From: Julie Dawson 
Subject: Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TXT  (fwd)
actions available to remedy discrimination.  S. 2345 included
both administrative and civil remedies.  It granted
administrative agencies the authority to order  all appropriate
remedial relief  and gave individuals the right to sue in a
district court for both injunctive relief and monetary damages,
including punitive damages.  Drafters of S. 933, however, viewed
these remedial provisions as extreme and politically impossible. 
Therefore they introduced remedies tailored to each title.  Only
administrative remedies were available for the public
accommodations and telecommunications provisions.  Private right
to action was granted for employment and public services
provisions.  For employment discrimination, S. 933 also allowed
for punitive damages.
                   Building Support for S. 933
     Before publicly circulating the final draft of the bill,
Silverstein and Osolinik submitted it to a group of individuals
in the disability community for their approval.  On one occasion,
the two staff members were grilled for hours by persons with
disabilities who objected to the apparent weakening of the bill. 
Osolinik tried to explain that the bill could not be passed
without the proposed changes. Silverstein emphasized that the new
bill remained true to the original principles.   Some in the
disability community, however, were outraged.   Lots of people
felt let down,  said Bonnie O Day about the reactions at the
spring, 1989,  conference of the National Council on Independent
Living (NCIL).  Yet most agreed that it was dangerous to include
provisions that might endanger the entire bill.  Ultimately, the
disability community lent its support, persuaded that it was the
best that could be achieved politically.  This was crucial, for a
competing Republican bill might polarize the debate and kill the
ADA; unity behind S. 933 made it difficult for an alternative
proposal to gain a foothold.
     After the disability community backed S.933, the next task
for ADA supporters was to enlist the cosponsorship of members of
Congress and the endorsement of President Bush.  As in 1988, Liz
Savage coordinated a cosponsorship drive in conjunction with
House and Senate sponsors.  This time the drive was even more
aggressive, and it continued throughout the entire ADA
deliberations. At the same time, Justin Dart, Marilyn Golden, and
others throughout the disability community continued to mobilize
the national grass roots network.  Persons with disabilities
began writing letters urging their representatives to support the
ADA.
     On the Senate side, ADA advocates were especially interested
in enlisting the support of Senators Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT) and
Robert Dole (R-KS).  Hatch s support was extremely impor tant
because he was the ranking Republican on the Labor and Human
Resources Committee, and the rest of the committee Republicans
generally followed his lead in disability policy.  In December,
1988, Senator Harkin began meeting with Hatch personally, in
addition to consultations between their staffs.  Harkin had hoped
that Hatch s long and solid record of supporting persons with
disabilities would lead to his endorsement of the bill as chief
cosponsor.  As with Senators Kennedy and Harkin, Hatch had
personal experience with disability through his brother, who lost
the use of his legs from polio.  Hatch, however, had serious
reservations about the bill.  For example, he proposed more
limited remedies and the exemption of religious groups from the
public accommoda tions provisions.  He also wanted to coordinate
his position with the White House.  As a result, he declined
Harkin s invitation to be the lead cosponsor.  
     Senator Dole s support was crucial because, as Minority
Leader, he could wield considerable influence over the progress
of the ADA through Senate committees and on the Senate
floor.Instead, Senator Hatch directed his chief counsel, Mark
Disler, to draft an alternative bill. Disler had worked for
Bradford Reynolds in the attorney general s office during the
Reagan administration.  During the battles over President
Reagan s Task Force on Regulatory Relief, Disler had formed good
working relationships with Kemp and Wright and become much more
knowl edgeable about disability, which helped smooth working with
Senator Hatch s staff.  The bill Disler crafted was similar to S.
2345 in that it was short and focused on general principles of
nondiscrimination.  Rather than propose strong, detailed
requirements as in S. 933, it gave execu tive agencies the
responsibility and authority to create nondiscrimination
standards.
     Senator Hatch s actions were, nonetheless, ultimately
designed to aid in the ADA s passage. A quick endorsement of the
Harkin bill might have alienated other Republicans, whose support
was necessary for effective implementation.  Senator Dave
Durenberger (R-MN), whose advocacy for people with disabilities
stretched back to his tenure as chief of staff for the Governor
of Minnesota in the 1960s, explained that Hatch  in effect had to
stay off of the original bill in order to leverage Republican
support for the final product.   By drafting his own bill, Hatch
paved the way for achieving a broader base of consensus and
helped prevent filibustering on the Senate floor.
