From: Julie Dawson 
Subject: Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TXT  (fwd)
all of whom supported the rewrite of S. 933.  Accordingly, the
committee voted unanimously, 16 to 0, to report the ADA to the
Senate floor for final consideration.  The Senate, the Bush
administration, and the disability and business communities had
truly come a long way since January to achieve unanimous,
bipartisan support.  It was  one of the most extraordinary
legislative accomplishments I ve ever seen,  said Neas.  For the
disability community, it was a remarkable victory.  Moreover, the
compromise empowered President Bush, who had previously supported
the principles of the ADA, to endorse a specific version of the
bill.
     The Labor and Human Resources Committee voted unanimously,
16 to 0, to report the ADA to the Senate floor for final
consideration a remarkable victory for the disability
community.The Senate closed for recess just two days after the
mark-up, on August 4.  But while many members and their staffs
went on vacation, Senators Harkin and Kennedy continued to drive
the ADA forward to keep the momentum alive.  They wanted to make
the ADA one of the first items of business when the Senate
resumed on Sep tember 6.  This meant that the committee report
had to be filed by August 30 in order to give Senators and their
staffs ample time to review the issues.  For three weeks
Democratic and Republican Senate staff worked intensively with
the administration, the disability community, and the business
community to develop a report that established an accurate
historical record reflecting the various negotiated agreements. 
They completed a draft by August 22, and submitted the report to
accompany the substitute version of S. 933 on August 30.
     The speed with which the Labor and Human Resources Committee
moved the ADA shocked many senators and staff members.  When the
ADA came up for a vote on September 7, just a day after the
Senate reopened for the fall, some senators complained that
things had happened too quickly, that they did not have enough
time to review the legislation.  Others opposed the bill
outright.  Humphrey (R-NH) called it  one of the most radical
pieces of legislation I have encountered.   Senator Jesse Helms
(R-NC) cynically suggested the bill should be called the  Lawyers
Relief Act of 1989.   For the most part, however, senators
applauded the concepts of the ADA. In fact, by September 6 more
than 60 senators had signed on as cosponsors.
     Debate on the Senate floor lasted late into the night,
totaling over fourteen hours.  Although the fundamentals of the
bill were never threatened, several divisive issues emerged.  The
first was a proposed amendment by Senator Hatch, which would
provide a $5,000 tax credit to businesses for making
accommodations and modifications an alternative to a complete
exemption for small businesses from the public accommodations
provisions.  Hatch warned that the government was a potentially
 oppressive  institution and said that it was unfair to burden
small businesses with the costs of implementation without placing
any of the responsibility on the government.  Senator Lloyd
Bentsen (D-TX), however, argued that the amendment was a  killer
amendment  because all bills affecting revenue are
constitutionally required to come from the House.  Hatch
disagreed with Bentsen, as did a majority of the Senate.  But
since the Budget Act required a two-thirds majority for such
revenue amendments, the tax credit proposal failed.
     Near the end of the floor debate, shortly before 10:00 p.m.,
Senator Grassley introduced an amendment that brought Congress
under the purview of the ADA.  Senator Hatch had raised the issue
during the committee mark-up, but Senator Kennedy had cautioned
Hatch that the provision might kill the bill if introduced too
early.  On the Senate floor, Grassley argued that it was unfair
for the Senate to impose a burden on the American people without
sharing it.  Senator Wendell H. Ford (D-KY), however, argued that
such an amendment blurred the constitutional balance of powers by
giving the executive branch administrative control over Congress. 
Ford agreed with Senators Harkin and Kennedy that the ADA should
apply to Congress.  But he thought the issue should be considered
more carefully in conference, not passed hastily because people
were tired and wanted to go home.  Despite his objections, the
Senate approved the amendment (by counting the number of Senators
standing in favor of and against it) with the supposition that
the amendment only articulated intent: details would be worked
out in the House or in conference.
