JF>>     Reports vary.  Former FBI agent Ali Soufan, told a Senate
JF>> Judiciary  subcommittee that the use of tougher interrogation
JF>> techniques was  "counterproductive".   However, former
CIA officer,
JF>> John Kiriakou,  said in 2007 that 35 seconds of waterboarding caused
JF>> Zubaydah to  reveal key intelligence that allowed the U.S. to
JF>> prevent several  terrorist attacks.

 RW> WOuld agree with that.  But, as I said elsewhere, the
 RW> questioning imho is quite legitimate.  SInce it was done in
 RW> the name of the American people we darned sure have a right
 RW> to ask whether or not it was truly effective, whether we
 RW> were able to stop what was coming in the planning stages,
 RW> and the real rpoof in the pudding, whether any trials etc.
 RW> are going to result that won't be compromised by the
 RW> "enhanced" techniques.

 And it didn't do much good.


 **************************************************************************

 Testimony of Ali Soufan

 May 13, 2009

 ...


 The issue that I am here to discuss today, interrogation
 methods used to question terrorists, is not, and should not
 be, a partisan matter. We all share a commitment to using the
 best interrogation method possible that serves our national
 security interests and fits squarely within the framework of our
 nation's principles.

 From my experience, and I speak as someone who has personally
 interrogated many terrorists and elicited important actionable
 intelligence? I strongly believe that it is a mistake to use
 what has become known as the "enhanced interrogation
 techniques," a position shared by many professional operatives,
 including the CIA officers who were present at the initial
 phases of the Abu Zubaydah interrogation.

 These techniques, from an operational perspective, are
 ineffective, slow and unreliable, and as a result harmful to
 our efforts to defeat al Qaeda. (This is aside from the

 ...


 And my focus is on the future. I wish to do my part to ensure
 that we never again use these harmful, slow, ineffective, and
 unreliable techniques instead of the tried, tested, and
 successful ones, the ones that are also in sync with our values
 and moral character. Only by doing this will we defeat the
 terrorists as effectively and quickly as possible.

 Most of my professional career has been spent investigating,
 studying, and interrogating terrorists. I have had the privilege
 of working alongside, and learning from, some of the most
 dedicated and talented men and women our nation has? individuals
 from the FBI, and other law enforcement, military, and
 intelligence agencies. In my capacity as a FBI Agent, I
 investigated and supervised highly sensitive and complex
 international terrorism cases, including the East Africa
 bombings, the USS Cole bombing, and the events surrounding the
 attacks of 9/11. I also coordinated both domestic and
 international counter-terrorism operations on the Joint
 Terrorist Task Force, FBI New York Office.

 I personally interrogated many terrorists we have in our
 custody and elsewhere, and gained confessions, identified terror
 operatives, their funding, details of potential plots, and
 information on how al Qaeda operates, along with other
 actionable intelligence. Because of these successes, I was the
 government's main witness in both of the trials we have had so
 far in Guantanamo Bay, the trial of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a
 driver and bodyguard for Osama Bin Laden, and Ali Hamza Al
 Bahlul, Bin Laden's propagandist. In addition I am currently
 helping the prosecution prepare for upcoming trials of other
 detainees held in Guantanamo Bay.


 **************************************************************************

 ...

 RW> SO let's ask the folks who were there what they got.  LEt's
 RW> see concrete proof of the operations they derailed, let's
 RW> see who's going to trial.  THis the American people have a
 RW> right to see, and a right to ask that it be produced.  You
 RW> might actually be surprised if the proof is brought forth.
 RW> Most folks probably don't give a rat's rear end if you
 RW> waterboarded a few qaedas, as long as ew really got
 RW> something good for it.


 **************************************************************************
 There are many examples of successful interrogations of
 terrorists that have taken place before and after 9/11. Many of
 them are classified, but one that is already public and mirrors
 the other cases, is the interrogation of al Qaeda terrorist
 Nasser Ahmad Nasser al-Bahri, known as Abu Jandal. In the
 immediate aftermath of 9/11, together with my partner Special
 Agent Robert McFadden, a first-class intelligence operative from
 the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), (which, from my
 experience, is one of the classiest agencies I encountered in
 the intelligence community), I interrogated Abu Jandal. Through
 our interrogation, which was done completely by the book
 (including advising him of his rights), we obtained a treasure
 trove of highly significant actionable intelligence. For
 example, Abu Jandal gave us extensive information on Osama Bin
 Laden's terror network, structure, leadership, membership,
 security details, facilities, family, communication methods,
 travels, training, ammunitions, and weaponry, including a
 breakdown of what machine guns, rifles, rocket launchers, and
 anti-tank missiles they used. He also provided explicit details
 of the 9/11plot operatives, and identified many terrorists who
 we later successfully apprehended.
 **************************************************************************

 ...