     Senator Dole s support was also crucial because, as Minority
Leader, he had the power to wield considerable influence over the
progress of the ADA through Senate committees and on the Senate
floor.  For example, he could discourage his party from
requesting that the ADA be referred to multiple committees, which
could delay or even kill the bill.  He could also help prevent
damag ing amendments from being introduced on the floor.  Similar
to Senator Hatch, Dole had a solid record on disability issues. 
He knew disability first-hand from the paralysis he incurred in
World War II.  On each anniversary of his injury, April 14, he
gave a speech about disability on the Senate floor.  In fact, he
devoted his first official speech in the Senate, on April 14,
1969, to the needs of the disability community.   It is a
minority group whose existence affects every person in our
society and the very fiber of our Nation,  said Dole.  He noted
that people with disabilities faced significant problems with
employment, income, health care, education, rehabilitation,
transporta tion, and access to public accommodations. 
Accordingly, he urged Congress to promote collabora tion between
the public and private sectors to improve opportunities for
persons with disabilities. He asserted his commitment to make
wise use of financial resources, but he wanted to do what was
necessary to achieve for people with disabilities  the
independence, security, and dignity  to which they are
 entitled.   Subsequently, in 1984, Dole established the Dole
Foundation, which he dedicated to improving the employment
prospects of persons with disabilities.
     Nevertheless, Senator Dole had reservations about the ADA. 
In part, he was ambivalent because he had talked with Senator
Charles E. Grassley (R-IA), Senator Harkin s fellow senator from
Iowa about introducing his own bill.  Dole, however, received a
flood of phone calls from the disability community urging him to
cosponsor Harkin s bill and abstain from introducing a competing
bill.  Crucial in shaping Dole s position on the ADA and
encouraging him to support it was one of his staff members,
Maureen West.  Paul Hearne, Executive Director of NCD and a
long-time associate of Dole, assisted West in educating the
senator about the ADA.  Dole refrained from introducing his own
bill.  But he also continued to withhold his support of S. 933,
even though he was one of fourteen original cosponsors of S.
2345.
     In addition to Senators Hatch and Dole, ADA supporters were
interested in enlisting the support of President Bush and his
administration.  President Bush had already spoken strongly on
behalf of civil rights legislation for people with disabilities
on multiple occasions.  And Senators Harkin and Kennedy had
consulted with the administration throughout the winter and
spring of 1989 for input on the development of S. 933.  Sometimes
these conversations were held person-to- person; at other times
they were mediated by members of the disability community, such
as Pat Wright and Justin Dart, who had very strong White House
connections.  The main goal, however, was to encourage the Bush
administration take a further step and endorse the version of the
ADA developed by Senators Harkin and Kennedy.  Faced with the
demands of forming an administration and lacking adequate
technical disability expertise, however, the White House did not
develop a firm position on the bill.  Harkin was actually ready
to introduce S. 933 in March, but he delayed its introduction at
the request of the administration.  By April, ADA supporters
decided they simply had to move forward with the bill, with or
without President Bush.  Accordingly, Senator Harkin scheduled
the introduction of S. 933 for May 9, 1989, at which time
Congressman Coelho would also introduce the companion bill, H.R.
2273.  Although ADA supporters were unsuccessful in securing the
cosponsorship of Hatch and Dole and the endorsement of Bush, the
congressional cosponsorship drive was effective.  By May 9, the
bill had acquired 33 Senate cosponsors and 84 House cosponsors.
     In consultation with Congressman Coelho, Senators Kennedy
and Harkin developed a strategy for maneuvering the ADA through
Congress.  They decided to begin the ADA deliberations in the
Senate.  The Senate would be more manageable because of its rules
for legislative delibera tions.  Whereas in the House a bill went
to all committees with partial jurisdiction, in the Senate a bill
went only to one committee, whichever had the preponderance of
jurisdiction (subsequent referrals to additional committees could
be requested).  Moreover, Kennedy and Harkin were chairmen of the
committee and subcommittee with jurisdiction.  Kennedy s
Committee on Labor and Human Resources also had a comfortable
Democratic majority.  And the ranking Republicans of both the
committee and subcommittee Senators Orrin Hatch and Dave
Durenberger were strong supporters of disability policy.  
