Michael Ragland wrote:

> Comment: I think only a fool would insist good and evil don't exist in
> the world. As a "general principle", however, I don't think Darwinian
> evolution results in caring and compassionate organisms. 

My take on this is that natural selection is "inadvertently"
manufacturing morality (via cultural evolution, i.e., the
evolution or rationality) at a faster rate than she can
eliminate it via her customary genteel technique of
dealing with inefficiency, as explained in my response
to a poster to another egroup:

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Price, Michael E wrote:

 >>>>
 >>>> Phil Roberts wrote:  "Could you offer some insight
as to why you
 >>>> believe "transcendence" [of selfish genes]
should be construed as
 >>>> an explanatory non-starter?"
 >
 >>
 >> I respond:  Because it's impossible.  We are our genes, we can't
 >> transcend them.


The fact that everything is the product of natural selection in
one way or another does not mean we are required to assume that
everything produced by natural selection is necessarily adaptive
(panadaptionism).  Indeed, in response to a similar remark by Carmi I
offered a hypothetical scenario in which we might evision how nature
could have begun to loose her grip on our values.  Perhaps you missed
it, or simply found it implausible.  In either case, I would appreciate
your feedback on the matter.  Here is a repeat of my response to
Carmi:

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Let me suggest a hypothetical mechanism, actually first
identified by Hume (1739), that I believe might
challenge the genetic determinism advocated by the likes of
Wilson, de Waal, Arnhart and yourself, and argued against
by Dawkins, Gould, and implicitly a number of others (e.g.,
Hamilton). It forms the centerpiece of the paper I have URL'd
at the bottom of the page. Assume for the sake of argument that:

       'An increase in cognitive objectivity (knowledge, cognitive
        competence, wisdom, intelligence, etc.) "facilitates" an
        increase in valuative objectivity (valuative impartiality)
        IRRESPECTIVE OF ITS ADAPTIVENESS.

This is analogous to the thesis developed in Kohlberg, 1981, only
postulated to transpire in cultures in much the manner Kohlberg
has postulated moral maturity as a function of cognitive
development in the individual.

Notice that valuative impartiality would be THE OPPOSITE of the
"ruthless selfishness" Dawkins and others have claimed to be
the predicted norm based on our formal models.

     Unlike [Lorentz and Montagu], I think 'nature red in
     tooth and claw' sums up our modern understanding of
     natural selection admirably. (Dawkins).

Since valuative impartiality is the exact OPPOSITE of the
"ruthless selfishness" Dawkins and others believe to be
what nature is selecting for, at least as represented in
our formal models, we almost certainly would not find
the effects of this mechanism resulting in anything approaching
full impartiality.  More than likely, we would probably
find a species with a valuative profile somewhat "red-shifted"
toward valuative impartiality relative to the predictions of our
formal models, perhaps more aptly described as benevolently
selfish as opposed to the predicted "ruthless selfishness".
Another way of saying this is that, via our mysterious X
factor, nature is "inadvertently" manufacturing benevolence
(and emotional instability) at a faster rate than she can
eliminate it via her customary genteel culling procedures.

Its also interesting to note that there are two sides to the
valuative impartiality coin.  Not only would we expect to
observe an increase in non-self-serving concern for non-
related others (e.g., concern for the suffering of a bird
with a broken wing) but we might also expect to find
A RELATIVIZING of self-value which might readily manifest
itself in precisely the sort of feelings of worthlessness
underlying the emotion of guilt we observe in man.

Of course, we're talking here about something that might
transpire over millennia of cultural evolution, the evolution
of rationality itself, you might say.  And because we are
talking about rational creatures here, who might well be LESS
DETERMINED than other creatures, or at least far more
individualized, we are going to pick up lots
of variation, not only in individuals, but in cultures as well.
So we will find deviations from this mechanism, unlike the
mechanisms that determine the behavior of a car engine, which
is why I used the term "facilitates" rather than "causes".  But
even so, one might speculate that the effects of such a mechanism
might be generally visible anywhere in the universe where
rationality has had sufficient time to evolve, albeit with
plenty of deviations (e.g., Ted Bundy, the Nazi regime, etc.).

      But for the new view of science, there may be no description
      such that for some events the formula, "whenever this, than
      that" applies. On this view, the world is radically open
      (Manicas and Secord, 1981).


In the final section of my paper I couple the mechanism to
the theory of natural selection via a simple cost/benefit
analysis as follows:


      Sustaining the Mechanism

      In its most simplistic formulation, accounting
      for the sustained presence of a mechanism presumed
      to produce maladaptive values (deviations from the
      predicted profile) is simply a matter of assuming
      that developments in our cognitive profile have
      enhanced our ability to survive to such a degree
      that it more than compensates for the dissipation
      in the resolve to do so.

      In other words, the less than optimal valuative
      profile has simply been TOLERATED by natural
      selection as a necessary premium for reaping the
      adaptive rewards that attend a rational species.
      Paradoxically, this would also entail the intriguing
      implication that, conatively and valuatively at
      least, we have become LESS DETERMINED by natural
      selection as a result of natural selection.  Or,
      if you prefer, the reason we turned out like Captain
      Kirk (emotional) instead of Mr. Spock, or more like
      Mother Teresa (altruistic) than Joseph Stalin, has
      been more a matter of psychodynamic necessity than
      of adaptive utility.

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PR
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