically focus their efforts on the House. 
The disability community, on the other hand, had been very much
on the offensive throughout the Senate delibera tions, seeking to
persuade senators and the Bush administration to support its
goals for an accessible America.  Although many compromises had
to be made to achieve presidential and Senate support, the
disability community had been generally satisfied with an ADA
that emerged from the Senate.  And with respect to the Bush
administration, it had been an active participant in hammering
out a compromise bill that could win the endorsement of President
Bush, which Bush granted on August 2, 1989.
     Persons with disabilities were now more on the defensive. 
Their chief goal was to hold as much ground as possible, amidst
an onslaught of proposed revisions.The circumstances were much
different in the House.  While business groups worked extensively
with the Senate and the Bush ad ministration in developing a
compromise bill, activity was primarily in Washington: there were
only limited efforts to apply pressure on members from their
constituents at home.  But, during House deliberations, the
business community vigorously lobbied the House by mobilizing
constituent pressure.  By the time the ADA reached the House,
Mayerson said, the National Federation of Independent Business
(NFIB) was distributing  millions of flyers to every business
across the country.   Moreover, because of President Bush s
endorsement of the ADA, outright opposition was futile and apathy
was dangerous.  Barring an unexpected calamity, the bill was
going to pass, at least in some form.  If businesses wanted their
voice to make a difference and meet some of their objectives,
they had to support the overall concept of the bill.  Persons
with disabilities, on the other hand, were now more on the
defensive.  Their chief goal was to hold as much ground as
possible amidst an onslaught of proposed revisions.
     The disability community continually reminded opponents that
a Republican president backed the ADA.  Indeed, President Bush
was a strong advocate of the ADA and had been in the forefront of
promoting civil rights legislation for people with disabilities. 
By endorsing the negoti ated version of the ADA on August 2,
1989, President Bush set the stage for the House deliberations,
where passage consequently seemed imminent.  Attorney General
Richard Thornburgh most actively articulated the Bush
administration s support.  For example, on September 19,
Thornburgh wrote a powerful letter to the editor of the New York
Times on behalf of the ADA.  He underscored his and the
president s support of the ADA.  In particular, he challenged the
errors of a Times article for example, its allegation that there
had been  surprisingly narrow public scrutiny  of the ADA. 
Thornburgh described how the Bush administration, the Senate, and
interested parties had entered  painstaking negotiations  that
resulted in  a carefully balanced measure.  
     On October 12, Attorney General Thornburgh testified on
behalf of the administration, before the House Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights and gave a ringing endorsement of
the ADA.  He noted that many people with disabilities continue to
live  in an intolerable state of isolation and dependence  and
argued that the ADA could be  the vehicle that brings persons
with disabilities into the mainstream of American life.   It was
a  historic opportunity,  he said, to have the chance to help
move the ADA through Congress.  Thornburgh s testimony was
important because it demonstrated the Bush administration s
continued support of the ADA and reflected President Bush s
desire to see the ADA passed quickly.
     For the most part, however, compared with its intense and
consistent interaction with the Senate, the Bush administration
participated in the House deliberations only intermittently. 
Proponents of the ADA widely assumed that the administration
stayed in the background because the administration was willing
to let the House modify the bill and perhaps implement proposals
the administration had been unable to negotiate with the Senate. 
House Republicans, for their part, preferred that the White House
let them have the freedom to conduct their own analysis and
revisions of the bill.  House Democrats wanted the administration
to speak out more authoritatively on behalf of the negotiated
ADA, but they would settle for not having the administration
advocate any weakening amendments.  President Bush satisfied all
parties by remaining outside the fray.
     The House deliberations were also characterized by
ideological distinctions.  ADA supporters widely hailed the bill
as bipartisan legislation.  Indeed, in the final analysis the ADA
received overwhelming support from both parties 93 percent of the
vote in each chamber and at least 86 percent of the vote in each
party.  There were also key advocates on both sides of the aisle,
especially in the Senate, where Senators Harkin, Kennedy, Orrin
G. Hatch (R-UT), Dave Durenberger (R-MN), and Robert Dole (R-KS)
were deeply committed to the ADA.  Moreover, Republicans and
Democrats found common ground: they agreed  that it was a bad
idea to pay people not to work, to stay home.   Nevertheless, an
ideological fault line emerged between the interests of the
business and disability communities.  Republicans tended to vote
in favor of easing the demands imposed on business.  This became
evident during the Senate floor deliberations.  For example,
Senator Hatch s amendment to include a tax credit for businesses
(the only vote to be recorded) split along party lines.  Whereas
71 percent of Republicans supported the amendment, 64 percent of
Democrats opposed it.  In the House, the division was even more
clear.  For example, whereas 85 percent of Democratic committee
members were cosponsors of the ADA, only 10 percent of Republican
committee members were.  In the committees, members tended to
split along party lines regarding amendments that most viewed as
helping businesses.  
     It is important, however, not to lose sight of the enormous
area of agreement on the ADA, which was established in the course
of negotiations.  Although Republicans and Democrats had their
differences, it is a testament to their talents and commitment to
a laudable objective that they were largely able to put aside
partisanship to find common ground.
                 Lobbying & Grass Roots Activities
     For business organizations such as NFIB, the Senate
deliberations represented a failure.   The reason we failed in
the Senate,  said Wendy Lechner, the NFIB point person for the
ADA,  was we didn t have time to educate  the members.  The ADA
was  pushed through as motherhood and apple pie before we had a
chance to do anything.   In the House, therefore, the objective
was to  slow it down long enough for education.   NFIB was not
alone.  Largely under the direction of Nancy Reed Fulco of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, business groups formed the Disability
Rights Working Group to help mold the ADA.  Different
organizations focused on different provisions: NFIB and the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce devoted considerable attention to public
accommoda tions; the American Bus Association (ABA), the American
Public Transit Authority (APTA), and Greyhound examined
transportation issues; the National Restaurant Association (NRA),
the Cham ber of Commerce, and the National Association of
Manufacturers dealt with employment.  But they banded together to
lobby members of the House about their common concerns.  As
illustrated in the Senate testimony, business groups were not
completely opposed to the bill.   We really weren t trying to
deep-six it,  said Lechner.   We were really trying to get a
better bill, a more livable bill. 
     We really weren t trying to deep-six it.  We were really
trying to get a better bill, a more livable bill. 
          Wendy Lechner  To create a more  livable  bill,
representatives of covered entities developed a list of about 20
to 30 amendments.  Throughout the House deliberations they
continually updated this list, removing those changes that were
accomplished, and adding others as new issues arose.  And they
lobbied members of Congress to argue the need for those
amendments by issuing various position papers and visiting
members  offices.  In addition to lobbying inside Washing ton,
organizations such as NFIB sent out action alerts to their
members urging people to write their representatives, especially
those serving on committees.  Some opponents of the ADA took
their concerns about the ADA to the main stream media.
     Business groups had a number of overriding concerns.  One
was the  vagueness of language  contained in the ADA.  Business
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