Furthermore, the Senate had a better working relationship with
the administration.  Given the importance of bringing the
administration on board, it was wise to tailor strategy to its
interests. 
     Senators Harkin and Kennedy hoped to push the ADA through
the Senate as rapidly as possible with minimal alterations.  They
feared that lengthy deliberations would increase the chance of
losing control of how the ADA was characterized in public debate. 
Kennedy thus proposed going to mark-up before the Fourth of July
recess and to the Senate floor before the August recess.  The
House would then proceed with the version passed by the Senate,
which would help limit the discrepancy between House and Senate
versions and smooth conference deliberations.
     Senate sponsors scheduled three hearings for May 9, 10, and
16; they devoted April to preparing for them.  (See Appendix D
for a chronology of legislative action on the ADA.)  They hoped
to prevent any surprises by getting the facts in order and
crafting responses to anticipated opposition.  Silverstein turned
to those who knew disability the best: members of the disability
community.  He developed a list of about 100 questions and asked
representatives of the disability community to explain, based on
their experiences at the local level, how various covered
entities would respond to ADA provisions.  Osolinik and
Silverstein then prepared thick briefing books based on the
responses.  They also worked with the disability community to
select witnesses to testify on each aspect of the bill.  Unlike
the hearings of 1988, the 1989 Senate hearings would include very
detailed, technical analyses of the ADA, with a balance of
testimony from those who supported the legislation outright and
those who promoted changes.  Accordingly, the business community
and other covered entities were gearing up for the hearings and
working with Senate leaders to identify effective witnesses.  On
May 5, for example, just before the bill s introduction, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce sponsored the first of several meetings for
all business organiza tions to discuss their strategy for the
ADA, which culminated in their testimony before Congress.
Subsequently, a group of business organizations formed a
coalition called the Disability Rights Working Group.
        Senate Hearings and the Quest for Bipartisanship
     Senate Hearings on S. 933 began in the Dirksen Senate Office
Building on Tuesday morning, May 9, 1989.  Ranking minority
member Senator Hatch set the stage for the hearings in his
opening statement.  I support a comprehensive civil rights bill
for persons with disabilities,  Hatch declared unambiguously. 
But he also stated he had  serious concerns.   Hatch challenged
the extension of public accommodations provisions beyond those
establishments covered under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  He
promoted an exemption for small businesses.  He also opposed
provisions for remedies that included monetary and punitive
damages.  Moreover, Hatch stated that his reservations concerning
S.933 might compel him to introduce his own bill, or support a
different bill, presumably one introduced by Senator Dole.
     We can be productive, if you will give us that right, give
us that opportunity.  That is all we ask for, nothing more, but
definitely nothing less. 
          Congressman Tony CoelhoTraditionally the administration
offers the lead testimony on major bills, but by May 9 the Bush
administration had still not developed a formal position.  In
fact, the White House had to cancel a May 1 Rose Garden press
conference with Senate leadership, which had been designed to
promote the ADA.   Consequently, Congressman Coelho was the lead
witness.  He was selected to open the deliberations not only
because he was the sponsor of the identical ADA bill introduced
in the House; he also poignantly symbolized the ADA.  In his
senior year of college, Coelho learned he had epilepsy reputed by
some to be demonic pos session.  As a result, he was barred from
the Catholic priesthood and his familial relationships were
severely strained.   I was suicidal and I was down,  Coelho said
of his experience with discrimination. But Bob Hope took him into
his own home and encouraged him to pursue his ministry through
pub lic service.  
     Congressman Coelho met with considerable success after
following Hope s advice and beginning a government career. 
Elected to Congress in 1978, he became Chairman of the Demo
cratic Congressional Campaign committee in 1981.  Five years
later, he was elected Majority Whip. He also became a national
leader in disability issues, which included service as Director
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