 RW> get something concrete for your trouble .  GEt the
 RW> location of a nest of Qaeda snakes to kill if nothing else.

 **************************************************************************
 The information was important for the preparation of the war in
 Afghanistan in 2001. It also provided an important background
 to the 9/11 Commission report; it provided a foundation for the
 trials so far held in Guantanamo Bay; and it also has been
 invaluable in helping to capture and identify top al Qaeda
 operatives and thus disrupt plots. The approach used in these
 successful interrogations can be called the Informed
 Interrogation Approach. Until the introduction of the "enhanced"
 technique, it was the sole approach used by our military,
 intelligence, and law enforcement community.

 ...

 For example, in my first interrogation of the terrorist Abu
 Zubaydah, who had strong links to al Qaeda's leaders and who
 knew the details of the 9/11 plot before it happened, I asked
 him his name. He replied with his alias. I then asked him, "how
 about if I call you Hani?" That was the name his mother
 nicknamed him as a child. He looked at me in shock, said "ok,"
 and we started talking. The Army Field Manual is not about
 being nice or soft. It is a knowledge-based approach. It is
 about outwitting the detainee by using a combination of
 interpersonal, cognitive, and emotional strategies to get the
 information needed. If done correctly it's an approach that
 works quickly and effectively because it outwits the detainee
 using a method that he is not trained, or able, to resist. This
 Informed Interrogation Approach is in sharp contrast with the
 harsh interrogation approach introduced by outside contractors
 and forced upon CIA officials to use. The harsh technique method
 doesn't use the knowledge we have of the detainee's history,
 mindset, vulnerabilities, or culture, and instead tries to
 subjugate the detainee into submission through humiliation and
 cruelty. The approach applies a force continuum, each time

 ...

  continue until the detainee's will is broken and he
 automatically gives up all information he is presumed to know.
 There are many problems with this technique.

 A major problem is that it is ineffective. Al Qaeda terrorists
 are trained to resist torture. As shocking as these techniques
 are to us, the al Qaeda training prepares them for much worse,
 the torture they would expect to receive if caught by
 dictatorships for example. This is why, as we see from the
 recently released Department of Justice memos on interrogation,
 the contractors had to keep getting authorization to use harsher
 and harsher methods, until they reached waterboarding and then
 there was nothing they could do but use that technique again and
 again. Abu Zubaydah had to be waterboarded 83 times and Khalid
 Shaikh Mohammed 183 times. In a democracy there is a glass
 ceiling of harsh techniques the interrogator cannot breach, and
 a detainee can eventually call the interrogator's bluff.

 In addition the harsh techniques only serves to reinforce what
 the detainee has been prepared to expect if captured. This gives
 him a greater sense of control and predictability about his
 experience, and strengthens his will to resist.

 ...


 As you can see from this timeline, many of the claims made in
 the memos about the success of the enhanced techniques are
 inaccurate. For example, it is untrue to claim Abu Zubaydah
 wasn't cooperating before August 1, 2002. The truth is that we
 got actionable intelligence from him in the first hour of
 interrogating him.

 In addition, simply by putting together dates cited in the
 memos with claims made, falsehoods are obvious. For example, it
 has been claimed that waterboarding got Abu Zubaydah to give up
 information leading to the capture of Jose Padilla. But that
 doesn't add up: Waterboarding wasn't approved until 1August 2002
 (verbally it was authorized around mid July 2002), and Padilla
 was arrested in May 2002.

 The same goes for KSM's involvement in 9/11: That was
 discovered in April 2002, while waterboarding was not introduced
 until almost three months later. It speaks volumes that the
 quoted instances of harsh interrogation methods being a success
 are false.

 Nor can it be said that the harsh techniques were effective,
 which is why we had to be called back in repeatedly. As we know
 from the memos, the techniques that were apparently introduced
 after I left did not appear to work either, which is why the
 memos granted authorization for harsher techniques. That
 continued for several months right till waterboarding was
 introduced, which had to be used 83 times, an indication that
 Abu Zubaydah had called the interrogator's bluff knowing the
 glass ceiling that existed.

 ...

 It is also important to realize that those behind this
 technique are outside contractors with no expertise in
 intelligence operations, investigations, terrorism, or al Qaeda.
 Nor did the contractors have any experience in the art of
 interview and interrogation. One of the contractors told me this
 at the time, and this lack of experience has also now been
 recently reported on by sources familiar with their backgrounds.

 **************************************************************************

 There is a whole lot more to this.

 www.snipurl.com/terrortestimony


BOB KLAHN bob.klahn{at}sev.org   http://home.toltbbs.com/bobklahn

... Blessed are the meek, for they make great scapegoats.
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