     A much more acrimonious debate centered on the definition of
disability.  Senator William L. Armstrong (R-CO) argued that the
definition of disability in the ADA was too broad.  He was
especially concerned about the inclusion of  mental disorders 
and disorders with a  moral con tent.   He questioned whether
senators thought homosexuality, bisexuality, exhibitionism, pedo
philia, voyeurism, and kleptomania should be protected by the
ADA.  Senator Jesse Helms shared Armstrong s concerns, especially
with respect to homosexuality, and feared that employers would no
longer be allowed to maintain  moral standards  in their
businesses.  Senator Kennedy, however, argued that prohibiting
discrimination against persons with HIV was crucial if the
epidemic was to be controlled, because people would otherwise be
less likely to reveal their illness.  And Senator Pete V.
Domenici (R-NM) cautioned against excluding persons with mental
illness, noting the recent recognition that such legendaries as
Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill struggled with bipolar
disorder.  Although Senators Kennedy and Harkin opposed unduly
restricting the definition, it appeared that the bill would not
go forward unless specific conditions or impair ments were
expressly excluded from the bill.  They thus worked with
Armstrong and Hatch for hours, in consultation with the
disability community, to prepare a list.  Senator Hatch typed the
amendment himself, and the Senate approved it by a voice vote.
     If it had become a Democratic bill, we would have lost. . .
. It had to be bipartisan. 
     Congressman Tony CoelhoWith these and several other smaller
amendments considered and resolved, the Senate finally voted on
the ADA.  In a remarkable demonstration of bipartisanship, the
Senate voted affirmatively by a count of 76 to 8.  This
bipartisanship was crucial for the ADA s success, because the
bill consequently entered the House deliberations as a coali tion
bill with the indispensable support of President Bush.  Without
the negotiations that had culminated in the support of Senators
Hatch and Dole and President Bush, the ADA might have been
labeled as a partisan initiative.   If it had become a Democratic
bill,  said Congressman Coelho,  we would have lost. . . . It had
to be bipartisan.   The ADA had indeed achieved a broad base of
support from both parties, but a difficult battle in the House of
Representa tives lay ahead.

  5
                   Fashioning a Durable ADA: 
                  The House of Representatives
Much more work had to be done to achieve the bipartisan support
that ADA advocates sought.  Hopes for quick passage were dashed;
debate in the House took nearly nine more months.The overwhelming
affirmative vote in the Senate contributed to the ADA s
remarkable momentum.  The intense negotiations with the White
House had resulted in a bill that earned President Bush s
endorsement, which essentially guaranteed passage of the bill in
some form.  The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources had
been unanimous in its support of the ADA. A grassroots disability
community had made its presence known on Capitol Hill by uniting
to advocate aggressively for the ADA.  Meanwhile, no considerable
opposition had organized.  By the time the Senate voted on
September 7, 1989, nearly half the House had cosponsored the
bill almost enough votes to pass it.  These factors led many
senators and the Bush administration to anticipate and hope for
swift passage in the House before year s end.  Other factors,
however, pointed to a more challenging process.
     Whereas 185 Democrats signed on as cosponsors (88 percent of
all House signatures), only 25 Republicans attached their names
to the bill.  Moreover, while House Democrats had worked with the
Senate in redrafting the ADA and were kept informed about the
negotiations with the administration, House Republicans had kept
their distance.  They did not contribute substantively to the
redrafting process; they also declined from participating in the
White House negotiations to avoid being bound by them, and
because they wanted to convey  that they were trying to look out
for [the] needs  of the business community.  Consequently, though
the Senate crafted a breakthrough compromise bill, House
deliberations would have to cover the same issues all over again. 
Much more work had to be done to achieve the bipartisan support
that ADA advocates sought.  Hopes for quick passage were dashed;
debate in the House took nearly nine more months.
                    Early Actions in the House
     Compared with the Senate, where there were powerful and
passionate advocates of disability in leadership positions on
both sides of the aisle, Republican and Democratic leadership in
the House, with the exception of Majority Whip Tony Coelho
(D-CA), were much more cautious. House Speaker James C. Wright,
Jr. (D-TX) and Majority Leader Thomas S. Foley (D-WA) were
skeptical of the ADA s wide-ranging impact and viewed the bill
more as a private agenda of Congressman Coelho than an issue of
national policy importance.   I had the leadership unwilling to
tell me no because it was me,  Coelho said.  But they were not
openly supportive and would have  killed  the ADA,  if it hadn t
been [for] my making it so personal.   Although in time the ADA
would come to be viewed as a leadership bill, largely because of
Coelho s status as Majority Whip, the initially weak support of
Democratic leadership placed Republicans in a position to shape
the ADA to their interests. 
