This Echo is READ ONLY !   NO Un-Authorized Messages Please!
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~   ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

For Immediate Release
CAIB PA 36-03

Date: June 27, 2003
Contact:  Laura Brown, 703-416-3532 or 281-467-8657


Columbia Accident Investigation Board
Issues Preliminary Recommendation Three:
On-Orbit/On-Station TPS Inspection and Repair Capability

ARLINGTON, VA - The Columbia Accident Investigation Board today
issued its third preliminary recommendation to the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, in advance of its appearance in
the final report. 

Recommendation Three:
Before return to flight, for missions to the International Space
Station (ISS,) develop a practicable capability to inspect and effect
emergency repairs to the widest possible range of damage to the
Thermal Protection System (TPS,) including both tile and Reinforced
Carbon Carbon (RCC,) taking advantage of the additional capabilities
available while in proximity to and docked at the ISS.

Before return to flight, for non-station missions, develop a
comprehensive autonomous (independent of station) inspection and
repair capability to cover the widest practicable range of damage
scenarios. 

An on-orbit TPS inspection should be accomplished early on all
missions, using appropriate assets and capabilities.

The ultimate objective should be a fully autonomous capability for
all missions, to address the possibility that an ISS mission does not
achieve the necessary orbit, fails to dock successfully, or suffers
damage during or after undocking.

Facts:

At present there is no certified on-orbit or on-station capability to
inspect the orbiter TPS for damage, or to effect repairs.


Past efforts, some predating STS-1, have not resulted in an
operational capacity.

Changes in imaging and inspection capabilities, materials technology,
and the access provided by the ISS have greatly improved the
prospects for deploying this capability.

Finding:

An inspection of the TPS, accomplished as soon as possible after
achieving orbit/rendezvous, coupled with repair capability, would
result in improved safety.

Background:

The Board is convinced of the necessity of taking all practicable
steps to "de-couple" foam insulation shedding from loss of crew and
vehicle, including: 1) design improvements to prevent foam shedding;
2) toughening the TPS; 3) improved TPS inspection and repair
capability. 

An inspection and repair capability is fundamental to improving the
ability of the orbiter to experience TPS damage without catastrophic
consequences. 

This effort does not reduce the urgency or importance of aggressively
reducing all sources of potential damage to the orbiter. Only by
reducing the likelihood of damage to the orbiter, as well as
developing the ability to detect and repair damage, can the maximum
safety improvement be realized. 

During the STS-107 flight and investigation, the lack of repair
capability was cited repeatedly, and may have been a factor in
decisions made during the STS-107 mission, including the decision not
to seek images which might have assisted in the assessment of damage
resulting from the foam strike on ascent.

 - END OF FILE -
==========

@Message posted automagically by IMTHINGS POST 1.30
---