From: "Rich Gauszka" 


"James Adams"  wrote in message
news:43621730$1{at}w3.nls.net...
> >
>>
>>The targets -- thousands of light trucks, cargo bicycles, even
>>porters, spread over thousands of miles of mostly tree-covered trails
>>-- simply weren't concentrated enough to make it worthwhile. It was
>>certainly bad news for those in the wrong place at the wrong time --
>>but the bottom-line question is how much our opponents were
>>constrained by supply shortages, and the answer seems to be not that
>>much.
>
> An instructor I had in Intel school when I was in the USMC, said he was
> asked by some Air Force types what he thought of the effects of ArcLight
> in I Corps.  He told them they had really knocked  hell out of the babbon
> population.
>
LOL!

There were quite a few attempts to create a barrier. The link has a good
history of the barrier concept and it's problems in Vietnam

http://www.chss.montclair.edu/english/furr/pbmcnamara.html

 Between 1966 and 1971 the Trail was used to infiltrate 630,000 troops,
100,000 tons of food, 400,000 weapons, and 50,000 tons of ammunition into
South Vietnam.41 The harder the US tried to interdict the trail the more
sophisticated it became. In the early days most infiltration on the trail
was by human porters walking on narrow paths. By 1972 it contained paved
roads capable of handling armored vehicles and a petroleum pipeline. CIA
Director Richard Helms offered the following comment on the effectiveness
of the US interdiction program in Laos:
  "Look: before the bombing they used to send three men south to get two in
place. Now they have to send five. We're willing to lose planes, they're
willing to pay in manpower. So it doesn't make a particle of difference.
There are more dead bodies. But in terms of net result, it doesn't make a
damned bit of difference."42

--- BBBS/NT v4.01 Flag-5