From: "Mark" 

"John Beamish"  wrote in
message news:416ab563{at}w3.nls.net...
> We may be looking at different "tools".  I tend to see them
as legislative
> and judicial while your comment brings in a broader panorama including
> inter-agency and intra-agency processes.

Yes, my thoughts were in a different plane than your own.

>  (btw, as for the FBI and CIA not
> talking, I'm not certain that is necessarily a bad thing.  The FBI is
> charged with upholding the law; the CIA is not restrained by that
> stricture.)

Essentially, I think, that lack of ability to talk was a left-over mind-set
from the paranoia of the 60s and I don't necessarily find all that much
fault with that outlook in the context of the times. However, post WTC-1993
it seems to me that breaking down that wall, at least to a degree, would
have been more prudent than strengthening it.

> My perception is that there were already sufficient tools in place and
> that
> the issue wasn't the tools but, rather, a failure to give the threat a
> level
> of importance commensurate with the information already flowing in.

While I still believe improved tools are necessary, your point is well
taken, there was not enough concern about world events throughout the 90s
and early 00s, whose importance seem obvious in hindsight.

> My perception, again, is that a variety of recently legislatively enacted
> tools
> are unlikely to withstand court challenges and the direct fallout from
> that
> will be cases dismissed because of the way the "evidence"
was gathered.

I'm not thinking of it in terms of taking cases to court, I'm thinking of
the usefulness in uncovering terrorist cells abroad and taking them out
before they're able to execute their plots or direct the cells that already
exist here to do so. According to Richard Miniter in "Shadow
War," we've killed or captured over 3,000 al Qaeda operatives in 102
countries since 9/11. We had special forces on the way to Afghanistan
within 24 hours of 9/11 and the Brits joined us there in less than a week
to gather intelligence from already captured al Qaeda that was used to help
plan the air strikes that began on 10/7/01.

> So ... the threat was certainly already well identified with the bombings
> of
> two US embassies, the Cole and the first attack on the Towers.  Because of
> that, Clinton was already aware of the on-going nature of the threat

Yes he was, but absent the the successful attack on the WTC, he had neither
the urgency nor the political capital to do more than he did. As didn't the
incoming Bush administration, who, BTW, had considerable trouble in getting
their appointees briefed in a timely manner due to the limbo in the
election and also met with a much more contentious confirmation process for
the same reason. Miniter believes that's the primary reason that Tenet was
retained - too bad IMHO.

> and passed that information along to the incoming administration and it
> was
> their set of priorities (not the tool set) that governed their subsequent
> actions.  I think it has been well (possibly conclusively) documented that
> the current administration in spite of all the information flows made a
> conscious decision to focus elsewhere.

I don't believe any such thing has been documented, conclusively or
otherwise. Indeed, they had plans for sending the CIA over to Afhanistan
with $200M to better arm the Northern Alliance, set up more listening posts
and begin a military affront on the Taliban beyond sending some cruise
missiles in. That plan was finalized in August and though too late to
thwart 9/11 (probably 5 years too late), I'm sure it was helpful that it
had already been hatched when the CIA headed out on 9/12 for Afghanistan.

> And that brings us to the second item:  if the new processes (your broader
> term) or new legislation (mine) were in place, can there be any assurance
> that the attack on the towers would have been prevented.  Clearly, there
> can
> not be such assurance.

No, there cannot be any ironclad assurance of success in any operation.

> In short ... it's not that the existing American "tools"
prevented timely
> handling of information flows concerning the impending attack but, rather,
> it was an unintended consequence of other policies and initiatives.  Well,
> policies are the perogative of governments and they will change from
> administration to administration.  But blaming the tools instead of the
> policies for events is not placing the onus for accountability where it
> correctly belong.

Of course the administration(s) bear ultimate responsibility for
interpreting and acting on information, but I don't really blame either
Clinton or Bush for not acting sooner, it was a less urgent 9/10 world and
neither had the political capital to take extensive action, such as a
full-scale attack on Afghanistan. So, no I don't blame the tools
exclusively, but do feel in today's environment that it is a good thing
that they've been strengthened.

--- BBBS/NT v4.01 Flag-5