"John Edser"  wrote in message
news:cdd2qu$2s25$1{at}darwin.ediacara.org...
[I am snipping all but what I consider to be the core of this disagreement.]
> > > > JM:
> > > > Theorem 1. [Hamilton] Under certain circumstances (rb>c)
> > > > it is possible for a gene to spread in a population,
> > > > when the effect of the gene is to cause its carriers to act
> > > > altruistically (at cost to their own Darwinian fitness,
> > > > but at benefit to the Darwinnian fitnesses of the fortunate
> > > > beneficiaries of the action).
>
> > > JE:-
> > > Theorem 1: Not true. An absolute reduction
> > > in fitness cannot be selected FOR. All
> > > theorem 1 measures is a reduction in just
> > > the RELATIVE fitness of the actor. This
> > > measure CANNOT discriminate between real
> > > and just phoney altruism because Axiom 1
> > > remains true.
>
> > JM:-
> > Of course, as anyone who followed my debate with
> > Dr. Hoelzer will know, I am not claiming that
> > an absolute reduction in fitness will be selected
> > for.  I am claiming that genes whose direct effect
> > on the bearer is to reduce absolute fitness will
> > be selected for.
>
> JE:-
> When all fitnesses are measured in exactly
> the _same_ units: Darwinian fitness units,
> then "claiming that genes whose direct effect
> on the bearer is to reduce absolute fitness will
> be selected for" is logically equivalent to
> "an absolute reduction in fitness will be selected
> for".

What you say seems "obvious", John, but it is wrong.
Here is the proof:

All fitnesses are measured in the units you prefer -
absolute counts of the number of offspring raised to
sexual maturity.

The genes in question definitely have the direct effect of
reducing the absolute fitness of the organisms that carry
them.  This is real altruism - for example, organisms that
have the "bad luck" of inheriting these genes can be expected
to have fewer maturing offspring (0.2 fewer on average, say)
than organisms born into the same situation, but not inheriting
those genes.  "c" in this case is 0.2.  Having these genes
"costs" you.  That is the direct effect.  Up until 1963, it is
the only effect that anyone thought mattered.

But there is also an indirect effect - not directly caused by
the genes, but correlated with the genes.  The fortunate
beneficiaries of the altruism raise more offspring to maturity
(0.5 more on average, say) than do organisms in the same situation
who do not benefit from altruism.  That is, "b" in this case
is 0.5.  Now, there is no direct genetic causality involved in
whether you are a beneficiary or not.  There is not some kind
of "pleasant personality" gene that makes other organisms "want"
to help you.  It is purely a matter of "luck" - either the organisms
around you are altruistic or they are not, and it is a matter of
luck whether you happen to be born into an altruistic environment.

Now, some organisms will have both "bad luck", and "good luck".
They will have the bad luck to inherit the genes that directly
cause them to behave in a costly altruistic fashion.  But they
may have the good luck to also be the beneficiaries of someone
else's altruism.  Their genes directly caused the "bad luck"
but are not directly causally related to the "good luck".

But .... The fact that you have the "bad luck" genes means
that your parents are more likely than average to have had
the "bad luck" genes as well.  And that means that your
siblings are also more likely than average to have inherited
those "bad luck" genes.  But your sibling's "bad luck" is your
"good luck".  If he is an altruist, then you are likely to be
a beneficiary.  That is, your genes for altruism have the
direct effect of giving you the "bad luck" of 0.2 fewer mature
offspring.  But they also have the indirect effect of giving
you an increased chance of the good luck of 0.5 more mature
offspring.  How much of an increased chance?  Well, when you
do the math, it turns out that the increased probability of
being a beneficiary is Hamilton's "r".

Obviously, the direct effect "bad luck" can be selected against.
Can the indirect effect "good luck" be selected for?  Yes it can.
When does selection for "good luck" outweigh selection against
"bad luck"?  When rb>c.  Quod erat demonstratum.

That is Hamilton's logic.  It has nothing to do with the difference
between relative and absolute fitnesses.  People were using
relative fitnesses in preference to absolute fitnesses long before
Hamilton came along.  Hamilton's logic for altruism works with
either relative or absolute fitness.  It is only his logic for
spite that requires the use of relative fitnesses to "make sense".

You tend to see your dispute with neo-Darwinism as being one
big dispute.  Actually, it is several smaller separate
disputes.  The Hamilton correctness issue is separate from the
Hamilton motivation issue and separate from the epistemology/
relative/absolute issue, at least in my mind.  I think that it
would help you if you tried to keep them separate in your own
mind as well.  You might find it easier to find people willing
to discuss these issues with you if you didn't always insist on
discussing all of these issues at once.
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