     Congressman Coelho was the first member of the House to join
the campaign to pass the ADA.  He was the bill s sponsor both in
1988 and in 1989.  He also collaborated with Senators Tom Harkin
(D-IA) and Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) to rewrite the ADA and craft
a master strategy for passage.  House Republicans did not
demonstrate significant interest in the ADA until it entered
Congress for the second time in the spring of 1989.  The leader
among Republicans was Congress man Steve Bartlett (R-TX).  He had
played an integral role in recasting disability policy in terms
of independence and in issuing a mandate to the National Council
on the Handicapped (NCD) to review federal programs and make
recommendations.  Although he generally supported the proposals
in Toward Independence, Bartlett was cautious about the lead
recommendation pertaining to an equal opportunity law. 
Throughout 1988 he had watched the ADA from a distance.  But
after President- elect Bush promised support of an act similar to
the ADA at a pre-inaugural event on January 19, making passage
seem imminent, Bartlett decided to become involved to ensure that
it was a reason able bill. 
     In April, 1989, Congressman Bartlett joined with Minority
Leader Robert H. Michel (R-IL) and Congressman William F.
Goodling (R-PA) to propose a partnership with Congressman Coelho.
 We would like to work with you to develop a good bipartisan
bill,  they wrote to Coelho on April 25.   By working together,
we hope to develop language that we can agree upon, support, and
introduce together.   But the revised draft was already completed
and Bartlett, Michel, and Goodling did not cosponsor the ADA at
the time of its introduction.  Michel also wrote a letter to
President Bush, on April 26, urging him to join in the efforts of
working toward a bipartisan bill.  Such an effort, Michel said
 is appropriate, definitely warranted, and most importantly,
deserved by individu als with disabilities and others who will be
affected by it.   Bush fulfilled this request by working with the
Senate to develop a compromise bill. 
     Shortly into the House deliberations in the spring of 1989,
ADA supporters received a significant blow that paralleled the
1988 defeat of Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R-CT).  While
House Speaker Wright was under scrutiny for alleged ethics
violations, some members accused Congressman Coelho of violating
House ethical standards by investing in certain bonds.  Unlike
Wright, however, who dragged out his own investigation before
leaving Congress, Coelho promptly submitted his resignation,
effective June 15.  His commitment to the ADA influenced this
decision. Coelho had become a national leader for disability
policy. And, though he flatly denied the charges against him, he
feared that an investigation might, by association, embarrass the
disability commu nity and consequently hurt its prospects for
success on the ADA.  
     Although Congressman Coelho s career as a U.S.
Representative drew to a close, his advocacy for the ADA did not. 
According to Ralph Neas,  he played a key role, if not a crucial
role, on many different occasions with Democrats in the House and
the Senate, with Republicans in the House and the Senate, and
with President Bush, pushing the calendar on a number of
occasions, really helping get us through some difficult times.  
For example, he took the lead in the House cosponsorship drive
and capitalized on his personal attachment to the bill and the
trust he had cultivated among colleagues.  Moreover, though he
was a partisan Democrat, Coelho was well known for his desire to
bring opponents to his side by working to empower them with
shared ownership and finding common ground, rather than pitch
battles.  
     There was always the possibility that having to go through
four committees . . . could endanger some of the best and
strongest provisions. 
          Ralph Neas     Accordingly, Congressman Coelho joined
with Democratic Congressman Major R. Owens (D-NY), and Republican
Congressmen Silvio O. Conte (R-MA) and Hamilton Fish, Jr. (R-NY),
to facilitate cosponsorship.  In a letter to the rest of their
colleagues on June 1, they emphasized the Republican origins of
the bill through NCD and the problem of paying persons with
disabilities not to work.   Persons with disabilities want to be
productive, self-supporting, and tax-paying participants in
society,  they wrote.   This bill will grant them that dignity
and that right.  Because the ADA was a civil rights bill, ADA
supporters anticipated that members would read ily support it. 
Yet, despite the bipartisan effort, the process of enlisting
House cosponsors was slow: the issue of costs caused people to
hesitate. Whereas members often cosponsor a bill when certain
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